Artikel Hukum Gratis

DAFTAR ISI
BAB 1 PENGANTAR
BAB 2 LATAR BELAKANG NEGOSIASI TRIMs
Addendum: Canada Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act,
Report of the Panel, 7 February 1984.
BAB 3 NEGOSIASI TRIMs DALAM PUTARAN URUGUAY (URUGUAY ROUND)
BAB 4 PERJANJIAN WTO MENGENAI TRIMS
Addendum: Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
BAB 5 ARTI PENTING PERJANJIAN TRIMs
BAB 6 PERKEMBANGAN PERJANJIAN TRIMs DALAM KONPERENSI TINGKAT TINGGI
WTO
BAB 7 SENGKETA PENANAMAN MODAL DI WTO: SENGKETA MOBIL NASIONAL RI
Addendum: Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry, Report of the Panel, 2 July 1998.

3
KATA PENGANTAR
Buku berjudul 'Perjanjian Penanaman Modal dalam Hukum
Perdagangan Internasional (WTO)' ini merupakan buku sejenis Cases
and Materials. Buku ini memuat bacaan awal atau dasar mengenai
perjanjian penanaman modal dalam WTO, yani Perjanjian TRIMs -
(Trade-Related Investment Measures), muatan isi perjajian TRIMs,
dan perkembangan negosiasi Perjanjian TRIMs dalam WTO.
Penulis menyusun naskah ini karena sangat kurangnya bukubuku
mengenai hukum perdagangan internasional (WTO) di tanah air.
Sedangkan kebutuhan akan tulisan atau buku seperti ini masih
langka. Buku ini memuat perjanjian dan sengketa-sengketa GATT dan
WTO yang terkait dengan penanaman modal. Dalam buku ini dua
sengketa yang secara khusus terkait mengenai TRIMs, yaitu sengketa
the FIRA (Foreign Review Investment Act) Case, yaitu sengketa yang
terjadi dalam kerangka GATT. Sengketa kedua adalah sengketa Mobil
Nasional RI (Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry), yaitu sengketa pertama dan terkenal sehubungan dengan
pembahasan mengenai TRIMs dalam WTO.
Buku ini semata-mata buku pengantar untuk memahami TRIMs
lebih lanjut. Kepada penerbit PT Rajagrafindo Persada yang telah
bersedia menerbitkan naskah-naskah penulis sebelumnya, penulis
ucapkan terima kasih. Mudah-mudahan buku ini dapat memberi setitik
sumbangan bagi perkembangan ilmu hukum yang kita cintai. Kritik
dan saran perbaikan atas buku ini akan penulis hargai dan ucapkan
terima kasih.
Bandung, Mei 2004.
Huala Adolf SH LLM PhD
1
BAB I
PENGANTAR
A. Pendahuluan
Penanaman modal asing1 berperan penting baik di negara maju
maupun negara sedang berkembang. Di dalam suatu laporannya yang
diterbitkan pada tahun 1996, WTO menunjukkan bahwa telah terjadi
suatu perkembangan yang cukup mendasar di bidang penanaman modal,
khususnya sejak tahun 1980-an. Aliran penanaman modal secara
global hanyalah sekitar 60 miliar dollar AS pada tahun 1985. Namun
angka ini mengalami peningkatan yang cepat dalam kurun waktu 10
tahun kemudian (pada tahun 1995), yaitu sebesar 315 miliar dollar
AS.2
Demikian pula aliran penanaman modal asing ke negara-negara
sedang berkembang mengalami perkembangan yang berarti dalam jangka
waktu 15 tahun terakhir. Aliran penanaman modal asing ke negaranegara
ini telah mengalami peningkatan yang berarti, yaitu dari
1 Prof. M. Sornarajah mendefinisikan penanaman modal sebagai 'the
transfer of tangible or intangible assets from one country to another
for the purpose of use in that country to generate wealth under the
total or partial control of the owner of the assets.' (M. Sornarajah,
The Law on Foreign Investment, (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1994), hlm.
4. Cf., Untuk definisi lainnya, lihat: Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan
Kinsella, Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law (Dobbs
Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1997), hlm. xix,xx. Untuk
kajian hukum internasional secara umum mengenai penanaman modal lihat,
antara lain, G. Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investment and International
Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1969); Cynthia D. Wallace, (ed.), Foreign
Direct Investment in the 1990s (Dordrecht, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff,
1990); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Legal Treatment of Foreign Investment: The
World Bank Guidelines (Dordrecht, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993);
Richard B. Lilich, The Protection of Foreign Investment (Syracuse, New
York: Sijthoff, 1965); Zouhair A. Kronfol, Protection of Foreign
Investment (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1972). Untuk kajian mengenai praktek
(hukum) penanaman modal asing, lihat P.T. Muchlinski, Multinational
Enterprises and the Law (Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995).
2 WTO, Annual Report 1996, (Geneva: WTO, 1996), hlm. 44; Lihat pula:
UNCTAD, World Investment Report: 1996 (New York: United Nations, 1996).
2
sekitar hanya 5 persen di tahun 1983 hingga 1987, menjadi 15
persen pada tahun 1995, yaitu sekitar 200 miliar dollar AS.3
Meskipun adanya peningkatan, namun tidak ada penjelasan
resmi mengenai sebab-sebab terjadinya peningkatan angka penanaman
modal tersebut. Namun demikian sebuah penelitian menunjukkan bahwa
adanya liberalisasi hukum penanaman modal asing baik di negara
maju maupun negara berkembang menjadi faktor penyebab utama
meningkatnya angka penanaman modal asing tersebut.4
Yang menjadi permasalahan cukup mendasar adalah bahwa hukum
internasional yang mengatur bidang ini ternyata berkembang agak
lambat guna mengimbangi perkembangan ini. Salah satu pendapat yang
berkembang mengungkapkan bahwa lambatnya perkembangan hukum
internasional di dalam mengatur masalah ini adalah karena
kurangnya upaya koordinasi masyarakat internasional untuk
merumuskan aturan-aturan hukum di bidang ini.
Pendapat lainnya menyatakan bahwa lemahnya aturan hukum
internasional mengatur bidang ini disebabkan karena tidak adanya
keinginan yang sungguh dari masyarakat internasional. Michael
Geist mengungkapkan bahwa tidak adanya niat yang serius dari
berbagai negara untuk mengatur bidang ini merupakan kendala bagi
perkembangan hukum di bidang investasi.5
Ada pula yang berpendirian bahwa alasan utama dari lambatnya
hukum internasional di dalam mengatur masalah ini adalah karena
3 WTO, Annual Report 1996 (Geneva: WTO, 1996), hlm. 46.
4 Untuk kajian umum mengenai hal ini, lihat: Renato Ruggiero, 'Whither
The Trade System Next?' dalam: Jagdish Bhagwati & Mathias Hirsch,
(eds.), The Uruguay Round and Beyond. (Berlin, New York: Springer,
1998), khususnya hlm. 126 et.seq.
3
tidak adanya lembaga khusus yang memformulasikan hukum
internasional di bidang penanaman modal asing.6
Pada prinsipnya terdapat 4 (empat) bidang utama dari hukum
internasional yang mengatur penanaman modal ini.
(1) Hukum internasional yang mengatur perlindungan terhadap
investor dan harta miliknya.
(2) Hukum internasional yang mengatur hubungan atau transaksi
bilateral antara dua negara (yang disebut juga sebagai BIT
atau bilateral investment treaty). Perjanjian seperti ini
banyak dibuat baik negara maju maupun berkembang.
(3) Hukum internasional yang mengatur upaya-upaya penanaman modal
di suatu wilayah (region) tertentu. Upaya ini timbul sebagai
reaksi ketidakpuasan terhadap hukum internasional yang
melindungi investor dan harta miliknya. Termasuk dalam hal
ini adalah prinsip pembayaran ganti rugi manakalah terjadi
nasionalisasi penanaman modal asing.
(4) Berkembangnya aturan hukum internasional baru yang mengatur
upaya-upaya penanaman modal yang terkait dengan perdagangan
internasional (the trade-related investment measures atau
TRIMs dalam kerangka WTO).7
Bidang keempat pengaturan hukum penanaman modal ini timbul
sebagai reaksi terhadap semakin meningkatnya kekhawatiran para
investor asing dan negara-negara maju terhadap semakin banyaknya
5 Michael A Geist, 'Toward a General Agreement on the Regulation of
Foreign Direct Investment,' 26 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 673 (1995).
6 M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 15,16.
4
kebijakan-kebijakan penanaman modal khususnya di negara sedang
berkembang. Mereka menganggap upaya-upaya atau kebijakan penanaman
modal tersebut telah mempengaruhi atau berdampak terhadap
perdagangan internasional.
Fenomena yang berkembang akhir-akhir ini telah semakin
dirasakan seiring dengan semakin berkembangnya kesadaran
masyarakat internasional. Fenomena tersebut sekarang ini digembargemborkan
sebagai liberalisasi atau globalisasi ekonomi. Termasuk
di dalamnya adalah dijunjung tingginya kebebasan aliran penanaman
modal. Bidang keempat dari hukum internasional ini sekarang telah
menjadi hukum internasional positif setelah dirampungkannya hasilhasil
perundingan Uruguay yakni dengan disahkannya perjanjian
mengenai TRIMs.
Buku ini mengkaji secara ringkas bidang hukum internasional
mengenai penanaman modal yang keempat. Kajian menunjukkan bahwa
lambatnya di dalam mengembangkan hukum intenasional di bidang ini
semata-mata disebabkan karena sulitnya upaya untuk mencakup dan
mengatur seluruh aspek mengenai hukum penanaman modal asing.
Besarnya perbedaan pandangan antara negara maju dan negara
berkembang ternyata sulit sekali untuk mencapai titik temu. Negara
maju menekankan pentingnya keterbukaan dan dihilangkannya semua
upaya atau kebijakan penanaman modal yang terkait dengan
perdagangan atau rintangan-rintangan penanaman modal.
Sebaliknya, negara sedang berkembang menganut sikap
preventif. Mereka acapkali menyandarkan diri kepada alasan
7 Untuk kajian mengenai sejarah atau latar belakang mengenai TRIMs,
lihat: Paul B. Christy III, 'Negotiating Investment in the GATT: A Call
5
kedaulatan dan menekankan kepada kebutuhan penanaman modal yang
dikaitkan dengan aspek pembangunan.
Kajian ini juga menyimpulkan bahwa: Pertama, WTO, bukan Bank
Dunia, PBB atau OECD, adalah forum yang tepat untuk mengatur
upaya-upaya penanaman modal yang merintangi perdagangan
internasional (TRIMs).
Kedua, kebijakan-kebijakan penanaman modal yang termuat
dalam hukum nasional masing-masing negara sedikit banyak akan
mempengaruhi posisi atau pendirian negara-negara tersebut di dalam
proses negosiasi pembentukan aturan-aturan penanaman modal.
B. Upaya-upaya Penanaman Modal yang terkait dengan Perdagangan
(Trade Related Investment Measures).
Dewasa ini, negara-negara penerima penanaman modal asing
tidak lagi menganggap masuknya modal asing sebagai suatu ancaman.
Mereka tidak lagi memandangnya dengan kecurigaan. Pendirian ini
berbeda di waktu awal tahun 1960-an hingga tahun 1970-an. Pada
waktu itu negara-negara sedang berkembang masih kental menganggap
bahwa masuknya modal asing adalah suatu ancaman penjajahan
(ekonomi) baru dari bekas negara kolonial-nya (asing). Karena itu,
setiap bentuk modal asing akan dipandang sebagai sesuatu yang
patut dicurigai.
Dewasa ini pandangan tersebut berubah. Modal asing tidak
lagi dipandang sebagai suatu, istilah Sir Leon Brittan, ‘Trojan
for Functionalism,' 12 Mich. J. Int'l.L 743 (1991).
6
Horses’ (‘Kuda-kuda bangsa Troja’).8 Sekarang negara berkembang
berpendapat bahwa modal asing dapat memberi modal kerja dan
mendatangkan keahlian manajerial, ilmu pengetahuan, modal dan
koneksi pasar.9
Penanaman modal asing dapat pula berperan dalam meningkatkan
pendapatan mata uang asing melalui aktivitas ekspor oleh
perusahaan multinasional (Multinational Enterprise atau MNE).10
Yang juga penting, penanaman modal asing (PMA) tidak melahirkan
utang baru. Selain itu negara penerima tidak perlu merisaukan atau
menghadapi risiko manakala suatu PMA yang masuk ke negerinya
ternyata tidak mendapatkan untung dari modal yang ditanamnya.11
Meskipun adanya aspek-aspek positif dari PMA dalam membantu
upaya-upaya pembangunan kepada perekonomian negara-negara
penerima, PMA ternyata dapat pula berdampak negatif terhadap
perekonomian negara penerima. Namun demikian sudah lama diakui
bahwa PMA dapat melahirkan sengketa dengan negara penerima atau
dengan penduduk asli setempat, khususnya di negara-negara sedang
berkembang.
8 Sir Leon Brittan, 'Building on the Singapore Ministerial: Trade,
Investment and Competition,' dalam: Jagdisch Bhagwati & Mathias Hirsch,
supra, note 4, hlm. 272.
9 William A. Fennel and Joseph W. Tyler, Trade and International
Investment from the GATT to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(1995), hlm. 2003.
10 Lihat Eric M. Burt, 'Developing Countries and the Framework for
Negotiations on Foreign Direct Investment in the World Trade
Organization,' 12:6 Am. U.J.Int'l.L & Pol'y 1022 (1997); Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata, 'Factors Influencing the Flow of Foreign Investment and the
Relevance of a Multilateral Guarantee Scheme,' 21 Int'l. Law 671, 675
(1987).
11 William A. Fennel, supra, note 9, hlm. 23.
7
Dampak lainnya adalah bahwa PMA oleh MNE dapat mengontrol
atau mendominasi perusahaan-perusahaan lokal.12 Sebagai akibatnya,
mereka dapat mempengaruhi kebijakan-kebijakan ekonomi atau bahkan
kebijakan-kebijakan politis dari negara penerima.
Di samping itu pula, MNE banyak dikecam telah mengembalikan
keuntungan-keuntungan dari kegiatan bisnisnya ke negara di mana
perusahaan induknya berada. Praktek seperti ini sedikitnya telah
mengurangi cadangan persediaan mata uang asing (foreign exchange
reserves) dari negara penerima.
Yang lebih banyak dikecam pula adalah adanya tuduhan-tuduhan
terhadap MNE yang kegiatan usahanya ternyata telah merusak
lingkungan di sekitar lokasi usahanya, terutama di negara-negara
sedang berkembang. Pasalnya adalah, MNE ini telah menggunakan zatzat
yang membahayakan lingkungan atau menerapkan teknologi yang
tidak atau kurang memperhatikan kelestarian lingkungan.13
Dampak negatif lainnya adalah bahwa MNE dikritik telah
merusak aspek-aspek positif dari penanaman modal itu sendiri di
negara-negara sedang berkembang. Misalnya, adanya praktek MNE yang
acapkali menerapkan kegiatan-kegiatan usahanya yang bersifat
restriktif (restrictive business practices).14
12 Sir Leon Brittan, supra, note 8, hlm. 271 (berpendapat bahwa banyak
negara maju, khususnya di Eropa dan sekutunya menganggap penanaman modal
sebagai saingan yang potensial terhadap perusahaan di dalam negeri).
13 Misalnya saja, perusakan lingkungan di Papua (Irian Jaya) sebagai
akibat dari pengoperasian proyek tembaga dan mas oleh PT Freeport
Indonesia (suatu anak perusahaan Amerika Serikat, the Freeport-McMoran
Company), atau kasus bocornya reaktor nuklir di India yang terkenal
dengan kasus the Bhopal case.
14 Eric M. Burt, supra, note 10, hlm. 1023.
8
C. TRIMS di Negara Sedang Berkembang.
Dengan mengingat dampak-dampak negatif PMA, dewasa ini
negara-negara berkembang umumnya berpendapat bahwa akivitas atau
ruang lingkup usaha perusahaan-perusahaan besar ini perlu
dibatasi. Mereka tidak boleh dengan bebas menanamkan modalnya di
segala sektor. Negara-negara ini memandang bahwa PMA harus diawasi
guna mencegah timbulnya aspek-aspek negatif tersebut tadi.15
Negara-negara berkembang umumnya,16 menerapkan pengawasan
modal yang tertuang dalam bentuk berbagai upaya penanaman modal
dan persyaratan-persyaratan penanaman modal. Persyaratanpersyaratan
demikian sekarang dikenal dengan istilah TRIMs atau
trade-related investment measures terhadap perusahaan-perusahaan
asing yang hendak menanamkan modalnya. Tujuan utama dari pengenaan
upaya-upaya atau persyaratan-persyaratan ini oleh negara penerima
adalah untuk mengatur dan mengontrol aliran PMA sedemikian rupa
sehingga dapat memenuhi tujuan pembangunannya.17
15 Pendekatan ini yang diperkenalkan oleh Prof. M. Sornarajah, yang
dikenal pula sebagai teori jalan tengah ('middle path theory'). Teori
ini berupaya mendamaikan adanya polarisasi dari dua teori yang saling
bersilangan, yaitu teori klasik ('classical theory') yang berpendapat
bahwa semua PMA adalah baik sifatnya dan teori kedua yaitu teori
ketergantungan ('dependency theory') yang beranggapan bahwa semua PMA
sifatnya adalah membahayakan. (Lihat, M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm.
45 et.seqq).
16 Suatu survei yang dilakukan pada tahun 1982 oleh pemerintah Amerika
Serikat menunjukkan bahwa negara-negara sedang berkembang telah
menerapkan sekitar 28 per sen TRIMS dibandingkan dengan negara-negara
maju yang hanya menerapkan 7,5 %. (David Greenaway, 'Why Are We
Negotiating on TRIMs?', dalam: David Greenaway, et.al., Global
Protectionism (Macmillan, Hampshire, 1991), hlm. 152.
17 Mina Mashayekhi and Murray Gibbs, 'Lessons from the Uruguay Round
Negotiations on Investment,' 33:6 JWT 1 (1999) (menyatakan antara lain
bahwa negara-negara sedang berkembang lebih menyukai kombinasi antara
insentif penanaman modal dan persyaratan pelaksanaan (performance
requirements) guna memenuhi tujuan pembangunannya); United Nations
Centre on Transnational Corporations, United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, The Impact of Trade Related Investment Measures on
9
Pada prinsipnya TRIMs ini merupakan unsur yang penting bagi
kebijakan-kebijakan negara tuan rumah, terutama negara sedang
berkembang. Beberapa negara sedang berkembang bahkan ada pula yang
menganggap TRIMs sebagai sarana pembangunannya.18 Negara
berkembang lainnya menggunakan TRIMS ini untuk meminimalkan dampak
dari PMA. Negara-negara ini telah pula menjadikan upaya-upaya
tersebut sebagai bagian dari pembangunan ekonominya untuk mencapai
tingkat pertumbuhan pembangunan negaranya.19
Tujuan lainnya dari negara tuan rumah di dalam menerapkan
TRIMS ini adalah mencegah perusahaan PMA untuk membuat putusan
atau kebijakan yang sifatnya lintas batas. Putusan atau kebijakan
seperti ini biasanya dapat mempengaruhi kebijakan atau
perekonomian negara tuan rumahnya.20 Di samping itu pula,
penerapan TRIMS dipandang semata-mata sebagai suatu hak atau
kebijakan setiap negara yang merdeka untuk mengatur
Trade and Development (UN Doc.ST/CTC/120, U.N. Sales No. E.91.II,A.19
(1991).
18 Lihat misalnya pernyataan yang dibuat oleh Delegasi ASEAN pada Joint
ASEAN Statement on the Uruguay Round at the APEC Ministerial Meeting,
Singapore, 30 July 1990, para. 14.
19 Ralph H. Folsom & Michael W. Gordon, International Business
Transactions, vol. 2 (St. Paul Minn.,: West Publishing Co., 1995), hlm.
137 (menyatakan bahwa negara-negara sedang berkembang berpendirian bahwa
TRIMS adalah sarana untuk mendorong tujuan-tujuan pemerintah di dalam
memajukan pembangunan ekonomi dan memastikan perdagangan yang
berimbang); Rachel McCulloch, 'Investment Policies in the GATT,' 13
World Economy 541, 545 (1990), (mengungkapkan berbagai bentuk kebijakan
nasional di bidang penanaman modal), Edmund M.A. Kwan, 'Trade Related
Investment Measures in the Uruguay Round: Towards a GATT for
Investment,' 16 N.C.J.Int'l.L.& Com.Reg. 309, 309, 319 (1991).
20 Lars Oxelheim, 'Foreign Direct Investment and the Liberalization of
Capital Movements,' dalam Lars Oxelheim (ed)., The Global Race for
Foreign Direct Investment, (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1993), hlm. 14.
Cf., Puri dan Bondap berpendapat bahwa TRIMS tidak semata-mata mengatur
FDI untuk memenuhi kebijakan negara tuan ruman tetapi juga untuk
mengundang investor datang ke negaranya. (Puri and Bondad, 'TRIMS,
Development Aspects and the General Agreement,' dalam Uruguay Round:
Further Papers on Selected Issues, (New York: United Nations, 1990),
hlm. 57.
10
perekonomiannya termasuk PMA di dalamnya (guna mencegah dampak
buruk dari PMA).21
Kebijakan seperti ini sudah barang tentu suatu langkah yang
lebih menguntungkan negara penerima (khususnya negara sedang
berkembang) daripada negara-negara maju (pengimpor modal dan
negara di mana perusahaan-perusahaan besar berdomisili).22
Para investor asing sebaliknya berpendapat lain. Mereka
beranggapan, TRIMS merupakan rintangan terhadap perdagangan dunia
dan aliran penanaman modal serta telah menghalangi mereka dalam
menerapkan strategi kompetitif global yang terpadu.23 Suatu
penelitian yang dilakukan pada tahun 1977 dan 1982, misalnya,
menunjukkan bahwa 45 hingga 60 persen perusahaan-perusahaan
Amerika Serikat terkena pengaruh dari adanya TRIMS ini.24
21 P.T Muchlinski, supra, note 1, hlm. 172. Untuk kajian secara umum
tentang TRIMS, khususnya mengenai sifat dan perkembangannya, lihat:
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, The Impact of Trade Related
Investment Measures on Trade and Development (UN Doc.ST/CTC/120, U.N.
Sales No. E.91.II,A.19 (1991).
22 Cf., sewaktu Tokyo Round (1979) berlangsung, mantan duta besar Kanada
untuk GATT menyatakan bahwa kebijakan negara-negara sedang berkembang
yang mengenakan syarat-syarat terhadap penanaman modal asing langsung
merupakan praktek yang telah lama berlangsung dan diakui. Beliau
berpendapat bahwa secara umum para investor asing pun dapat menerima
adanya persyaratan-persyaratan tersebut sebagai harga yang harus dibayar
atas kesempatan untuk membuat keuntungan yang besar di dalam pasar
negara-negara sedang berkembang. (Rodney de C. Grey, " '1992' TRIMS and
Selected Issues (New York: United Nations, 1990), hlm. 238).
23 UNCTAD, The Outcome of the Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment (New
York: UN, 1997), hlm. 135.
24 Low and Subramanian, 'TRIMs in the Uruguay Round: An Unfinished
Business,' dalam: Robert M. Stern, (ed.), Multilateral Trading System
(Ann Arbor: the University of Michigan Press, 1993), hlm. 418. Cf.,
suatu pandangan yang berbeda dikemukakan oleh sarjana Hong Kong yang
menyatakan tidak ada bukti yang jelas dan dapat diterima bahwa TRIMS
benar-benar merintangi perdagangan dan aliran penanaman modal. Suatu
kajian dari sudut pandang ekonomi mengungkapkan bahwa TRIMS sesungguhnya
dapat digunakan secara efisien sebagai penyangkal atas akibat buruk dari
akibat negatif dari perdagangan dan penanaman modal. (Lihat lebih
lanjut: Eden S.H. Yu and Chi-Chun Chao, 'On Investment Measures and
Trade,' 21 World Economy 4 (1998), hlm. 549 dan khususnya hlm. 559.
11
Pada umumnya, persyaratan penanaman modal dapat digolongkan
ke dalam dua bentuk.25 Pertama, persyaratan masuk (entry
requirement) dan kedua, persyaratan operasional (operational
requirement). Kebijakan negara-negara menunjukkan bahwa pada
umumnya negara-negara menerapkan kedua bentuk persyaratan tersebut
sebagai syarat untuk masuknya modal asing ke negaranya.26
Pada tahap pertama, yaitu persyaratan masuk (entry
requirement), biasanya badan penanaman modal dari negara penerima
memeriksa apakah usulan atau proposal penanaman modal asing sesuai
atau cocok dengan tujuan-tujuan pembangunan negaranya.
Pertimbangan lainnya, apakah proposal tersebut memberikan
keuntungan kepada negara penerima.27 Karena itu, manakala negara
penerima setelah memeriksa suatu proposal PMA beranggapan bahwa
proposal tersebut tidak memenuhi persyaratan masuk atau
persyaratan kebijakan penanaman modal nasionalnya, maka pemerintah
tersebut dapat menolak permohonan penanaman modal.
Sebaliknya, manakala pemerintah negara penerima beranggapan
bahwa suatu usulan PMA memenuhi persyaratan untuk masuknya suatu
penanaman modal, maka negara yang bersangkutan akan menerapkan
persyaratan yang kedua, yaitu persyaratan operasional atau
persyaratan pelaksanaan (operational atau performance
requirements). Ruang lingkup persyaratan-persyaratan ini cukup
25 Lihat juga Muchlinski, supra, note 1, hlm. 172 et.seq.
26 Fennel berpendapat bahwa ada juga TRIMS yang tidak secara eksplisit
merupakan bagian dari kebijakan perdagangan, yaitu rintangan-rintangan
birokrasi di berbagai negara sedang berkembang yang dapat menjadi
rintangan bagi penanaman modal. (Lihat: William A. Fennel and Joseph W.
Tyler, supra, note 9, hlm. 2034).
27 M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 100-102.
12
luas, bergantung kepada tujuan atau kebijakan masing-masing
negara.
Namun demikian persyaratan pelaksanaan yang paling umum
adalah persyaratan menggunakan kandungan local (local content
requirements), persyaratan perdagangan yang berimbang (trade
balancing requirements) persyaratan ekspor (export performance
requirements), pembatasan impor (limitation on imports),
persyaratan mata uang asing dan pengiriman mata uang asing
(foreign exchange and remittance requirements), persyaratan modal
minimum (minimum local equity requirements), persyaratan alih
teknologi (technology transfer requirements), dan persyaratan
lisensi produk (product licensing requirements).28
Dengan diterapkannya persyaratan-persyaratan ini, negara
tuan rumah akan memastikan bahwa PMA akan memberikan keuntungan
maksimum kepada pembangunan ekonominya. Dalam hal ini, PMA akan
digunakan sebaik-baiknya untuk membangun atau untuk memenuhi
rencana pembangunan atau rencana perekonomian negaranya.
Semua persyaratan ini lebih banyak dan lazim dipraktekkan
oleh negara tuan rumah. Legalitas upaya ini disandarkan pada
alasan untuk memelihara kedaulatan atau pengawasan negara terhadap
PMA.29 Setiap usulan penanaman modal yang tidak memenuhi tujuan
dari negara tuan rumah atau usulan PMA yang diduga akan
28 Eric M. Burt, supra, note 10, hlm. 1025.
29 Maskus and Eby, 'Developing New Rules and Disciplines on Trade-Related
Investment Measures,' in Robert M. Stern (ed.), supra, note 24, hlm.
451.
13
membahayakan tujuan pembangunan negaranya, maka negara tersebut
akan menolak masuknya PMA.30
Semua upaya atau kebijakan tersebut adalah sah. Pada
prinsipnya hukum internasional memberikan kekuasaan, jurisdiksi
atau hak-hak berdaulat kepada suatu negara untuk mengatur setiap
kegiatan. Termasuk di dalamnya adalah kegiatan perdagangan atau
ekonomi di wilayahnya.
Perlu ditekankan di sini bahwa jangka waktu penanaman modal
MNEs di negara tuan rumah biasanya cukup lama. Karena itu,
pertimbangan waktu inilah yang juga menjadi latar belakang mengapa
negara tuan rumah mengatur ruang lingkup PMA. Langkah ini perlu
guna mengantisipasi akibat-akibat yang mungkin timbul di kemudian
hari dari PMA melalui berbagai kebijakan atau persyaratan.31
Kewenangan negara tuan rumah untuk mengatur masuknya PMA
hanya tunduk kepada perjanjian-perjanjian internasional (di bidang
PMA) yang ditandatangani oleh negara yang bersangkutan.32
Pengakuan atas hak ini sangat penting untuk negara-negara,
khususnya negara sedang berkembang. Hak tersebut diperlukan untuk
mengatur dan mengawasi masuknya PMA ke dalam wilayahnya.33 Prof.
M. Sornarajah menjelaskan hak ini sebagai berikut:34
'The right of a state to control entry of foreign investment
is unlimited, as it is a right that flows from sovereignty.
Entry of any foreign investment can be excluded by a state.
Once an alien enters a state, both he and his property are
30 M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 100.
31 Eric M. Burt, supra, note 10, hlm. 1027.
32 Muchlinski, supra, note 1, hlm. 173.
33 Dapat dikemukakan di sini bahwa adanya pengakuan untuk mengatur dan
mengontrol ini telah mencerminkan pendirian negara-negara sedang
berkembang di Uruguay Round mengenai TRIMS.
34 M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 83.
14
subject to the law of the host state. This result flows from
the fact that the foreign investor had voluntarily subjected
himself to the regime of the host state by making entry into
it. The absoluteness of the right to exclude the alien prior
to entry becomes somewhat modified after entry as the alien
then comes to enjoy a status, which is protected by
international law.'
Tampak bahwa hukum internasional berperan penting di dalam
penanaman modal. Peranan hukum ini juga cukup luas. Ia juga
berperan penting di dalam menyelesaikan sengketa yang timbul
antara dua negara, yakni antara negara penerima dengan negara dari
para investor.35
Uraian di atas menunjukkan hukum internasional telah
mengakui hak negara-negara untuk mengontrol orang asing (investor
asing atau MNE). Ironisnya perkembangan hukum internasional di
bidang ini (khususnya PMA) masih diwarnai oleh berbagai debat di
antara para ahli hukum internasional.36
Latar belakang dari keadaan ini adalah masih adanya sengketa
atau polarisasi pandangan antara (sarjana-sarjana) negara maju dan
negara sedang berkembang. Pada prinsipnya sarjana dari negara maju
berpandangan perlunya suatu rejim hukum internasional yang
liberal, yaitu rejim yang tidak boleh menghalangi aliran penanaman
modal ke mana pun juga.
Sedangkan sarjana dari negara berkembang acapkali masih
bersandar pada prinsip kedaulatan negara. Mereka berpendapat bahwa
35 M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 7-8. Secara umum, peranan yang
dimainkan oleh hukum internasional antara lain adalah bahwa hukum ini
meletakkan beberapa prinsip tentang penyelesaian sengketa, misalnya
saja, prinsip penyelesaian sengketa melalui cara-cara damai, atau
larangan menggunakan kekerasan di dalam menyelesaikan sengketa.
15
adalah hak berdaulat setiap negara untuk mengontrol setiap PMA,
dari manapun asalnya, yang masuk ke dalamnya.37
Pandangan negara-negara maju terhadap adanya TRIMS adalah
bahwa TRIMS tersebut telah memaksa mereka untuk mempertimbangkan
faktor-faktor non-ekonomis di dalam rencana penanaman modal
mereka. Dalam pandangan mereka, TRIMS tidaklah kondusif dan telah
menjadi rintangan bagi perdagangan. Karena itu, mereka bertekad
untuk mengurangi atau bahkan menghapus adanya upaya-upaya TRIMS
tersebut.
D. TRIMS di Negara Maju
Meskipun adanya pandangan-pandangan di atas, beberapa negara
maju sebenarnya telah juga menerapkan rintangan-rintangan
perdagangan terhadap penanaman modal. Hal ini terjadi ketika
beberapa negara telah berubah kedudukannya, yaitu bukan lagi
semata-mata sebagai pengekspor modal, tetapi juga sebagai
pengimpor atau penerima modal asing.38
Adalah benar bahwa negara-negara ini telah mengurangi atau
berupaya menghapus rintangan-rintangan penanaman modal. Namun
rintangan tersebut tidak seluruhnya hilang. Ada beberapa rintangan
yang masih ada. Ada dua alasan mendasar mengapa beberapa rintangan
masih dipertahankan. Pertama, negara maju kadang-kadang pula
36 Prof. M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 1 (menyatakan bahwa hukum
penanaman modal telah menjadi bahan debat yang cukup sengit di antara
para sarjana hukum internasional pada pertengahan abad ke dua-puluh).
37 M. Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 85.
38 Robert H. Edwards Jr and Simon N. Lester, 'Towards a More
Comprehensive World Trade Organization on Trade-Related Investment
Measures,' 33 Stan.J. Int'l.L. 169 (1997), khususnya hlm. 184-186
(memberikan contoh-contoh praktek Amerika Serikat dan Kanada di dalam
menerapkan TRIMS terhadap penanaman modal asing).
16
menyandarkan pendekatannya kepada rasa nasionalisme yang tinggi.
Kedua, terdapat rasa kekhawatiran pada sebagian negara maju bahwa
modal asing akan mengambil alih aset-aset produktif di
negaranya.39
Selain itu, beberapa negara maju telah pula menutup atau
melarang beberapa sektor untuk PMA. Atau, kalaupun akhirnya
sektor-sektor tersebut diliberalisasi, tingkat keikutsertaan PMA
di sektor tersebut sangat dibatasi.40 PMA tidak diperkenankan
untuk ikut serta di dalam permodalan di dalam privatisasi asetaset
milik negara. Atau, PMA ini akan dikaji dan hanya
diperbolehkan manakala mereka telah memenuhi beberapa persyaratan
tertentu.41
Negara-negara maju utama, seperti Eropa, Kanada, Australia
dan bahkan Amerika Serikat mempraktekkan kebijakan-kebijakan
penanaman modal seperti ini. Mereka menyandarkan kebijakankebijakan
tersebut kepada standar-standar mereka yang pada
hakekaktnya merupakan hambatan terhadap masuknya PMA ke negaranegara
tersebut. Dalam laporan pada tahun 1988, PBB mengungkapkan
bahwa Amerika Serikat telah membatasi kepemilikan atas sektorsektor
oleh PMA yang dapat mempengaruhi atau mengancam keselamatan
dan kepentingan vital, seperti pengangkutan laut (maritim) dan
pengangkutan udara.42
39 Lars Oxelheim, supra, note 20, hlm. 27.
40 Stephen J. Canner, 'Trade and International Investment: from GATT to
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,' dalam: Joseph F. Dennin,
(ed)., Law and Practice of the World Trade Organization (New York:
Oceana Publ., 1995), hlm. 12.
41 Stephen J. Canner, Ibid, hlm. 12.
42 William A. Fennel and Joseph W. Tyler, supra, note 9, hlm. 2037,
(mengutip U.N. Center on Transnational Corps., 7 National Legislation
17
Guna mengantisipasi masuknya PMA ke negaranya, Amerika
Serikat mengundangkan suatu Undang-Undang yang disebut Defense
Production Act. Tujuan utama dari UU ini adalah mengawasi dan
melindungi produk-produk yang sifatnya strategis bagi pertahanan
Amerika Serikat.
Di tahun 1975, Amerika Serikat mendirikan suatu badan antar
departemen yang disebut the Interagency Committee on Foreign
Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS). Badan baru ini bertugas mengawasi
aliran masuk PMA di bidang perminyakan.
Setahun kemudian di tahun 1976, Amerika Serikat
mengundangkan the International Investment and Trade in Service
Survey Act (IITSSA) guna memonitor aliran penanaman modal Amerika
Serikat ke luar negeri dan PMA yang masuk ke dalam wilayah Amerika
Serikat. The IITSSA mewajibakan para investor untuk memberikan
laporan secara periodik mengenai kegiatan penanaman modalnya.43
Pada tahun 1988, pemerintah Amerika Serikat mengundangkan
the Exxon-Florio Act. Undang-undang ini memberi kewenangan kepada
presiden untuk mengkaji ulang setiap penanaman modal asing. Kajian
ini dipandang perlu dilakukan untuk mengetahui apakah penanaman
modal tersebut akan mempengaruhi atau membahayakan keamanan
nasional Amerika Serikat. Undang-Undang ini juga memberi wewenang
kepada presiden untuk menunda atau melarang PMA yang ternyata
and Regulation Relating to Transnational Corporations 289, ST/CTC/31,
U.N. Sales No. E. 89. II. A.9 [1989]).
43 Robert H. Edwards Jr and Simon N. Lester, supra, note 38, hlm. 184-
186.
18
mempengaruhi atau membahayakan keamanan nasional Amerika
Serikat.44
44 William A. Fennel and Joseph W. Tyler, supra, note 9, hlm. 2037; M.
Sornarajah, supra, note 1, hlm. 85.
1
BAB II
LATAR BELAKANG NEGOSIASI TRIMs
Hingga dewasa ini belum ada aturan hukum internasional
komprehensif yang mengatur PMA. Sedangkan lembaga internasional
yang mengatur dan mengawasi liberalisasi PMA baru terbentuk pada
tahun 1995. Alasan utama dari keadaan ini adalah karena upayaupaya
masyarakat internasional terhadap masalah ini masih sangat
sektoral sifatnya.1
Dalam perkembangan awalnya, penanaman modal asing secara
langsung mulai tampak di masa penjajahan (kolonialisme). Penanaman
modal pada waktu itu berlangsung dalam bentuk pergerakan manusia
(investor) bersama modalnya dari Eropa ke negara-negara di Asia,
Afrika dan Amerika selatan. Umumnya modal yang ditanamkan tersebut
ditujukan untuk mengeksploitasi kekayaan melimpah di negara-negara
tersebut.
Pemerintah penjajah biasanya membuat suatu kebijakan yang
menarik bagi para investor asing. Mereka juga memberikan
perlindungan dan jaminan bahwa para investor dan harta bendanya
dapat tunduk kepada jurisdiksi pengadilan negara penerima di mana
para investor tersebut berdomisili atau menginvestasikan modalnya.
1 Cf., Pandangan yang berbeda dapat terlihat dalam: Lee E. Preston and
Duane Windsor, (eds)., The Rules of the Game in the Global Economy:
Policy Regime for International Business, (Boston-Dordrecht-London:
Kluwer, 2nd.ed., 1977), hlm.137 (yang berpendapat bahwa peranan penaman
modal asing akan memainkan perannya pasca perang tata ekonomi
internasional tidak diantisipasi manakala fondasi dari hukum perdagangan
dan pembayaran tidak ada).
2
Atau, mereka diperkenankan pula untuk tunduk kepada jurisdiksi
nasional negara para investor tersebut.2
Sebenarnya perlindungan investasi pada waktu itu tidak
merupakan masalah yang penting. Umumnya para penguasa
(pemerintahan penjajahan) telah menjadikan masalah perlindungan
ini sebagai salah satu bagian dari kebijakannya di wilayah negara
jajahannya. Karena itu kebutuhan investor akan perlindungan hukum
internasional tidaklah begitu penting.
Setelah berakhirnya Perang Dunia II yang diikuti oleh
lahirnya negara-negara baru di Asia, Afrika dan Amerika Selatan
yang memerdekakan dirinya, para investor mulai mengfokuskan
perhatiannya kepada pembangunan kembali negara-negara baru
tersebut. Mereka berupaya pula mencari syarat-syarat yang
menguntungkan di dalam usaha penanaman modalnya.3
Dalam masa ini terjadi suatu masa baru di mana para investor
dan pemerintah negara-negara baru tersebut membuat kesepakatankesepakatan
mengenai penanaman modal yang tertuang di dalam suatu
perjanjian. Dalam hal ini, para investor asing mulai berupaya
mencari aturan-aturan yang mengatur penanaman modal asing di
tingkat bilateral, regional atau internasional.
Upaya petama di dalam menetapkan aturan hukum intenasional
bagi penanaman modal asing terjadi sebelum Perang Dunia II. Pada
masa itu, Amerika Serikat dan beberapa negara Eropa menetapkan
2 Nico Schrijver, 'Developments in International Investment Law', in:
Ronald St. John Macdonald, (ed)., Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya,
(Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), hlm.
704.
3 Preston and Windsor, supra, note 1, hlm. 136.
3
standar-standar internasional untuk perlindungan penanaman modal
asing.
Standar-standar bagi perlindungan penanaman modal ini
sesungguhnya pula dibuat untuk menampung kebutuhan negara-negara
(maju) dan para investornya. Fokus utama dari standar tersebut
adalah mengenai status orang asing. Standar ini diterapkan
terhadap berbagai aspek hukum mengenai penanaman modal dan
perlindungan modalnya.4 Termasuk di dalamnya adalah pengaturan
mengenai perlindungan hak-hak milik penanaman modal asing (the
regulations of foreign investment protection of property rights),
penyelesian sengketa, hak asasi manusia dan orang asing, dan
perlindungan dalam hal terjadinya pemberontakan atau kekacauan.5
Negara-negara maju tersebut berpendapat bahwa pengaturanpengaturan
seperti ini harus ditaati oleh semua negara. Mereka
menyebut pengaturan-pengaturan tersebut sebagai standar minimum
yang harus diterapkan secara internasional (international minimum
standard).6
Standar-standar perlakuan tersebut juga dimasukkan di dalam
perjanjian-perjanjian di bidang perdagangan. Untuk memastikan agar
standar-standar tersebut mengikat, negara-negara maju berupaya
4 Untuk analsis lebih lanjut mengenai hal ini lihat: M. Sornarajah,
'Power & Justice in International Law,' 1 SJICL 28 (1997), (berpendapat
bahwa hukum internasional 'has been an extension of power play of states
and curtailment of such use of power by normative principles involved in
notions of justice'). (hlm.49)
5 Nico Schrijver, 'Developments in International Investment Law', supra.,
note 2, hlm. 706.
6 Untuk pembahasan lebih lanjut mengenai standar minimum internasional
ini, lihat: G. Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and International
Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1969).
4
memaksakan standar-standar tersebut melalui tekanan-tekanan
politik atau bahkan kadang kala melalui intervensi militer.7
Perlakuan yang cenderung lebih menguntungkan investor asing
ditentang keras oleh beberapa negara Amerika Latin. Salah seorang
sarjana yang menentang standar internasional ini adalah Carlos
Calvo, seorang ahli hukum dan menteri luar negeri Argentina.8
Menurut Calvo, seorang asing yang menetap di negera lain (untuk
berusaha dan lain-lain) tunduk kepada hak-hak perlindungan yang
sama dengan warga negara di negara tersebut.
Menurut Calvo pula, orang asing tidak dapat menuntut hak
perlindungan yang lebih besar.9 Pendapat ini menjadi standar yang
digunakan dan diterapkan oleh sebagian besar negara sedang
berkembang dalam upaya mereka mengatur penanaman modal asing.
Mereka berpendapat bahwa penanaman modal asing di suatu negara
tunduk kepada hukum di negara tersebut, termasuk perlindungannya
7 UNCTAD, The Outcome of the Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment (New
York: UN, 1997), hlm. 135.
8 Untuk pengkajian mengenai status Calvo Doctrine dewasa ini dalam
hubungannya dengan prinsip nasional di dalam hukum internasional
mengenai penanaman modal, lihat: Denise Manning-Cabrol, 'The Imminent
Death of the Calvo Clause and the Rebirth of the Calvo Principle:
Equality of Foreign and National Investors,' 26 Law & Pol'y Int'l. Bus.
1169 (1995) at 1199.
9 'M. Sornarajah, The Law on Foreign Investment, (Cambridge: Cambridge
U.P., 1994), hlm. 11. Perlu dikemukakan di sini, sebagaimana diungkapkan
oleh Prof. M. Sornarajah, bahwa ‘hukum yang mengatur penanaman modal
asing selama adanya konflik pandangan antara Amerika Serikat dan negaranegara
Amerika Latin tidak terkait dengan pengambil-alihan harta milik
orang asing. Masalah utamanya adalah kasus-kasus mengenai penyerangan
oleh penduduk atau balas dendam politis yang dilakukan untuk memberi
keuntungan kepada pemerintah Junta yang sedang berkuasa. Beliau pun
menyatakan bahwa 'the law on foreign investment in this nature should be
kept in mind since the early scholars tended to apply the uniform
principles between the investment cases in Latin American mentioned
above and the cases of the taking of foreign investment resulting from
economic reforms in later period both in Latin America and other part of
the world'). (M. Sornarajah, supra, note 8, hlm. 11).
5
dan ganti ruginya manakala negara penerima menasionalisasi
penanaman modal asing.
Begitu pula manakala suatu sengketa timbul dari adanya suatu
perjanjian penanaman modal asing. Dalam keadaan tersebut sengketa
harus diselesaikan menurut hukum nasional negara penerima
investasi. Pengadilan yang mengadili sengketa itu pun haruslah
pengadilan nasional dari negara tuan rumah (penerima PMA).
Standar nasional ini diikuti, antara lain, oleh Indonesia
selama tahun 1960-an di dalam sengketa nasionalisasi perusahaanperusahaan
perkebunan Belanda di Sumatera. Dalam sengketa ini,
pemerintah Indonesia menyandarkan pada hukum nasionalnya untuk
membayar ganti rugi kepada pemerintah Belanda.10
Konflik antara dua standar tersebut di atas juga mendapat
perhatian Liga Bngsa-Bangsa (LBB). Dalam berbagai konperensi badan
dunia ini, negara-negara gagal mencapai kesepakatan mengenai
perbedaan standar yang harus diterapkan antara kewajiban-kewajiban
negara tuan rumah dengan hak-hak investor asing.11
Upaya yang lebih serius dari masyarakat internasional untuk
merumuskan pengaturan mengenai PMA terjadi setelah Perang Dunia II
usai. Dalam suatu konperensi PBB mengenai Perdagangan dan
Ketenagakerjaan (the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment) di tahun 1947-1948, negara-negara juga telah menaruh
perhatiannya kepada masalah penanaman modal ini. Namun pada waktu
10 Lihat Sudargo Gautama, Segi-segi Hukum Internasional mengenai
Nasionalisasi di Indonesia (Djakarta: Universitas, 1969); Martin Domke,
'Indonesian Nationalization Measures before Foreign Courts,' 54
Am.J.Int'l.L 305 (1960); Huala Adolf, Aspek-aspek Negara dalam Hukum
Internasional, Jakarta: Rjagrafindo Persada, cet. 3, 2002, khususnya Bab
V tentang Tanggung Jawab Negara.
6
itu, isu penanaman modal bukan merupakan suatu agenda khusus. Ia
semata-mata masih bagian dari suatu agenda yang membahas persoalan
praktek bisnis yang restriktif (restrictive business practices).12
Isu penanaman modal mendapat suatu tempat khusus dan serius
dalam aganda suatu konperensi internasional terjadi ketika
masyarakat internasional menandatanani the Final Act of the Havana
Charter for International Trade Organization.13 Final Act (Piagam
Havana) ini mengatur di dalamnya upaya penggalakan aliran modal
intenasional untuk penanaman modal yang produktif di antara tujuan
dari the International Trade Organization (ITO) (Article 1 : 2).
Bab III dari Final Act tersebut yang berjudul "International
Investment for Economic Development and Reconstructions" antara
lain menyatakan bahwa:
“1. The Members recognize that:
(a) international investment, both public and private, can be
of great value in promoting economic development and
reconstruction and consequent social progress. ...
(c) without prejudice to existing international agreements to
which Members are parties, a Member has the right:
(i) to take any appropriate safeguards necessary to ensure
that foreign investment is not used as a basis for
interference in internal affairs or national policies;
(ii) to determine whether and to what extent and upon what
terms it will allow future foreign investment... .”14
11 UNCTAD, supra, note 7, hlm. 136.
12 UNCTAD, supra, note 7, hlm. 136.
13 Untuk teks the Havana Charter, lihat: United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related Documents, ECONF. 2/78. Teks
tersebut juga termuat dalam buku klasik mengentai ITO: Clair Wilcox, A
Charter for World Trade (New York: Macmillan, 1949), hlm. 227-319. The
Havana Charter tidak pernah berlaku karena adanya kondisi-kondisi pada
waktu itu. Pasal 103 Charter, tidak terpenuhi dalam jangka waktu yang
ditetapkan. Keengganan Amerika Serikat untuk meratifikasi the Charter
merupakan penyebab utama kegagalannya.
14 Article 12:1 Havana Charter. Analisis lebih lanjut dan latar belakang
sejarah Bab III dan pasal-pasal mengenai penanaman modal dalam Charter,
lihat: Clair Wilcox, supra note 13, hlm. 140-148.
7
Piagam Havana tidak meletakkan persyaratan terhadap negaranegara
anggotanya untuk mempraktekkan perlakuan non-diskriminatif
atau perlakuan nasional terhadap PMA.15 Di samping itu, Piagam
juga tidak mengatur isu-isu penting lainnya, seperti penggunaan
insentif penanaman modal atau persyaratan-persyaratan pelaksanaan
oleh negara penerima. Piagam juga tidak mengatur penyelesaian
sengketa untuk menyelesaikan sengketa-sengketa penanaman modal
antara negara tuan rumah dan investor asing.16
Beberapa sarjana berpendapat bahwa salah satu alasan
gagalnya ITO adalah karena adanya ketentuan mengenai penanaman
modal sebagaimana diatur dalam Pasal 12 tersebut. Salah satu
pendapat menyatakan bahwa pasal tersebut terlalu memberi
perlindungan kepada negara berkembang. Dalam hal ini, Sylvia Ostry
menyatakan sebagai berikut:
“The ITO did include investment as well as trade but the
provisions were heavily circumscribed, reflecting the fears
of many developing countries strong pro-investment rules
would lead to foreign control over natural resources and
'strategic' industries.”17
GATT yang semula direncanakan sebagai suatu dokumen yang
dilampirkan kepada Piagam ITO tidak menyebut suatu ketentuan apa
pun mengenai penanaman modal. Dapat dimaklumi, GATT sejak semula
hanya direncanakan untuk mengatur tarif dan perdagangan.
15 Edward M. Graham, 'Should There Be Rules on Foreign Direct
Investment,' dalam: John H. Dunning, (ed)., Governments, Globalization,
and International Business (New York: Oxford U.P., 1997), hlm. 484.
16 Edward M. Graham, Ibid., hlm. 484.
17 Sylvia Ostry, A New Regime for Foreign Direct Investment (Washington
DC: Group of Thirty, 1997), hlm. 3. Cf., Eric M. Burt, 'Developing
Countries and the Framework for Negotiations on Foreign Direct
Investment in the World Trade Organization,' 12:6 Am. U.J.Int'l.L &
Pol'y 1028 (1997) (mengupas keinginan negara sedang berkembang bahwa
pasal-pasal mengenai penanaman modal di dalam ITO atau Havana Charter
lebih menguntungkan negara sedang berkembang).
8
Namun demikian, the CONTRACTING PARTIES GATT telah pula
memberi perhatiannya kepada penanaman modal internasional.
Sayangnya perhatian tersebut tidaklah terlalu serius. Dalam salah
satu resolusinya mengenai 'International Investment for Economic
Development,' pada tanggal 4 Maret 1955, the CONTRCTING PARTIES
antara lain menyatakan:
“Recommended that the contracting parties who are in a
position to provide capital for international investment and
the contracting parties who desire to obtain such capital
use their best endeavours to create conditions calculated to
stimulate the international flow of capital having regard in
particular, to the importance for this purpose of providing
by appropriate methods for security for existing and future
investment, the avoidance of double taxation, and facilities
for the transfer of earning upon foreign investment, and
urge that contracting parties upon the request of any
contracting party enter into consultation or participate in
negotiations directed to the conclusion of bilateral and
multilateral agreement relating to these matters.”18
Dalam suatu pengamatannya, UNCTAD berpendapat bahwa pada
waktu tahun-tahun permulaan Perang Dunia II, negara-negara
sebenarnya belum siap untuk mengadopsi aturan-aturan hukum
internasional untuk mengatur kebijakan penanaman modalnya. Karena
itu pula negara-negara, terutama negara maju, mengambil kebijakan
untuk mengadakan perjanjian bilateral dengan negara lainnya di
bidang penanaman modal ini.
Waktu itu perjanjian demikian dikenal sebagai the
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaties.19 Perjanjian
seperti ini biasanya mengatur hal-hal yang cukup luas. Termasuk di
dalamnya adalah hak warga negara dari masing-masing negara dan
perlindungan harta miliknya di luar negeri. Prinsip lainnya yang
18 3S/49,50, GATT, Guide to GATT Law and Practice, updated 6th.ed. (1995).
19 UNCTAD, supra, note 7, hlm. 136.
9
terkait adalah perlakuan nasional dan perlakuan MFN, pelayaran dan
masalah jurisdiksi masing-masing negara.
Ketentuan yang luas ini sebagaimana termuat dalam perjanjian
FCN ternyata tidak memuaskan para investor dan negara penerima.
Mereka berpendapat bahwa perlu adanya peraturan yang khusus untuk
mengatur masalah penanaman modal. Pandangan seperti ini kemudian
melahirkan suatu bentuk perjanjian baru yang khusus di bidang
penanaman modal yaitu perjanjian penanaman modal bilateral (the
bilateral investment treaty atau BIT).20
Dalam perkembangannya kemudian, negara-negara telah
menggunakan perjanjian seperti BIT ini sebagai salah satu upaya
untuk mengadakan perjanjian dengan negara lainnya. Menurut
professor Sornarajah, suatu pengkajian terhadap BIT ini
menunjukkan bahwa terdapat sekitar 2000 BIT yang dibuat sejak
tahun 1990.21
20 Nico Schrijver, 'Developments', supra, note 2, hlm. 713. Cf., untuk
kajian mengenai peralihan dari FCN ke BIT ini, lihat: Jeswald Salacuse,
'BIT by BIT: The Growth of BITs and Their Impact on Foreign Investment
Treaties and the Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries,'
24 Int'l. Law 657 (1990). Lihat juga: Todd S Shenkin, 'Trade Related
Investment Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties and The GATT:
Moving Toward a Multilateral Investment Treaty,' 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 548
(1994); Huala Adolf, Hukum Ekonomi Internasional, Jakarta: Rajagrafindo
Persada, cet. 3, 2002, khususnya Bab I..
21 Kumpulan perjanjian penanaman modal bilateral dapat dilihat pada:
ICSID, Investment Laws of the World (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana
Publications, 1972 - ), Lihat pula website ICSID di:
; Paul Peters,
'Exhaustion of Local Remedies: Ignorance in Most Bilateral Investment
Treaties,' XLIV NILR 233 (1997), hlm. 244. Kajian pengantar (awal) untuk
BIT ini lihat: Margrete Stevens & Ruvan de Alwis, 'References on
Bilateral Investment Treaties,' 7 ICSID Rev. FILJ (1992), hlm. 229-283.
Kajian lengkap mengenai BIT, lihat: Dolzer & M. Stevens, Bilateral
Investment Treaties (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995). Dan
untuk kajian agak kontroversial mengenai status BIT ini sebagai hukum
kebiasaan internasional, lihat: M. Sornarajah, The Pursuit of
Nationalized Property (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986),
hlm. 40; Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and International Law,
(London: Stevens and Sons, 1969), hlm. 8-9.
10
Tujuan utama dari perjanjian bilateral seperti itu adalah
untuk memastikan bahwa harta milik para investor tidak akan
diambil alih tanpa adanya ganti rugi yang sifatnya Prompt,
Adequate and Effective. Perjanjian seperti ini juga mengandung
ketentuan mengenai perlakuan non-diskriminatif, peralihan dana,
dan prosedur penyelesaian sengketanya manakala sengketa timbul
antara investor dengan negara tuan rumah.
Pembahasan mengenai penanaman modal internasional pada
tingkat multilateral dimulai kembali di PBB khususnya pada tahun
1960-an dan 1970-an. Dengan semakin banyak lahirnya negara-negara
baru di Asia dan Afrika, peran negara-negara ini di dalam
menyuarakan kepentingan dan keprihatinan mereka mengenai penanaman
modal cukup penting. Negara-negara ini mengemukakan pendapatnya
dengan mengedepankan aspek kedaulatan secara kental. Mereka
berpendapat standar internasional di bidang penanaman modal
sebagaimana diperkenalkan negara-negara maju selama abad ke – 19
tidaklah sesuai dengan aspirasi negara-negara ini.
Upaya negara sedang berkembang untuk merumuskan kepentingan
dan kebutuhan mereka untuk meningkatkan pembangunannya melalui PMA
dilakukan antara lain melalui PBB. Hasil yang cukup penting dari
upaya ini adalah dikeluarkannya resolusi Majelis Umum PBB mengenai
the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources pada tahun
1962.22 Resolusi penting lainnya adalah resolusi mengenai the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States pada tahun 1974.
22 Lihat lebih lanjut: Nico Schrijver, 'Permanent Sovereignty over
natural resources versus the common heritage of mankind; complementary
or contradictory principles of international economic law' in: de Waart,
Peters and Denters, (eds.), International Law and Development
11
Resolusi pertama (the Permanent Sovereignty Resolution)
mengakui hak setiap negara untuk secara bebas memanfaatkan
kekayaan alamnya sesuai dengan kepentingan nasionalnya. Resolusi
ini juga menegaskan bahwa perjanjian penanaman modal yang
dilakukan oleh negara-negara berdaulat secara bebas harus
dihormati dengan itikad baik.23
Piagam Hak-Hak dan Kewajiban Ekonomi Negara-negara (the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States) mengandung
pengaturan yang lebih banyak mengenai penanaman modal asing. Pasal
2 Piagam mengatur hak-hak setiap negara untuk mengatur dan
melaksanakan jurisdiksinya atas penanaman modal sesuai dengan
hukum dan perundangannya serta sejalan dengan tujuan-tujuan dan
prioritas-prioritas internasionalnya. Pasal ini juga menyatakan
dengan tegas bahwa negara-negara tidak dapat dipaksakan untuk
memberikan perlakuan yang menguntungkan kepada sesuatu PMA.24
The United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations
juga sudah mengeluarkan the Draft Code of Conduct in Transnational
Corporation (Rancangan Perjanjian Aturan Tingkah Laku Bagi
(Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1988), also Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources; Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge: Cambridge
U.P., 1997), khususnya pada bab 2 dan 3
23 Paragraph 8. CERDS dikritik keras oleh negara-negara maju. Sewaktu
pengesahannya, CERDS mendapat 104 suara, 16 menolak dan 6 abstein. Suara
penolakan datang dari negara maju. Alasan utama penolakan adalah
keberatan negara maju atas pasal atau ketentuan mengenai nasionalisasi
yang mensyaratkan bahwa kompensasi atau pembayaran ganti rugi harus
dilakukan sesuai dengan ‘hukum atau perundangan yang relevan dan dengan
memperhatikan keadaan-keadaan yang relevan ... ' (Article 2 paragraph 2
(2)). Kajian menarik mengenai CERDS lihat: S.K. Chatterjee, 'The Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States; An evaluation after 15 years,'
(1991) 40 Int'l.&Comp.L.Q. 669; Milan Bulagic, Principle of Development
of International Law (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher,
1986); E.U. Petersmann, 'Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States,' in R. Bernhardt (ed)., Encyclopedia of Public International
Law, Installment 5 (1985).
12
Perusahaan Transnasional).25 Rancangan Perjanjian ini juga
mengatur beberapa aspek mengenai penanaman modal asing. Rancangan
perjanjian ini mengatur berbagai hal yang terkait dengan kegiatan
perusahaan transnasional, seperti praktek-praktek bisnis yang
restriktif, transfer pricing, perlakuan terhadap perusahaan
transnasional, nasionalisasi, apropriasi, ganti rugi, dll.26
Negara-negara maju menentang keras aturan-aturan tersebut di
atas. Mereka berpendapat aturan-aturan tersebut tidak memiliki
kekuatan hukum.27 Mereka memandang ketentuan-ketentuan mengenai
penanaman modal sebagaimana termuat dalam resolusi-resolusi
Majelis Umum PBB di atas sifatnya adalah hukum internasional yang
tidak mengikat ('soft' international law).28
Sejarah pembentukan perjanjian-perjanjian internasional
penting dalam hukum internasional. Hal tersebut menunjukkan bahwa
tanpa adanya dukungan dari negara-negara maju, maka perjanjianperjanjian
tersebut akan sangat sulit untuk dapat berlaku.
Misalnya saja, tidak adanya ratifikasi Amerika Serikat terhadap
Piagam ITO telah menyebabkan Piagam ini tidak dapat berlaku.29
Karena itu pula tampak bahwa upaya-upaya PBB untuk
merumuskan dan mengatur penanaman modal gagal karena tidak adanya
24 UNCTAD, supra, note 7, hlm.136.
25 Draft, UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (UN
Doc.5/1988/39/- add.1.)
26 UNCTAD, supra, note 7, hlm.136.
27 Pembahasan lebih lanjut dan evaluasi terhadap beberapa pendapat
sarjana mengenai masalah ini, lihat: Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern,
International Economic Law (Dordrecht, Boston, London; Martinus Nijhoff
Publisher, 2nd.ed., 1992), khususnya hlm. 37-42.
28 UNCTAD, supra, note 7, hlm. 137.
29 Contoh lainnya adalah penolakan negara-negara maju untuk menaati
ketentuan-ketentuan dalam Bab XI dari Konvensi Hukum Laut 1982 (United
Nations Convention on Law of the Sea of 1982).
13
dukugan dari negara maju. Sejalan dengan itu pula, keengganan
negara-negara sedang berkembang secara umum untuk mengatur masalah
ini berdasarkan GATT merupakan alasan lainnya mengapa pengaturan
penanaman modal khususnya TRIMS juga lambat untuk berkembang.
Tahun 1970 Goldberg and Kindleberger dalam suatu tulisannya
berjudul 'Towards a GATT for Investment: A Proposal for
Supervision of the International Corporation,'30 mengusulkan suatu
pengaturan internasional komprehensif mengenai penanaman modal.
Mereka berhasil mengemukakan berbagai hal yang menjadi penghalang
bagi penanaman modal, termasuk di dalamnya adalah kontrol neraca
pembayaran, kontrol ekspor dan pengaturan mengenai jaminan
(securities regulation) terhadap perusahaan transnasional.
Goldberg dan Kindleberger juga mengemukakan dua usulan
penting berkaitan dengan penanaman modal ini, yaitu pertama
perlunya membentuk suatu ‘General Agreement for International
Corporation’ (‘the Agreement’). Kedua, perlunya membentuk suatu
badan khusus yang bertugas untuk melaksanakan the Agreement
tersebut.31
Peranan Bank Dunia di dalam mengembangkan aturan-aturan
internasional mengenai penanaman modal juga cukup besar.
30 Paul M. Goldberg and Charles P. Kindleberger, 'Towards A GATT for
Investment: A Proposal for Supervision of the International
Corporation,' 2 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 295-325 (1970).
31 Goldberg and Kindleberger, ibid, hlm. 323. Upaya lain yang juga
penting untuk dikemukakan di sini adalah upaya Bank Dunia yang berupaya
mempersiapkan suatu ketentuan internasional mengenai penanaman modal
asing. Karya komprehensif yang membahsa hal ini adalah Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata yang berhasil merampungkan dan menerbitkan 'Guidelines on the
Treatment of Foreign Direct investment.' Namun demikian karya penting
tersebut tetap hanyalah sebagai pedoman semata ('guideline'). Ia tidak
memiliki kekuatan hukum yang mengikat negara-negara. (Lihat: World Bank,
Legal Framework for the Treatment of Foreign Investment, Vol.: 1; Survey
14
Khususnya, Bank Dunia membantu penyelesaian sengketa mengenai
penanaman modal dan di dalam memberikan jaminan bagi penanaman
modal. Perjanjian multilateral pertama yang berhasil dibuat adalah
the Convention on the Establishment of an International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States (ICSID). Konvensi ini berlaku pada tanggal 14
Oktober 1966. ICSID mengatur prosedur penyelesaian sengketa
penanaman modal. ICSID juga memiliki suatu daftar nama-nama orang
yang berkualitas sebagai konsiliator atau arbitrator yang dapat
dipilih oleh para pihak yang bersengketa.32
Perjanjian multilateral kedua yang dibuat oleh Bank Dunia
adalah the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Konvensi ini berlaku pada tanggal 12
April 1988. Tujuan utama dari lembaga MIGA ini adalah untuk
memberikan jaminan kepada investor terhadap risiko non ekonomis
khususnya di negara sedang berkembang. Di samping itu, MIGA
berperan dalam menggalakkan aliran penanaman modal untuk tujuantujuan
produktif ke negara-negara sedang berkembang.33
Pada pokoknya Konvensi MIGA tidak mengatur hal-hal pokok
mengenai standar perlakuan dari suatu PMA. Ia hanya menyatakan di
dalam menjamin penanaman modal, MIGA harus berkeyakinan bahwa
of Existing Instruments, Progress Report and Background Studies
(Washington D.C.: the World Bank Group, 1992).
32 Diskusi lebih lanjut mengenai ICSID, lihat: Aron Broches, Selected
Essays: World Bank, ICSID and Other Subjects of Public and Private
International Law (Dordrecht, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), khususnya
Part III; Antonio Parra, 'Provisions on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Multilateral Instrument on Investment,' 12 ICSID Rev.- FILJ 287 (1977).
33 Jurgen Voss, 'The MIGA: Status, Mandate, Concept, Features and
Implications, 4 J.W.T. (1987), hlm. 1-23; Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Multi
15
kondisi-kondisi penanaman modal di negara tuan rumah telah
tersedia, termasuk tersedianya perlakuan yang fair dan equitable
serta perlindungan hukum bagi penanaman modal.34
Beberapa negara di region-region tertentu telah pula membuat
ketentuan atau perjanjian penanaman modalnya sendiri. Misalnya
saja, Perjanjian Roma (the Treaty of Rome) pada 1957 yang
mendirikan MEE. Perjanjian ini memberi kebebasan bagi setiap orang
untuk melakukan usaha di bidang jasa dan modal. Pasal 52 hingga 58
Perjanjian mengenai hak untuk mendirikan perusahaan menyatakan,
antara lain, bahwa kebebasan untuk mendirikan perusahaan (freedom
of establishment) termasuk di dalamnya adalah hak untuk melakukan
kegiatan-kegiatan sebagai orang perorangan (self-employed
persons). Tercakup di dalamnya adalah hak untuk mendirikan dan
melaksanakan usahanya, khususnya perusahaan atau firma,
berdasarkan prinsip perlakuan nasional (national treatment).35
Perjanjian lainnya yang terkait dengan penanaman modal yang
dibuat di region Amerika Utara adalah the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) yang mulai berlaku pada 1994.36 Bab 11
Perjanjian NAFTA memuat pengaturan komprehensif mengenai PMA.37
Investment Guarantee Agency and Foreign Investment (Dordrecht: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1988).
34 Article 12 : 2 MIGA Convention. Bahasan lebih lanjut mengenai peran
MIGA dan ICSID, lihat: Malcolm D. Rowat, 'Multilateral Approaches to
Improving the Investment Climate of Developing Countries: the Cases of
ICSID and MIGA,' 33 Harv.Int'l.L.J. 103 (1992).
35 Pembahasan lebih lanjut mengenai Pasal-pasal 52 hingga 58 Perjanjian
Roma, lihat: John Temple, The Common Market and Common Law (Chicago,
London: the University of Chicago Press, 1966), khususnya Bab 5 (Freedom
of Establishment).
36 The North American Free Trade Agreement mengatur prinsip-prinsip
seperti national treatment, MFN, non-discriminatory treatment, dan
minimum standards of treatment sesuai dengan hukum internasional (untuk
investor dan modal dari negara lainnya. Perjanjian ini juga melarang
16
The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) juga
telah menyepakati suatu perjanjian guna memajukan dan melindungi
penanaman modal pada tahun 1987.38 Tujuan dari perjanjian ini
adalah untuk menggalakkan dan memajukan aliran alih teknologi dan
penanaman modal di antara negara-negara anggotanya.
Pengaturan mengenai penanaman modal di Asia dan Pasifik
(APEC) telah termuat dalam suatu pengaturan khusus mengenai
penanaman modal. APEC telah menyepakati suatu prinsip yang tidak
mengikat (non-binding principles) sebagai suatu pedoman untuk
menghapus secara progresif rintangan-rintangan penanaman modal di
antara anggotanya dan perlindungannya.39
Upaya lainnya yang mendapat sorotan kuat adalah usulan dari
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Lembaga negara-negara maju ini mengusulkan pembentukan suatu
perjanjian multilateral mengenai penanaman modal atau the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).40
OECD secara resmi mengusulkan MAI pada the Ministerial
Meeting OECD pada bulan Mei 1995. Prinsip utama yang diemban MAI
adalah prinsip non-diskriminasi dengan menekankan aspek-aspek
sebagai berikut:
penerapan pensyaratan pelaksanaan (performance requirement). (Lihat:
UNCTAD, supra, note 7, p.137).
37 The NAFTA diterbitkan dalam 32 ILM 289 (1993); lihat juga:
.
38 Teks perjanjian ASEAN untuk Penggalakan dan perlindungan Penanaman
Modal tanggal 15 Desember 1987 diterbitkan pula di dalam 27 ILM 612
(1988), lihat juga website: .
39 Lihat: M. Sornarajah, 'Protection of Foreign Investment in the Asia-
Pacific Economic Co-operation Region,' 29 J.W.T. 2 (1995), hlm. 105 -
129. Lihat pula website: .
17
1) prinsip perlakuan nasional (national treatment) yang
mensyaratkan perusahaan-perusahaan asing dan domestik dan
penanaman modal untuk diperlakukan secara sama (adil);
2) Prinsip transparansi yang mensyaratkan para anggotanya untuk
menerapkan prinsip transparansi di dalam peraturan
perundangannya (beserta implikasinya) terhadap anggota
lainnya; dan
3) prinsip pengaturan konsiliasi dan penyelesaian sengketa yang
spesifik.41
Dinyatakan pula bahwa manakala MAI ini kelak disahkan, maka
instrumen ini akan mengikat secara hukum. MAI akan pula berlaku
tidak saja kepada negara anggota OECD, tetapi juga terhadap semua
negara yang mau tunduk kepadanya, termasuk negara sedang
berkembang.42
Sebagaimana telah direncanakan, MAI akan dipandang sebagai
perjanjian multilateral pertama yang mengatur penanaman modal
asing secara umum di samping pengaturan yang telah ada yang
sifatnya sektoral. Misalnya, pengaturan penyelesaian sengketa di
bidang penanaman modal asing seperti ICSID atau pengaturan
mengenai penjaminan penanaman modal (misalnya investment guarantee
dalam MIGA).
Namun demikian, perkembangan mengenai perundingan dari
instrumen ini sangatlah sulit. Adanya pendekatan yang tidak
40 William H. Witherel, 'The OECD Multilateral Agreement on
Investment,'4:2 Transnational Corporation 1-14 (1995); Preston and
Windsor, supra, note 1, hlm. 140.
41 Preston and Windsor, supra, note 1, hlm. 140.
42 Preston and Windsor, supra, note 1, hlm. 140.
18
konsisten dari para juru runding MAI telah menuai banyak kritik
para sarjana.43
Pembahasan lebih lanjut mengenai peraturan multilateral
mengenai penanaman modal dilakukan kembali setelah dirampungkannya
putaran (perundingan) Tokyo tahun 1979. Beberapa negara maju
mencoba untuk memasukkan masalah penanaman modal asing ini di
dalam GATT. Mereka berupaya keras untuk membatasi persyaratan
pelaksanaan (perfomance requirement) oleh negara tuan rumah dalam
hubungannya dengan persyaratan penggunaan kandungan lokal hingga
persyaratan ekspor (local content - export performance).
Upaya-upaya di atas juga telah gagal. Sebagian besar negara
sedang berkembang enggan merundingkan masalah ini dalam kerangka
GATT. Mereka tetap berpendirian, GATT tidak mengurus penanaman
modal.
Kemajuan penting mengenai upaya pengaturan penanaman modal
di dalam kerangka GATT terjadi di tahun 1982. Waktu itu timbul
sengketa antara Amerika Serikat dan Kanada mengenai keabsahan UU
PMA Kanada yang terkenal bernama the Administration of the Foreign
Investment Review Act (FIRA).44
43 M. Sornarajah, A Developing Country Perspective on International
Economic Law in the Context of Dispute Settlement, (Manuscript, 2001,
hlm. 17). Lihat pula upaya yang dilakukan oleh the Friends of Earth,
suatu LSM yang bergerak di bidang perlindungan lingkungan. LSM ini
mengkritik dengan tajam dan menentang dibentuknya MAI, dengan alasan
bahwa MAI akan membiarkan investor asing merusak lingkungan. (Lihat:
website: ; David Henderson, The MAI
Affair: A Story and Its Lessons (London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1999).
44 Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA)
(Panel Report) (GATT B.I.S.D 30s/140 (disahkan pada tanggal 7 Februari),
Pierre Pescatore, William J.Davey & Andreas F.Lowenfeld, eds., Handbook
of WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement (Vol I, 1997), Cs 54/1; GATT Analytical
Index, pp 165 et.segg. [Lihat addendum bab ini].
19
Sebelum UU ini disahkan, Amerika Serikat menikmati kebebasan
berusaha dalam bentuk penanaman modal di Kanada tanpa adanya
syarat-syarat yang membebaninya.45 Namun, di tahun 1973, Kanada
mengundangkan FIRA yang mensyaratkan para investor asing untuk
membeli barang-barang atau produk Kanada dibandingkan dengan
produk impor dari negara lain. Amerika Serikat yang terkena banyak
dampak oleh UU ini, menganggap bahwa FIRA melanggar pasal III:4,
III:5, XI and XVI:1 (c) GATT.
Sebelum GATT menangani kasus ini, negara-negara sedang
berkembang yang diwakili oleh Argentina sempat mempermasalahkan
jurisdiksi atau kewenangan GATT untuk mengadili sengketa penanaman
modal. Negara sedang berkembang berpendapat GATT tidak memiliki
jurisdiksi untuk menangani sengketa mengenai perundangan PMA.
Meskipun ada keberatan, Dewan GATT (GATT Council) ternyata
memberi lampu hijau kepada panel GATT untuk memeriksa kasus
tersebut. Dewan GATT juga menyatakan, kewenangan GATT di dalam
menangani kasus ini hanya dibatasi semata-mata kepada kewajiban
perdagangan negara anggota GATT.46
Panel GATT memutuskan, upaya atau persyaratan untuk membeli
produk-produk asli Kanada dibandingkan dengan produk impor dari
negara lain secara jelas menunjukkan bahwa Kanada telah memberikan
45 Rodney de C. Grey, '1992, TRIM and the Uruguay Round,' dalam: Uruguay
Round: Further Papers on Selected Issues, UNCTAD, (New York: United
Nations, 1990), hlm. 239.
46 Penting dikemukakan di sini bahwa dengan memperhatikan kepentingan
negara sedang berkembang, Panel GATT telah memutuskan untuk tidak
menguji aturan-aturan khusus yang berlaku terhadap penanaman modal di
negara sedang berkembang, seperti misalnya pasal XVIII:c (Lihat: Pierre
Pescatore, William J. Davey, Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Handbook of WTO/GATT
Dispute Settlement (Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational
Publishers, 1997).
20
perlakuan yang lebih ‘favourable’ (menguntungkan) daripada yang
diberikan kepada produk-proudk sejenis dari negara lainnya.
Panel juga menyatakan bahwa kebijakan PMA Kanada yang
termuat dalam FIRA adalah bertentangan dengan Pasal III:4 GATT.
Pasal III:4 menyatakan bahwa produk-produk impor harus diberikan
perlakuan yang tidak boleh kurang daripada perlakuan yang
diberikan kepada produk yang sama dalam hubungannya dengan
persyaratan-persyaratan yang mempengaruhi jual beli, penawaran,
pembelian, pengangkutan, distribusi atau penggunaannya secara
lintas batas (internasional).47
Panel berpendapat, upaya-upaya yang mensyaratkan agar
membeli produk Kanada tidak mencegah masuknya produk-produk impor
dan karenanya tidaklah bertentangan dengan pasal XI:1 GATT
mengenai larangan resktiktif kuantitatif. Panel juga menyimpulkan,
persyaratan-persyaratan yang dikenakan oleh Kanada bahwa investor
harus membuat pernyataan secara tertulis dan bahwa mereka akan
mengekspor produksinya dalam jumlah tertentu tidaklah bertentangan
dengan pasal XVI:1.48
Panel dalam sengketa ini telah hati-hati untuk tidak
menerapkan prinsip non-diskriminasi di dalam pasal III GATT di
47 Dalam kesimpulannya, Panel memutus sebagai berikut:
'The Panel sympathized with the desire of the Canadian authorities to
ensure that Canadian goods and suppliers would be given a fair chance to
compete with imported goods. However, the Panel holds the view that the
purchase requirements under examination do not stop short of this
objective but tend to tip the balance in favour of Canadian products,
thus coming into conflict with Article III:4....
'…Purchase requirement supplied to foreign investors in Canada which are
inconsistent with article III:4 can affect the trade interest of all
contracting parties, and impinge upon their rights.' (Huruf miring oleh
kami).
48 UNCTAD, supra, note 7, hlm. 138.
21
dalam kasus penanaman modal ini. Di samping itu, Panel dengan
tegas menyatakan bahwa ia tidak memiliki kewenangan untuk
mengadili apakah para investor asing telah terpengaruh oleh adanya
persyaratan untuk membeli (purchase requirements).49
Kasus ini merupakan kasus yang penting di dalam penyelesaian
sengketa GATT. Putusan Dewan GATT yang merestui panel untuk
melanjutkan penyelidikannya dalam menangani kasus ini merupakan
terobosan hukum dan langkah inovatif Panel.
Namun demikian, persetujuan Dewan GATT tersebut tampaknya
agak berlebihan. Pokok sengketa dalam kasus ini bukanlah masalah
perdagangan atau sengketa mengenai tarif, suatu wilayah jurisdiksi
GATT. Jelas tampak bahwa sebenarnya pokok sengketanya adalah
penanaman modal.
Maka dari itu sangatlah sulit untuk diterima bahwa GATT
sebagai suatu organisasi internasional yang mengatur masalah
perdagangan dan tarif harus menangani masalah atau sengketa
penanaman modal. Kasus ini memberi preseden ‘buruk’, bahwa setiap
sengketa atau pokok perkara yang ternyata dapat mempengaruhi
perdagangan, maka sengketa tersebut (baik berupa perburuhan,
lingkungan, hak asasi manusia, dll) yang dapat dikatakan sebagai
terkait dengan perdagangan maka dapat ditafsirkan pula sebagai
sengketa yang terkait dengan perdagangan (trade related).
49 GATT BISD, 30th supp. art 167 (1984). Kanada menerima putusan Panel.
Namun negara-negara sedang berkembang berpendapat, putusan tersebut
tidak berlaku untuk mereka sehubungan dengan seringnya negara-negara ini
mensyaratkan penggunaan kandungan lokal sebagai kebijakan penanaman
modal mereka berdasarkan pasal XVIII.c GATT. Lihat: Edward M. Graham,
supra, (should there be) note 15, hlm.48. Cf., Sarjana lain yang
mendukung posisi Kanada: lihat: R.ST.J Macdonald, 'Trade Related
Performance Requirement and the GATT', dalam: Jerzy Makarczyk, (ed.),
22
Sengketa FIRA ini dan adanya fakta bahwa terdapat banyak
negara yang mempraktekkan TRIMS yang memiliki pengaruh langsung
dengan perdagangan telah menjadi pendorong penting bagi Amerika
Serikat untuk memasukkan masalah TRIMS ini ke dalam agenda
perundingan GATT di Uruguay Round.
Kehendak Amerika Serikat untuk memasukkan isu ini telah
dimulai di tahun 1981 tatkala Amerika Serikat mengeluarkan suatu
kebijakan perdagangannya yang tertuang di dalam '1981 White
Paper.' Dokumen ini menyatakan keinginan pemerintah Amerika
Serikat untuk memasukkan isu penanaman modal ke dalam perundingan
perdagangan.50 Amerika Serikat menghendaki masuknya TRIMS ini yang
akan mencakup antara lain:
a. pengaturan mengenai upaya-upaya yang mengganggu aliran
perdagangan dan penanaman modal dengan merugikan negara anggota
lainnya;
b. hak untuk melakukan penanaman modal;
c. pemberlakuan prinsip national treatment dan MFN untuk penanaman
modal yang baru.51
Uraian di atas menunjukkan, upaya hukum intenasional untuk
mengatur penanaman modal asing tampaknya masih sangat sulit. Hukum
di bidang ini yang telah berkembang pada awal abad ke 20, ternyata
belum dapat berkembang secara memuaskan. Meskipun telah cukup
Essays in International Law in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs, (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), hlm. 717 et.seqq.
50 David Greenaway, 'Why Are We Negotiating on TRIMs,' dalam: David
Greenaway, et.al., (eds.), Global Protectionism, (London: Macmillan,
1991), hlm. 145.
51 Stephen J. Canner, 'Trade and International Investment: From GATT to
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,' dalam: Joseph F. Dennin,
(ed)., Law and Practice of the World Trade Organization (New York:
Oceana Publ., 1995), hlm. 3.
23
banyak kajian dilakukan oleh para sarjana dan berbagai organisasi
internasional, namun tidak ada satu aturan pun yang dapat mencakup
semua aspek dari bidang penanaman modal ini.
Luasnya ruang lingkup penanaman modal telah membuat upaya
pembentukan hukum komprensif tersebut gagal. Misalnya saja, di
dalam proses penanaman modal, para calon investor akan segera
menghadapi hukum administrasi (proses 'screening'), hukum
perusahaan (pendirian badan usaha asing), alih teknologi dan hak
atas kekayaan intelektual.
Bidang hukum lainnya adalah hukum mengenai praktek bisnis
restriktif (restrictive business practices), hukum persaingan,
hukum lingkungan, perburuhan dan hak asasi manusia, hukum keuangan
(perpajakan, pengembalian keuntungan, dan masalah-masalah keuangan
lainnya, hukum perdagangan internasional dalam GATT, serta
penyelesaian sengketa di dalam GATT. Yang juga penting adalah
masalah-masalah sensitif seperti politik yang dapat mempengaruhi
kebijakan negara tuan rumah. Dalam hal ini yang terutama adalah
adanya ketakutan bahwa masuknya penanaman modal asing tersebut
akan mempengaruhi kebijakan politik negara tuan rumah.
Di samping itu, tampak bahwa pembentukan aturan-aturan
multilateral di bidang ini masih jauh dari kenyataan. Alasan
utamanya, pertama, adanya pendangan yang berbeda antara negara
maju dan sedang berkembang sehubungan dengan tetap adanya dua
kepentingan yang berbeda mengenai penanaman modal. Negara sedang
berkembang menyandarkan kepada tujuan pembangunan ekonomi
nasionalnya. Sebaliknya investor asing berupaya mendapat
24
keuntungan yang besarnya dari modal yang ditanamnya. Dua kubu
kepentingan yang berbeda ini sulit didamaikan.
Kedua, terdapatnya berbagai organisasi regional dengan
berbagai bentuk perjanjian regional di bidang penanaman modal.
Organisasi-organisasi ini berupaya membentuk suatu hukum
perjanjian di bidang ini.
Upaya-upaya tersebut menyebabkan dan menunjukkan sulitnya di
dalam merumuskan aturan hukum internasional di bidang ini. Hal ini
juga dipersulit oleh adanya perbedaan pandangan yang cukup tajam,
perbedaan tingkat pertumbuhan ekonomi dan keadaan-keadaan khusus
di setiap negara.
Ketiga, adanya fakta seperti tesebut di atas bahwa
organisasi internasional multilateral hingga saat ini hanya dapat
merumuskan aturan-aturan penanaman modal yang sifatnya sektoral
atau sebagian kecil saja dari penanaman modal. Hal ini mempertegas
sekaligus memperlihatkan sulitnya merumuskan aturan hukum
internasional di bidang ini.
Keempat, adanya upaya yang ‘terbatas’ yang gagal untuk
mencakup semua sektor akan mengakibatkan gagalnya upaya tersebut.
Upaya terbatas yang bersifat tanggung ini tampak misalnya dalam
hal pembahasan mengenai MAI.
25
ADDENDUM
CANADA - ADMINISTRATION OF THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW ACT
Report of the Panel adopted on 7 February 1984
(L/5504 - 30S/140)
1. Introduction
1.1 In a communication dated 5 January 1982, the United States requested the government of
Canada to consult under Article XXII:1 on the administration of the Canadian Foreign Investment
Review Act. Among the issues which the United States wished to raise in the consultation was the
practice of the government of Canada to enter into agreements with foreign investors according to
which these are to give preference to the purchase of Canadian goods over imported goods and to
meet certain export performance requirements. The communication was circulated to the contracting
parties on 7 January 1982 (L/5280). Since the consultation did not lead to a solution, the United
States, in a communication dated 19 March 1982, referred the matter to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES in accordance with Article XXIII:2 (L/5308).
1.2 At its meeting on 31 March 1982 the Council agreed to establish a Panel and authorized its
Chairman, in consultation with the two parties concerned and with other interested contracting parties,
to decide on appropriate terms of reference and, in consultation with the two parties concerned, to
designate the Chairman and the members of the Panel.
1.3 At the meeting of the Council on 2 November 1982 the Chairman of the Council informed the
Council that these consultations had been held and that the following composition and terms of
reference had been agreed:
Composition
Chairman: Mr. T.C. O'Brien
Members: Mr. J.N. Feij
Mr. M. Ikeda
Terms of Reference
"To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States concerning the administration of the Foreign
Investment Review Act of Canada with respect to the purchase of goods in Canada and/or
export of goods from Canada by certain firms subject to that Act; and to make such findings as
will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or rulings provided
for in paragraph 2 of Article XXIII."
1.4 At the Council meeting, a number of delegations expressed doubts whether the dispute
between the United States and Canada was one for which the GATT had competence since it
involved investment legislation, a subject not covered by the GATT. They therefore reserved their
position on the terms of reference (C/M/162, pages 25-26). The representative of the United States
said that his government was not calling into question the Canadian investment legislation as such
but was complaining about the two specific trade-related issues mentioned in the terms of reference.
The representative of Canada said that, in the view of his government, the terms of reference
26
ensured that the examination would touch only on trade matters within the purview of GATT. The
Chairman suggested, and the Council so decided, that the terms of reference remain as they stood,
that the reservations and statements made be placed on the record and that it be presumed that the
Panel would be limited in its activities and findings to within the four corners of GATT.
1.5 The representatives of the contracting parties which had spoken on the matter in the Council
were asked by the Chairman of the Panel, in letters dated 20 December 1982, whether they wished to
have an opportunity to be heard by the Panel as provided in paragraph 15 of the Understanding
Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance (BISD 26S/213). Argentina
asked to be given this opportunity and was heard by the Panel on 25 January 1983. (The views of
Argentina are summarized below in paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2).
2. Factual Aspects
2.1 The following description of the factual aspects, particularly in paragraphs 2.3, 2.5, 2.7 and
2.12, contains much information about the Foreign Investment Review Act which is not directly at
issue in this dispute but is useful in placing the dispute in its general context.
2.2 The Foreign Investment Review Act. In December 1973 the Parliament of Canada enacted
the Foreign Investment Review Act. According to Section 2(1) of this Act, the Parliament adopted the
law "in recognition that the extent to which control of Canadian industry, trade and commerce has
become acquired by persons other than Canadians and the effect thereof on the ability of Canadians
to maintain effective control over their economic environment is a matter of national concern" and that
it was therefore expedient to ensure that acquisitions of control of a Canadian business or
establishments of a new business by persons other than Canadians be reviewed and assessed and
only be allowed to proceed if the government had determined that they were, or were likely to be, of
"significant benefit to Canada".
2.3 Section 2(2) lists five factors to be taken into account in assessing whether a proposed
investment is or is likely to be of significant benefit to Canada. These are:
(a) The effect of the acquisition or establishment on the level and nature of economic
activity in Canada, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the effect on
employment, on resource processing, on the utilization of parts, components and services
produced in Canada, and on exports from Canada;
(b) the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the business enterprise
or new business and in any industry or industries in Canada of which the business enterprise or
new business forms or would form a part;
(c) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on productivity, industrial efficiency,
technological development, product innovation and product variety in Canada;
(d) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on competition within any industry or
industries in Canada; and
(e) the compatibility of the acquisition or establishment with national industrial and
economic policies, taking into consideration industrial and economic policy objectives
enunciated by the government or legislature of any province likely to be significantly affected by
the acquisition or establishment.
2.4 Written undertakings given by investors. The Act provides that investors may submit written
undertakings on the conduct of the business they are proposing to acquire or establish, conditional on
approval by the Canadian government of the proposed acquisition or establishment. The submission
27
of undertakings is not required under the Act but, as the administration of the Act evolved, they are
now routinely submitted in support of nearly all larger investment proposals. Many undertakings are
the result of negotiations between the investor and the Canadian government. Undertakings given by
investors may deal with any aspect of the conduct of a business, including employment, investment,
research and development, participation of Canadian shareholders and managers, productivity
improvements as well as practices with respect to purchasing, manufacturing and exports. There are
no pre-set formulas or prescriptions for the undertakings.
2.5 Purchase undertakings. Undertakings with respect to the purchase of goods have been
given in a variety of forms:
- Some involve best efforts to seek Canadian sources of supply;
- some specify a percentage or amount of purchases of Canadian products;
- some envisage replacement of imports with Canadian-made goods in a
specific dollar amount;
- some refer to the purchase of Canadian products, others only to the purchase from
Canadian suppliers (whether of domestic or imported goods);
- some involve a commitment to set up a purchasing division in the Canadian Subsidiary;
and
- some involve a commitment to consult with federal or provincial industry specialists in
drawing up tender lists.
Undertakings on purchases are often but not always conditional on goods being "available",
"reasonably available" or "competitively available" in Canada with respect to price, quality, and
delivery or other factors specified by the investor.
2.6 Manufacturing undertakings. Some firms have given undertakings to manufacture in Canada
products or components of a product used or sold by the firm.
2.7 Export undertakings. The undertakings involving the export of goods have been given in a
variety of forms:
- Some involving development of natural resources are predicated on the development of
offshore markets;
- some involve a specific export target, expressed as a percentage of output or sales, often
to be achieved within a specified time frame;
- some involve assigning to the Canadian business exclusive rights to export either all its
products to certain countries or specified products on a world basis;
- some involve a commitment by the investor to assist the Canadian subsidiary in selling its
products in foreign markets; and
- some involve commitments that the Canadian business will not be restricted from seeking
out and taking advantage of any export opportunities.
2.8 Statistics on the undertakings. The Act came into force on 9 April 1974 with respect to
acquisitions and on 15 October 1975 with respect to new businesses. From April 1974 to
28
September 1982, the Government of Canada has rendered decisions on 4,103 investment proposals,
of which 2,448 were from the United States. Approximately 90 per cent of the reviewable investment
proposals on which the government has taken a decision have been judged to be of significant benefit
to Canada and have, therefore, been allowed. The Panel asked questions about the frequency with
which the various types of undertakings have been given. In order to answer these questions the
Canadian government reviewed a sample of 181 investments allowed in the month of November in
the years 1980, 1981 and 1982. (November was the latest month for which data were available). In
this sample, 55 of the investors or 30 per cent of the total gave no undertakings relating to sourcing.
The remaining 126 investors gave a total of 178 sourcing undertakings. (Some investors gave more
than one sourcing undertaking). Of those 178 sourcing undertakings, 65 per cent referred to the
purchase of goods and services from Canadian suppliers or words to that effect, 15 per cent referred
to purchase of Canadian produced goods. The remaining 20 per cent were sourcing commitments of
other kinds, e.g. to set up a Canadian purchasing division, or to consult with a government body to
identify potential Canadian suppliers. This latter 20 per cent also includes undertakings relating
solely to the purchase of services. 71 per cent of the undertakings to purchase in Canada or to
purchase Canadian produced goods carried a qualification with respect to the availability of goods on
competitive terms.
2.9 With respect to export undertakings in the same sample of 181 investments, 97 investors or
54 per cent of the total gave no export undertakings of any kind. The remaining 84 investors gave 96
export undertakings. (Again some investors gave more than one undertaking relating to exports). Of
the 96 export undertakings, 32 per cent referred to a quantifiable level of exports, e.g. target value of
exports or a percentage of output. The remaining 68 per cent were export undertakings of other
kinds, such as an undertaking not to restrict the export activities of the Canadian business, or to
actively pursue export opportunities.
2.10 Enforcement of the undertakings. Written undertakings given by firms are legally binding on
the investor if the investment is allowed. According to Section 21 of the Act the Minister responsible
for the administration of the Act may apply to the courts for a remedial order in the event an investor
fails to implement undertakings he has given. The Minister responsible for the Act made the following
statement in the Canadian Parliament in 1973 on the enforcement of undertakings:
"In normal circumstances the inability to fulfil undertakings will lead to discussions with the
Minister and perhaps to the negotiation of new undertakings. Like any contract, an undertaking
can be modified with the consent of both parties. If, however, the failure to comply with an
undertaking is clearly the result of changed market conditions - for example, the undertaking to
export frisbees is followed by the collapse of the frisbee market - the person would not be held
accountable. It should be remembered, however, that some undertakings may be tailored to a
range of market expectations."
2.11 All investments that are allowed subject to the Act are monitored by the government of
Canada. If the investment involves specific undertakings the investor is asked at regular intervals for
a progress report on the implementation of his undertakings. All undertakings are monitored at least
once before the file is closed, normally after the fifth anniversary of the date on which the permission
to invest was granted. If the investor's progress report reveals a variation from the undertakings, or
non-fulfilment of them, the investor is asked to provide a more detailed explanation. Depending on
the circumstances, performance of unfulfilled undertakings has so far always been either postponed
or waived, or the undertakings have been replaced by revised undertakings. To date, the Minister
responsible for the administration of the Act has not applied to the courts to enforce an investor's
written undertaking.
29
2.12 Recent changes in the administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act. During the
second half of 1982 some changes were introduced in the administration of the Foreign Investment
Review Act, without entailing modifications in the Act itself. Among the most important changes was
the decision to raise the threshold for the review of new investments or direct acquisitions under the
small business procedures from Can$ 2 million and 100 employees to Can$ 5 million and 200
employees. The small business procedures do not require a full review, except under special
circumstances. Approximately, 85 per cent of all proposals fall within the small business procedure.
3. Main Arguments
3.1 The United States requested the Panel to find that the written undertakings obtained by the
Government of Canada under the Foreign Investment Review Act which oblige foreign investors
subject to the Act
(a) to purchase goods of Canadian origin in preference to imported goods or in specified
amounts or proportions, or to purchase goods from Canadian sources;
(b) to manufacture in Canada goods which would be imported otherwise
are inconsistent with Articles III:4, III:5, XI and XVII:1(c) of the General Agreement, and that the
undertakings which oblige foreign investors
(c) to export specified quantities or proportions of their production
are inconsistent with Article XVII:1(c) of the General Agreement, and that any such undertakings
therefore constitute a prima facie case of nullification and impairment under Article XXIII of the
General Agreement. The United States further requested the Panel to suggest that the
CONTRACTING PARTIES recommend that Canada (a) make clear that it will not regard as binding,
or seek to enforce in the context of the Foreign Investment Review Act, any undertaking of the kind
found to be inconsistent with the General Agreement, and (b) that it cease eliciting and accepting
such undertakings as part of investment proposals.
3.2 Canada requested the Panel to find that the purchase undertakings (paragraph 3.l(a)) given
by foreign investors are not inconsistent with the provisions of Articles III:4, III:5, XI or XVII:1(c) of the
General Agreement, that the export undertakings (paragraph 3.1(c) ) are not inconsistent with the
provisions of Article XVII:1(c) and that, were the purchase and/or export undertakings to fall within the
provisions of one or more of these Articles, they, would constitute measures within the provisions of
Article XX(d). As to the manufacturing undertakings (paragraph 3.1(b)), Canada asked the Panel to
find that these do not fall under the Panel's terms of reference.
3.3 Both parties agreed that the issue before the Panel was not the Foreign Investment Review
Act itself or Canada's right to regulate the entry and expansion of foreign direct investments, but
rather the consistency with the General Agreement of the purchase and export undertakings given by
investors subject to the Foreign Investment Review Act.
(a) Undertakings to purchase goods of Canadian origin in preference to imported goods or in
specified amounts or proportions, or to purchase goods from Canadian sources
3.4 Article III:4. The United States contended that the written undertakings which oblige investors
to purchase goods of Canadian origin in preference to imported goods or in specified amounts or
proportions, or to purchase goods from Canadian sources (henceforth referred to as "purchase
undertakings") violated Article III:4 because they constituted requirements giving less favourable
treatment to imported products than to like products of national origin.
30
3.5 In the view of the United States even those undertakings that obliged a firm to purchase
goods in Canada whenever "available", "reasonably available", or "competitively available" had the
effect of according less favourable treatment to imported goods. Such undertakings prevented the
investor from choosing freely between imported and domestic goods since they obliged him to opt in
favour of domestic products whenever the availability condition was fulfilled. The provisos
"reasonably available" or "competitively available" were vague and involved value judgements
regarding quality, reliability of supply and the like. A firm subject to an undertaking with such a proviso
was therefore likely to purchase Canadian goods even when they were less attractive than imported
goods in order to avoid possible conflict with Canadian officials monitoring compliance who have a
different perspective and apply different value judgements on these matters. Undertakings to
purchase from Canadian sources or suppliers (whether the products purchased were domestic or
imported) would also result in less favourable treatment to imports than that given to Canadian
products because in cases where a product was produced in both Canada and other countries such
undertakings would oblige the investor to purchase imports from a Canadian "middleman" (the
importer/distributor/retailer), thus forcing the investor to incur additional costs in the form of the
middleman's profit if he decided to import, but leaving him free to purchase directly from a Canadian
manufacturer, thereby avoiding the additional cost of the "middleman". Even more discrimination
against imported products would result in instances in which Canadian sources and suppliers did not
stock or distribute imported products sought by the investor.
3.6 Canada held that the purchase undertakings did not constitute laws, regulations or
requirements within the meaning of Article III:4. There was no provision in the Foreign Investment
Review Act, its regulations or any other Canadian act or regulation which stipulated that any
undertaking shall be given by a firm as a condition of investment. While there was an overall
requirement under the Act that a foreign investor demonstrate that his proposal, as an overall
package, was, or was likely to be, of significant benefit to Canada, it was entirely up to him to choose
the means to do this. Frequently, investors chose to offer purchase undertakings in support of their
proposals. Canada further stated that the investment screening procedures were not intended nor
applied so as to provide protection to Canadian manufacturers or to oblige companies to depart from
commercially sound practices. Investors, having decided on their plans for conducting business in
Canada, generally had no hesitation in giving undertakings which reflected these plans. Since both
the investor and the Canadian government had to act in the context of markets in which the investor's
competitors were not subject to undertakings, it was highly unlikely that purchase undertakings would
either be offered or sought that departed significantly from the purchasing practices the investor would
follow in the absence of the undertaking. Where undertakings were given, they reflected a decision
by the investor about how he intended to conduct his business in Canada. Undertakings would only
represent a cost to the investor if they did not reflect his business intentions. When investors gave
purchase undertakings without any qualification as to the competitive availability of goods in Canada,
it was usually because either the investor had already identified his sources of supply, or, given the
nature of his business, purchases were ordinarily made locally. A review of the circumstances of the
investment proposals specifically cited by the United States in their submission did not support the
claim that the undertakings given in these proposals had to be regarded as requirements.
3.7 The United States replied that it was true that the Act itself did not require investors to offer
undertakings, but, once given, the undertakings had to be regarded as requirements in the light of the
circumstances in which they were offered and accepted and of their legally binding character. No
private business would bind its future purchasing practices unless the achievement of some benefit or
the avoidance of some penalty was made contingent upon that binding. The investors only offered
undertakings in order to obtain the Canadian government's approval of their investment proposals.
Moreover, there were many cases in which purchase undertakings were the result of negotiations in
which Canada sought new or "improved" undertakings. The government of Canada itself had
31
indicated that most of the work performed by the Foreign Investment Review Agency established
under the Foreign Investment Review Act centred on the effort to define and to improve the terms of
the original investment proposals.52 Once the investment proposal had been approved, the
undertaking became legally binding on the investor, who was then no longer free to modify his
purchase undertaking without the permission of the government of Canada, regardless of changed
circumstances. In the current economy it was difficult to imagine that a company would not alter
plans it had made more than a year before unless the alteration of those plans entailed a greater
penalty than adherence to them. The threat of legal action and the potential effect of non-compliance
on future requests for permission to invest was not lost on enterprises that had given undertakings.
Canada replied that, although undertakings were not required, where an investment was allowed
which contained undertakings it was both reasonable and necessary for the Canadian government to
have a means by which remedial action could be taken in the event an investment was implemented
in a manner inconsistent with the authority granted. Enforceability under the law simply held the
investor, after he had given the undertaking, to doing what he said he would do. Enforceability served
to discourage the presentation of grandiose or inflated statements by the investor of his intentions so
as to secure approval of his proposal.
3.8 Canada, citing the panel reports in BISD 7S/60 and 25S/49 as precedents, stated that the
word "requirements" in Article III had to be interpreted in conjunction with the terms "laws and
regulations" and in this context it should be defined as a mandatory rule of general application
applying across-the-board to a particular product or range of products. The undertakings, however,
were private contractual obligations of a particular foreign investor. They applied to a specific
investment and not to trade in goods generally. The United States replied that the exercise of many
governmental functions, and the grant of many benefits within a government's power, could be
viewed, or recast to appear, as "private contracts" between firms and the government. To find that
such "private contracts" were not requirements within the meaning of Article III would be to invite
contracting parties to do by "private contract" what the General Agreement did not permit to be done
by laws of general application. There was no basis in the General Agreement or in previous panel
reports for asserting that only across-the-board measures applying to purchases of all products of a
certain category were subject to GATT obligations.
3.9 Canada stated that the word "requirements" in Article III:4 of the General Agreement should
be interpreted in the light of Article 12 of the Havana Charter, which reads in part: "The Members
recognize that ..., without prejudice to existing international agreements to which Members are
parties, a Member has the right... to determine whether and to what extent and upon what terms it
will allow future foreign investments, to prescribe and give effect on just terms to requirements as to
the ownership of existing and future investments and to prescribe and give effect to other reasonable
requirements with respect to existing and future investments". The drafting history of the General
Agreement revealed that it was the intention of the drafters of the General Agreement that the extent
of the rights and obligations under the General Agreement were to be consistent with, and defined
within the broader context of, the Havana Charter. The draftsmen were working within a conceptual
framework that encompassed both trade and investment, and rights and obligations with respect to
both. GATT Article III was amended in 1948 to incorporate the text of the Havana Charter on national
treatment. Canada was not arguing that the Havana Charter was in force but rather that one could
not read into the General Agreement obligations which the drafters of the General Agreement had not
intended it to contain. Given that it was agreed that the provisions of the Havana Charter were to be
interpreted as a consistent whole, it was reasonable to conclude that the meaning of the word
"requirements" in the Charter's national treatment provision corresponding to Article III of the General
Agreement did not encompass "requirements as to ownership" or "other reasonable requirements"
52 1Proceedings of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and
Economic Affairs of 26 May 1981.
32
allowed under the Charter's investment provisions. Although the Chapter of the Charter dealing with
investment was not incorporated into the General Agreement, it was one of the Chapters the general
principles of which the contracting parties, in Article XXIX of the General Agreement, agreed to
observe to the fullest extent of their executive authority pending the ratification of the Charter. It was
therefore reasonable to assume that it had not been the intention of the drafters of the a General
Agreement to include within the meaning of the words "requirements" in Article III of the General
Agreement those "requirements" provided for under Article 12 of the Havana Charter. Thus, if the
Panel were tending towards an interpretation that undertakings were requirements, which in Canada's
view they were not, they would be requirements within the meaning of Article 12 of the Havana
Charter.
3.10 The United States replied that Canada was asking the Panel to decide that a provision in a
draft agreement which never entered into force be interpreted to override specific obligations of the
GATT. The Havana Charter provisions on investment, had they entered into force, would most likely
not have been interpreted to override the Charter's national treatment obligation. A broad range of
requirements - for instance those relating to the employment of nationals, to management, etc. -
could be imposed without conflict with the obligation to grant to imported products no less favourable
treatment than to products of domestic origin. As a matter of common sense and normal
interpretation of an international agreement, the requirements that were contrary to another specific
obligation of the Charter would not have been interpreted to be a "reasonable" requirement within the
meaning of the Charter's investment provisions.
3.11 The United States pointed out that, after the Charter had been abandoned, Article III had
been amended but not to exempt trade-related requirements affecting foreign investors. Canada
replied that Article III was last amended in 1948 whereas Article XXIX went into force in 1952.
3.12 Article III:5. The United States contended that purchase undertakings which obliged the
investor to purchase in Canada a specified amount or a proportion of his requirements constituted
internal quantitative regulations relating to the investor's processing and use of products and that they
were therefore contrary to Article III:5. Canada stated that the Foreign Investment Review Act did not
establish any internal quantitative regulations. In the relatively few cases in which investors had given
purchase undertakings that referred to specific amounts or proportions of the investors requirements,
the figures mentioned reflected the investor's expectations. Regulations were, in the view of Canada,
subsidiary rules of general application promulgated by the executive pursuant to an existing legislative
enactment. The word "regulations" in Article III:5 involved a rule of general application as was the
case in the previous Panel reports which involved Article III:5 (BISD 11S/95 and 25S/49). The
purchase undertakings were firm-specific and did not relate generally to the international trade of the
goods in question; they could therefore not be regarded as "regulations" within the meaning of
Article III:5. The United States replied that each undertaking obviously did not, by itself, have the
same degree of effect as a general regulation applicable to an entire industry. But the effect of such
undertakings was to restrict the internal market for various imported products by requiring individual
firms to use specified amounts or proportions of Canadian products.
3.13 Article XI. The United States claimed that the purchase undertakings operated as restrictions
on the importation of products into Canada and were therefore contrary to Article XI. In the view of
Canada there was a fundamental distinction in the General Agreement between measures affecting
the importation of products and measures affecting imported products. The former were regulated by
Article XI which clearly spoke of "importation" and the latter by Article III which referred to "imported
products". If Article XI were interpreted to cover also internal measures affecting imported products
Article III would have no function. The United States said that, though Article XI was primarily aimed
at traditional import quota systems, the language of the Article was broad enough to cover also other,
similarly restrictive non-tariff barriers not implemented or enforced at the border. In the United States'
33
view the purpose of the undertakings was to limit imports and reserve a portion of the internal market
for Canadian products, which Article XI was intended to prohibit.
3.14 Article XVII:1(c). The United States asserted that the purchase undertakings prevented the
investors from acting solely in accordance with commercial considerations and that they therefore
violated Canada's obligations under Article XVII:1(c). Canada replied that Article XVII:1 only extended
to state-trading and other enterprises the most-favoured-nation principle, and whether or not the
investor was prevented from acting in accordance with commercial considerations was therefore
irrelevant given the meaning of this Article. A careful research which Canada had undertaken into the
drafting history had revealed no reference to national treatment in the discussions leading to the
adoption of Article XVII:1. Under Article 26 of the United States "Suggested Charter for an
International Trade Organization of the United Nations", which served as a basis for the London
Conference in October-November 1946, state-trading enterprises were to accord "non-discriminatory
treatment, as compared with the treatment accorded to the commerce of any country other than that
in which the enterprise is located." At the London Conference the non-discrimination obligation was
reformulated to read: "... the commerce of other Members shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to the commerce of any country, other than that in which the enterprise
is located... ". The formulation of the non-discrimination obligation contained in Article XVII went back
to a draft adopted at the 1947 Geneva Conference. If the drafting changes introduced then had been
intended to include the national treatment obligation in the provisions on state-trading, this
fundamental change would have been referred to in the extensive records of the drafting sessions.
One reference to the Article on state-trading in the records of the Geneva Conference
(E/PC/T/A/SR/10, page 34) confirmed in the view of Canada that this Article was understood to
establish only a most-favoured-nation obligation: a delegate had said in a discussion on government
procurement that the Article on state-trading referred only "to most-favoured-nation treatment and not
to national treatment" and had then proposed that, in drafting rules on government procurement, "you
have got to stick to most-favoured-nation treatment as you have in state-trading."
3.15 The United States stated that it disagreed with the Canadian interpretation for two reasons.
First, paragraph 1(a) spoke of principles of non-discriminatory treatment. Were the
most-favoured-nation principle the only principle intended to be covered, the word principle would not
have been used in the plural. Second, paragraph 2 of Article XVII would be unnecessary if the
most-favoured-nation principle of non-discriminatory treatment were the only principle covered by
paragraph 1(a). Paragraph 2 permitted contracting parties to give less favourable treatment to
imports in comparison to domestic products when purchasing for the consumption of the government.
This exception from the national treatment obligation would be superfluous if the term "principles of
non-discriminatory treatment" only covered the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment.
3.16 Canada said that Article XVII:1(b), and the principles of "commercial considerations" and
"adequate opportunity to compete" it contained, were intended to define the most-favoured-nation
treatment principle with respect to state-trading, contained in Article XVII:1(a). This was made clear
by the opening clause of paragraph (b) which read: "The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this
paragraph shall be understood to require...". The reference to "commercial considerations" in this
context permitted a derogation from the most-favoured-nation principle; it did not impose an
additional obligation of broad import, as the United States suggested. The obligation in
Article XVII:1(c) was that a contracting party shall not prevent any enterprise from acting in
accordance with the principles of XVII:1(a) and 1(b). The word principle was used in the plural
because the most-favoured-nation obligation in the General Agreement involved a number of
principles such as those set out in Article I, Article IV on screen quotas for films, and Article XIII
concerning import quotas. In response to the argument that paragraph 2 of Article XVII would be
unnecessary if the most-favoured-nation principle of non-discriminatory treatment were the only
principle covered by paragraph l(a), Canada stated that a reference in the Geneva Conference to the
Article on state-trading (E/PC/T/A/SR/37, page 7) established that paragraph 2 of Article XVII did not
involve the national treatment principle. Further evidence of the most-favoured-nation character of
34
Article XVII was demonstrated by the fact that Article XVII:1(a) dealt with the purchases or sales of
state enterprises involving either imports or exports. The terms "imports" and "exports" described the
process of a product crossing a border and clearing customs. Once the product had entered or left
the country, it was an "imported" or "exported" product. (Thus Article III spoke of "imported"
products.) The scope of Article XVII was therefore limited to purchases or sales abroad by the state
enterprise. It was not concerned with the treatment by the state-trading enterprise of imported or
domestic products in its domestic market.
(b) Undertakings to manufacture in Canada goods which would be imported otherwise
3.17 The United States stated that undertakings which required a firm to manufacture goods in
Canada with the purpose of substituting a domestically produced good for one that would be imported
in the absence of the undertaking (henceforth referred to as manufacturing undertakings) violated
Article III:4. Such undertakings reserved a portion of the internal market for products of domestic
origin, to the exclusion of imported products. Undertakings obliging the investor to manufacture in
Canada specified parts or components of a particular product were also inconsistent with Article III:5
because they constituted internal quantitative regulations relating to the mixture, processing or use of
products which required that a specified amount or proportion of a product be supplied from domestic
sources.
3.18 Canada stated that Article III:4 did not deal with the manufacture or production of goods and
therefore did not apply to manufacturing undertakings. The undertakings to manufacture parts or
components of particular products in Canada reflected the individual investor's intention and were
firm-specific. They were therefore not "regulations" within the meaning of Article III:5. In the view of
both parties, their arguments on the applicability or non-applicability of Articles XI and XVII:1(c) to
purchase undertakings also applied to manufacturing undertakings (see paragraphs 3.4 - 3.16
above).
3.19 In the view of Canada the manufacturing undertakings were not only fully in conformity with
its obligations under GATT but also outside the Panel's terms of reference. It therefore requested the
Panel not to examine these undertakings.
(c) Undertakings to export specific amounts or proportions of production
3.20 The United States stated that Article XVII:1(c), which prohibited government interference with
the operation of commercial considerations, was also applicable to undertakings to export specified
amounts or proportions of production. The export levels of companies subject to such undertakings
could not be assumed to be the result of a decision-making process based on commercial
considerations. No enterprise would bind itself voluntarily to export fixed amounts or proportions of its
production given the uncertainty of markets and conditions of competition. Once the undertakings
were accepted, the investor could not adjust its export sales in accordance with commercial
considerations, but was dependent on the consent of the Canadian government to make a change in
the undertaking. He might therefore be forced to dump products abroad to meet his obligations.
3.21 Canada reiterated that Article XVII:1 only contained a most-favoured-nation obligation and
could therefore not be applied to export undertakings, none of which made distinctions among
contracting parties. Canada also rejected the contention that an investor might dump goods in order
to fulfil an undertaking. This argument lacked credibility because export undertakings were given by
the investors on the basis of their expectations of future export market prospects and in the
knowledge of the flexible manner in which Canada monitored compliance with the undertakings.
35
(d) Article XX(d)
3.22 Canada contended that, in the event that the Panel were to consider the undertakings to be
inconsistent with Articles III, XI or XVII, then they would fall within the exception provided for in
Article XX(d) of the General Agreement. Within the meaning of Article XX(d), the Foreign Investment
Review Act constituted a law which was not inconsistent with the provisions of the General
Agreement and the administrative practices under that Act with respect to undertakings fell well within
the scope of the types of measures envisaged under this Article as being necessary to secure
compliance with this law. Under any scheme under which a state granted authority to a foreign
investor to invest in its territory, there had to be some means of ascertaining the nature of the
investment for which authority was being granted and that the investment was implemented in a
manner consistent with the authority granted. The written undertakings describing the intentions of
investors served both these purposes. They were the means by which the investment for which
authority was being granted was defined with some precision and, together with the monitoring
procedures of the government, buttressed by Sections 19 to 22 of the Act, they were also the means
by which the government ensured that investments were implemented within the terms of the
authority granted.
3.23 If the government did not have the possibility to enforce undertakings the only recourse it
would have in a case of non-implementation of the terms of the authority granted to invest would be to
render the investment nugatory. This could entail economic hardship and loss of employment. The
enforceability of undertakings and their flexible application provided a reasonable recourse for the
government in cases of non-implementation of the proposal as allowed. Moreover, undertakings
provided the government with a means of assessing, with confidence, that a proposed investment is,
or is likely to be, of significant benefit. Undertakings may be provided with respect to any aspect of
the proposed investment as set out in the criteria listed in the Act to be taken into account in
assessing significant benefit. An investor's plans with respect to the use of Canadian goods and to
exports may properly be considered in assessing the effect of a proposed investment. Many
investors submitting proposals, including those involving services and distributorships, may have no
other means than through purchase or export undertakings to demonstrate significant benefit. If
purchase and export undertakings were not permitted, many potential investors would be denied an
equitable opportunity to demonstrate significant benefit.
3.24 The measures the Canadian government took to secure compliance with the Foreign
Investment Review Act were, insofar as they related to the purchase or sale of goods, identical in all
respects to the measures pertaining to any other aspects of investments allowed under the law. The
Canadian practices in this regard were therefore not disguised restrictions on trade within the
meaning of the opening sentence of Article XX. The detailed explanation given on the need for
undertakings also showed that the undertakings and related administrative practices were not
disguised restrictions on trade.
3.25 The United States stated that the undertakings at issue were not necessary to implement the
Foreign Investment Review Act and that they constituted disguised restrictions on foreign trade. Two
of the conditions of the Article XX(d) exception were therefore not met. The Foreign Investment
Review Act itself did not require any undertakings, not to mention undertakings requiring preference
for purchase or use of Canadian products or adherence to export performance targets. The Act itself
required only that investment proposals be submitted for review to determine whether the proposal
was, or was likely to be, of significant benefit to Canada. The effect of the investment on the use of
Canadian parts and components and on exports was only one of many factors to be taken into
account by the government of Canada in assessing whether a proposal was, or was likely to be, of
significant benefit to Canada. Eliciting or accepting binding undertakings to give preference to
Canadian products or to meet export targets was therefore an exercise of administrative authority
under the Act, rather than a measure necessary to secure compliance with the Act. The undertakings
at issue also operated as disguised restrictions on international trade. A preference requiring
36
purchase or use of domestically produced goods obviously restricted trade. Export performance
requirements restricted trade by creating artificial export targets for products with which the industries
of other contracting parties had to compete. The undertakings at issue, moreover, went far beyond
what was necessary to address the concerns that had led to the enactment of the Foreign Investment
Review Act.
4. Position of Argentina
4.1 Argentina was heard by the Panel in accordance with paragraph 15 of the Understanding
Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance (see paragraph 1.5 above).
Argentina said that a distinction should be made between the purchase and export undertakings and
their compatibility with the General Agreement on the one hand, and Canada's investment legislation
as such on the other. While the former subject could be considered as falling within the competence
of GATT, the latter clearly fell outside the purview of the General Agreement. In this connection
Argentina recalled that it had been decided not to include the question of investments in the
Ministerial declaration in November 1982. The question of GATT competence would need to be
taken into consideration by the Panel in interpreting its terms of reference.
4.2 Argentina further said the dispute before the Panel involved two developed contracting
parties. The provisions and arguments invoked against Canada were not necessarily those which
could legitimately be invoked against developing countries, considering the protection which those
countries had the right to grant under the General Agreement to their developing industries.
Argentina asked the Panel to take this into account in its deliberations.
5. Findings
(a) General
5.1 In view of the fact that the General Agreement does not prevent Canada from exercising its
sovereign right to regulate foreign direct investments, the Panel examined the purchase and export
undertakings by investors subject to the Foreign Investment Review Act of Canada solely in the light
of Canada's trade obligations under the General Agreement. This approach is in accordance with the
Chairman of the Council's conclusions at the close of the discussion of this question at the Council
meeting of 2 November 1982.
5.2 In its statement before the Panel, Argentina also pointed out that the provisions and
arguments invoked against Canada in this case were not necessarily those which could be
legitimately invoked against less-developed contracting parties, given rights to protect national
industries which these contracting parties enjoyed under the General Agreement. The Panel
recognizes that in disputes involving less-developed contracting parties full account should be taken
of the special provisions in the General Agreement relating to these countries (such as
Article XVIII:C). The Panel did not examine the issues before it in the light of these provisions since
the dispute only involved developed contracting parties.
5.3 The Panel considered that the examination of undertakings to manufacture goods which
would be imported otherwise, as requested by the United States (paragraphs 3.1(b), and 3.17 to 3.19
above), was not covered by its terms of reference which only refer to "the purchase of goods in
Canada and/or the export of goods from Canada". Accordingly the Panel did not examine this
question.
(b) Undertakings to purchase goods of Canadian origin in preference to imported goods or in
specified amounts or proportions, or to purchase goods from Canadian sources
37
5.4 Article III:4. The Panel first examined whether the purchase undertakings are to be
considered "laws, regulations or requirements" within the meaning of Article III:4. As both parties had
agreed that the Foreign Investment Review Act and the Foreign Investment Review Regulations -
whilst providing for the possibility of written undertakings - did not make their submission obligatory,
the question remained whether the undertakings given in individual cases are to be considered
"requirements" within the meaning of Article III:4. In this respect the Panel noted that Section 9(c) of
the Act refers to "any written undertakings ... relating to the proposed or actual investment given by
any party thereto conditional upon the allowance of the investment" and that Section 21 of the Act
states that "where a person who has given a written undertaking ... fails or refuses to comply with
such undertaking" a court order may be made "directing that person to comply with the undertaking".
The Panel further noted that written purchase undertakings - leaving aside the manner in which they
may have been arrived at (voluntary submission, encouragement, negotiation, etc.) - once they were
accepted, became part of the conditions under which the investment proposals were approved, in
which case compliance could be legally enforced. The Panel therefore found that the word
"requirements" as used in Article III:4 could be considered a proper description of existing
undertakings.
5.5 The Panel could not subscribe to the Canadian view that the word "requirements" in
Article III:4 should be interpreted as "mandatory rules applying across-the-board" because this latter
concept was already more aptly covered by the term "regulations" and the authors of this provision
must have had something different in mind when adding the word "requirements". The mere fact that
the few disputes that have so far been brought before the CONTRACTING PARTIES regarding the
application of Article III:4 have only concerned laws and regulations does not in the view of the Panel
justify an assimilation of "requirements" with "regulations". The Panel also considered that, in judging
whether a measure is contrary to obligations under Article III:4, it is not relevant whether it applies
across-the-board or only in isolated cases. Any interpretation which would exclude case-by-case
action would, in the view of the Panel, defeat the purposes of Article III:4.
5.6 The Panel carefully examined the Canadian view that the purchase undertakings should be
considered as private contractual obligations of particular foreign investors vis-à-vis the Canadian
government. The Panel recognized that investors might have an economic advantage in assuming
purchase undertakings, taking into account the other conditions under which the investment was
permitted. The Panel felt, however, that even if this was so, private contractual obligations entered
into by investors should not adversely affect the rights which contracting parties, including contracting
parties not involved in the dispute, possess under Article III:4 of the General Agreement and which
they can exercise on behalf of their exporters. This applies in particular to the rights deriving from the
national treatment principle, which - as stated in Article III:1 - is aimed at preventing the use of internal
measures "so as to afford protection to domestic production".
5.7 The Panel then examined the question whether less favourable treatment was accorded to
imported products than that accorded to like products of Canadian origin in respect of requirements
affecting their purchase. For this purpose the Panel distinguished between undertakings to purchase
goods of Canadian origin and undertakings to use Canadian sources or suppliers (irrespective of the
origin of the goods), and for both types of undertakings took into account the qualifications "available",
"reasonably available", or "competitively available".
5.8 The Panel found that undertakings to purchase goods of Canadian origin without any
qualification exclude the possibility of purchasing available imported products so that the latter are
clearly treated less favourably than domestic products and that such requirements are therefore not
consistent with Article III:4. This finding is not modified in cases where undertakings to purchase
goods of Canadian origin are subject to the qualification that such goods be "available". It is obvious
that if Canadian goods are not available, the question of less favourable treatment of imported goods
does not arise.
38
5.9 When these undertakings are conditional on goods being "competitively available" (as in the
majority of cases) the choice between Canadian or imported products may frequently coincide with
normal commercial considerations and the latter will not be adversely affected whenever one or the
other offer is more competitive. However, it is the Panel's understanding that the qualification
"competitively available" is intended to deal with situations where there are Canadian goods available
on competitive terms. The Panel considered that in those cases where the imported and domestic
product are offered on equivalent terms, adherence to the undertaking would entail giving preference
to the domestic product. Whether or not the foreign investor chooses to buy Canadian goods in given
practical situations, is not at issue. The purpose of Article III:4 is not to protect the interests of the
foreign investor but to ensure that goods originating in any other contracting party benefit from
treatment no less favourable than domestic (Canadian) goods, in respect of the requirements that
affect their purchase (in Canada). On the basis of these considerations, the Panel found that a
requirement to purchase goods of Canadian origin, also when subject to "competitive availability", is
contrary to Article III:4. The Panel considered that the alternative qualification "reasonably available"
which is used in some cases, is a fortiori inconsistent with Article III:4, since the undertaking in these
cases implies that preference has to be given to Canadian goods also when these are not available
on entirely competitive terms.
5.10 The Panel then turned to the undertakings to buy from Canadian suppliers. The Panel did
not consider the situation where domestic products are not available, since such a situation is not
covered by Article III:4. The Panel understood the choice under this type of requirement to apply on
the one hand to imported goods if bought through a Canadian agent or importer and on the other
hand to Canadian goods which can be purchased either from a Canadian "middleman" or directly
from the Canadian producer. The Panel recognized that these requirements might in a number of
cases have little or no effect on the choice between imported or domestic products. However, the
possibility of purchasing imported products directly from the foreign producer would be excluded and
as the conditions of purchasing imported products through a Canadian agent or importer would
normally be less advantageous, the imported product would therefore have more difficulty in
competing with Canadian products (which are not subject to similar requirements affecting their sale)
and be treated less favourably. For this reason, the Panel found that the requirements to buy from
Canadian suppliers are inconsistent with Article III:4.
5.11 In case undertakings to purchase from Canadian suppliers are subject to a "competitive
availability" qualification, as is frequent, the handicap for the imported product is alleviated as it can be
obtained directly from the foreign producer if offered under more competitive conditions than via
Canadian sources. In those cases in which Canadian sources and a foreign manufacturer offer a
product on equivalent terms, adherence to the undertaking would entail giving preference to Canadian
sources, which in practice would tend to result in the purchase being made directly from the Canadian
producer, thereby excluding the foreign product. The Panel therefore found that requirements to
purchase from Canadian suppliers, also when subject to competitive availability, are contrary to
Article III:4. As before (paragraph 5.9), the Panel considered that the qualification "reasonably
available" is a fortiori inconsistent with Article III:4.
5.12 The Panel considered the Canadian view expressed in paragraph 3.9 above that the word
"requirements" in Article III:4 of the General Agreement should be interpreted in the light of Article 12
of the Havana Charter, the general principles of which the contracting parties, in Article XXIX of the
General Agreement, agreed to observe to the fullest extent of their executive authority. The Panel
noted that the deletion of Article XXIX of the General Agreement was proposed in 1955 and accepted
by all but one contracting party1, and that - although this Article is technically still in force - it refers to
an instrument which itself has never been implemented and the acceptance of which is no longer
pending as is assumed in Article XXIX. This leaves considerable doubt as to the manner in which its
provisions would have been interpreted if they had entered into force. The Panel further noted that
39
paragraph l(c) of Article 12 of the Charter was to apply "without prejudice to existing international
agreements to which Members are parties", and that paragraph 1(a), (b) and (d) as well as
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article tended to encourage international investments (including
international co-operation in this field). It is therefore doubtful whether paragraph l(c) which reserved
the rights of Members to prescribe "reasonable requirements" should by itself be considered as a
"general principle" in the sense of Article XXIX:1 of the General Agreement. The wording of this latter
provision suggests that it was not the intention of its drafters that contracting parties should
"undertake to observe to the fullest extent of their executive authority" what they would in any case
judge to be in their own interest, nor that they should invoke the Charter to detract from their
obligations under the General Agreement, but rather that they should observe general principles
which reinforced or added to these obligations. _______________
1Protocol Amending Part I and Articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, annexed to the Final Act adopted at the Ninth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES,
published 10 March 1955. This protocol did not enter into force (see Status of Legal Instruments,
page 2-7.1).
In the light of the foregoing facts and considerations the Panel could not subscribe to the assumption
that the drafters of Article III had intended the term "requirements" to exclude requirements connected
with the regulation of international investments and did not find anything in the negotiating history, the
wording, the objectives and the subsequent application of Article III which would support such an
interpretation.
5.13 Article III:5. The Panel then considered the United States contention that purchase
undertakings which obliged the investor to purchase in Canada a specified amount or proportion of
his requirements were also contrary to Article III:5. The Panel noted that these cases had been
characterized by both parties as purchase undertakings (paragraph 2.5) and had also been presented
as such by the United States (paragraphs 3.l(a) and 3.12). In this regard the Panel noted that in
paragraph 5 of Article III the conditions of purchase are not at issue but rather the existence of
internal quantitative regulations relating to the mixture, processing or use of products (irrespective of
whether these are purchased or obtained by other means). On the basis of the presentations made,
the Panel (which was unable to go into a detailed examination of individual cases where purchase
undertakings referred to percentages or specific amounts) therefore did not find sufficient grounds to
consider the undertakings in question in the light of Article III:5, but came to the conclusion that they
fell under the purchase requirements that had been found inconsistent with Article III:4.
5.14 Article XI. The United States further asked the Panel to find that the purchase undertakings
operate as restrictions on the importation of products into Canada and are therefore contrary to
Article XI:1. The Panel shares the view of Canada that the General Agreement distinguishes
between measures affecting the "importation" of products, which are regulated in Article XI:1, and
those affecting "imported products", which are dealt with in Article III. If Article XI:1 were interpreted
broadly to cover also internal requirements, Article III would be partly superfluous. Moreover, the
exceptions to Article XI:1, in particular those contained in Article XI:2, would also apply to internal
requirements restricting imports, which would be contrary to the basic aim of Article III. The Panel did
not find, either in the drafting history of the General Agreement or in previous cases examined by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES, any evidence justifying such an interpretation of Article XI. For these
reasons, the Panel, noting that purchase undertakings do not prevent the importation of goods as
such, reached the conclusion that they are not inconsistent with Article XI:1.
5.15 Article XVII:1(c). The United States requested the Panel to find that the purchase
undertakings obliging investors to give less favourable treatment to imported products than to
domestic products prevent the investors from acting solely in accordance with commercial
considerations and that they therefore violate Canada's obligations under Article XVII:1(c).
40
5.16 The Panel takes the view that, through its reference to sub-paragraph (a), paragraph l(c) of
Article XVII of the General Agreement imposes on contracting parties the obligation to act in their
relations with state-trading and other enterprises "in a manner consistent with the general principles of
non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting
imports or exports by private traders". This obligation is defined in sub-paragraph (b), which declares,
inter alia, that these principles are understood to require the enterprises to make their purchases and
sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations. The fact that sub-paragraph (b) does not
establish a separate general obligation to allow enterprises to act in accordance with commercial
considerations, but merely defines the obligations set out in the preceding sub-paragraph, is made
clear through the introductory words "The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of the paragraph shall be
understood to require ...". For these reasons, the Panel considers that the commercial considerations
criterion becomes relevant only after it has been determined that the governmental action at issue
falls within the scope of the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed by the
General Agreement. The Panel saw great force in Canada's argument that only the
most-favoured-nation and not the national treatment obligations fall within the scope of the general
principles referred to in Article XVII:1(a). However, the Panel did not consider it necessary to decide
in this particular case whether the general reference to the principles of non-discriminatory treatment
referred to in Article XVII:1 also comprises the national treatment principle since it had already found
the purchase undertakings at issue to be inconsistent with Article III:4 which implements the national
treatment principle specifically in respect of purchase requirements.
(c) Undertakings to export specified quantities or proportions
5.17 The United States requested the Panel to find that the undertakings which oblige investors to
export specified quantities or proportions of their production are inconsistent with Article XVII:1(c)
because the export levels of companies subject to such undertakings cannot be assumed to be the
result of a decision-making process based on commercial considerations.
5.18 As explained in paragraph 5.16 above, Article XVII:1(b) does not establish a separate
obligation to allow enterprises to act in accordance with commercial considerations but merely defines
the obligation of the enterprises, set out in sub-paragraph (a) of Article XVII:1, to "act in a manner
consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment" prescribed in the General
Agreement. Hence, before applying the commercial considerations criterion to the export
undertakings, the Panel first had to determine whether Canada, in accepting investment proposals on
the condition that the investor export a certain quantity or proportion of his production, acts
inconsistently with any of the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in the
General Agreement. The Panel found that there is no provision in the General Agreement which
forbids requirements to sell goods in foreign markets in preference to the domestic market. In
particular, the General Agreement does not impose on contracting parties the obligation to prevent
enterprises from dumping. Therefore, when allowing foreign investments on the condition that the
investors export a certain amount or proportion of their production, Canada does not, in the view of
the Panel, act inconsistently with any of the principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed by
the General Agreement for governmental measures affecting exports by private traders.
Article XVII:1(c) is for these reasons not applicable to the export undertakings at issue.
(e) Article XX(d)
5.19 Canada contended that, in the event that the Panel were to consider the purchase
undertakings to be inconsistent with Article III:4, these would fall within the exception provided for in
Article XX(d) of the General Agreement because, within the meaning of that provision, the Foreign
Investment Review Act constitutes "a law which is not inconsistent with the provisions of the General
Agreement" and the purchase undertakings are "measures necessary to secure compliance" with that
law.
41
5.20 Since Article XX(d) is an exception to the General Agreement it is up to Canada, as the party
invoking the exception, to demonstrate that the purchase undertakings are necessary to secure
compliance with the Foreign Investment Review Act. On the basis of the explanations given by
Canada the Panel could not, however, conclude that the purchase undertakings that were found to be
inconsistent with Article III:4 are necessary for the effective administration of the Act. The Panel is in
particular not convinced that, in order to achieve the aims of the Act, investors submitting applications
under the Act had to be bound to purchasing practices having the effect of giving preference to
domestic products. It was not clear to the Panel why a detailed review of investment proposals
without purchasing requirements would not be sufficient to enable the Canadian government to
determine whether the proposed investments were or were likely to be of significant benefit to Canada
within the meaning of Section 2 of the Foreign Investment Review Act.
(f) Other undertakings
5.21 To avoid any misunderstanding the Panel wishes to underline that some of the undertakings
mentioned in paragraph 2.5 above, such as undertakings to set up a purchasing division in the
Canadian subsidiary or to consult with Canadian industry specialists in drawing up tender lists, -
although related to the purchase of goods in Canada - have not been the subject of United States
contention in the Panel proceedings and were therefore not examined. The Panel also wishes to
stress that the considerations relating to the purchase undertakings examined in paragraphs 5.1 to
5.20 remain strictly without prejudice to the status of other undertakings agreed upon in the context of
the Foreign Investment Review Act and referred to in paragraph 2.4 but pertaining to employment,
investment, research and development and other subjects which clearly fall outside the scope of the
General Agreement.
6. Conclusions
6.1 In the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 5.4 to 5.12, the Panel concluded that
the practice of Canada to allow certain investments subject to the Foreign Investment Review Act
conditional upon written undertakings by the investors to purchase goods of Canadian origin, or
goods from Canadian sources, is inconsistent with Article III:4 of the General Agreement according to
which contracting parties shall accord to imported products treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all internal requirements affecting their
purchase. The Panel further concluded that in relation to Article III:5, there were insufficient grounds
to consider the purchase undertakings which refer to specific amounts or proportions under its
provisions (paragraph 5.13). Noting that purchase undertakings do not prevent the importation of
goods as such, the Panel reached the conclusion that they are not inconsistent with Article XI:1
(paragraph 5.14). Further, having reached a decision on purchase requirements in relation to
Article III:4, the Panel did not consider it necessary to make a specific finding on the interpretation of
Article XVII:1(c) in the context of this case, and therefore did not reach a separate conclusion
regarding the consistency of purchase requirements with this provision (paragraphs 5.15 and 5.16).
On the basis of the evidence before it, the Panel could not conclude that the purchase undertakings
that were found to be inconsistent with Article III:4 are necessary within the meaning of Article XX(d)
for the effective administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (paragraphs 5.19 to 5.20).
6.2 For the reasons set out in paragraphs 5.17 and 5.18, the Panel found that Canada does not
act inconsistently with Article XVII:1(c) of the General Agreement when allowing certain investments
subject to the Foreign Investment Review Act conditional upon undertakings by investors to export a
specified amount or proportion of their production. Finally, the Panel considered that the examination
of undertakings to manufacture goods which would be imported otherwise was not covered by its
terms of reference (paragraph 5.3).
42
6.3 The Panel is aware that inconsistency with Article III:4 was not intended by the Foreign
Investment Review Act, which does not require the submission of undertakings, but that this practice
developed as the administration of the Act evolved, to the point that "they are now routinely submitted
in support of nearly all larger investment proposals" (paragraph 2.4 above). This evolution may partly
reflect the need for foreign investors to demonstrate, by this and other means, to the Canadian
administration that their proposed investment would be of significant benefit to Canada. The Panel
sympathizes with the desire of the Canadian authorities to ensure that Canadian goods and suppliers
would be given a fair chance to compete with imported products. However, the Panel holds the view
that the purchase requirements under examination do not stop short of this objective but tend to tip
the balance in favour of Canadian products, thus coming into conflict with Article III:4.
6.4 The Panel recognizes that purchase requirements may reflect plans which the investors
would have carried out also in the absence of the undertakings; that undertakings with such provisos
as "competitive availability" have an adverse impact on imported products only in those cases in
which imported and Canadian goods are offered on equivalent terms; and that the undertakings are
enforced flexibly. Many of the undertakings, though technically in violation with the General
Agreement, therefore possibly do not nullify or impair benefits accruing to the United States under the
General Agreement. However, understanding GATT practice, a breach of a rule is presumed to have
an adverse impact on other contracting parties (BISD 26S/216), and the Panel also proceeded on this
assumption.
6.5 As to the extent to which purchase requirements reflect plans of the investors, the Panel
does not consider it relevant nor does it feel competent to judge how the foreign investors are
affected by the purchase requirements, as the national treatment obligations of Article III of the
General Agreement do not apply to foreign persons or firms but to imported products and serve to
protect the interests of producers and exporters established on the territory of any contracting party.
Purchase requirements applied to foreign investors in Canada which are inconsistent with Article III:4
can affect the trade interests of all contracting parties, and impinge upon their rights.
6.6 The Panel carefully considered the effects of the purchase requirements on trade. The Panel
concluded that an evaluation of these effects would entail scrutiny and analysis of the implementation
of several thousands of often differently worded undertakings as well as speculation on what the
purchasing behaviour of foreign investors would have been in their absence. The Panel could not
undertake such an evaluation and it is therefore not in a position to judge how frequently the purchase
requirements cause investors to act differently than they would have acted in the absence of the
undertakings and how frequently they therefore adversely affect the trade interests of other
contracting parties. The Panel, however, believes that an evaluation of the trade effects was not
directly relevant to its findings because a breach of a GATT rule is presumed to have an adverse
impact on other contracting parties (see paragraph 6.4 above).
6.7 Taking into account all the above considerations, the Panel considered what scope might
exist for modifications of administrative practices under the Foreign Investment Review Act so as to
bring them into conformity with Canada's obligations under the General Agreement. In this
connection, the Panel considered the following Canadian submission contained in paragraph 3.6 of
particular relevance:
"Since both the investor and the Canadian government had to act in the context of markets in
which the investor's competitors were not subject to undertakings, it was highly unlikely that
purchase undertakings would either be offered or sought that departed significantly from the
purchasing practices the investor would follow in the absence of the undertaking."
43
On the face of it, this statement and the above-mentioned considerations seem to suggest that there
may be scope for adapting the administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act in such a way as
to remove the implication that imported products are treated less favourably than domestic products.
The Panel notes that in a previous case another Panel had been confronted with a somewhat similar
situation and had suggested a solution along these lines.1 In the case at issue, the Panel considers
that the Canadian authorities might resolve the problem by ensuring that any future purchase
undertakings will not provide more favourable treatment to Canadian products in relation to imported
products. The Panel's findings also apply to existing purchase undertakings. However, the Panel
recognizes that an immediate application of its findings to these undertakings might cause difficulties
in the administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act. Consequently, the Panel suggests that
the CONTRACTING PARTIES recommend that Canada bring the existing purchase undertakings as
soon as possible into conformity with its obligations under the General Agreement, and invite Canada
to report on the steps taken to that effect before the end of 1985.
_______________
1BISD 7S/66-67: "The Panel considered, furthermore, that if the considered view of the
Italian Government was that these credit facilities had not influenced the terms of competition on the
Italian market, there would not seem to be a serious problem in amending the operation of the Law so
as to avoid any discrimination as regards these credit facilities between the domestic and imported
tractors and agricultural machinery."
1
BAB III
NEGOSIASI TRIMs DALAM PUTARAN URUGUAY (URUGUAY ROUND)
Negosiasi mengenai TRIMs merupakan salah satu agenda penting
selama putaran Uruguay. Agenda ini menarik perhatian cukup serius
dari para perunding, khususnya para perunding dari negara maju dan
negara sedang berkembang. Namun demikian dalam perundingan agenda
TRIMs ini mereka tidak mempunyai pengalaman atau pengetahuan
memadai mengenai apa yang dimaksud dengan TRIMs. Karena itu pula,
dapatlah dimengerti apabila negosiasi di bidang ini merupakan
salah satu perundingan yang paling sulit selama putaran Uruguay.1
Upaya lama Amerika Serikat untuk menempatkan isu atau agenda
penanaman modal dalam GATT cukup berhasil ketika perundingan
putaran Uruguay diluncurkan.2 Namun demikian konflik antara negara
maju dan negara sedang berkembang kembali berlangsung selama
perundingan GATT (Uruguay) mengenai masalah TRIMs ini.
Konflik utama yang terjadi adalah adanya perbedaan pandangan
di antara dua kelompok negara ini mengenai sifat TRIMs. Beberapa
negara maju (industri) beranggapan, TRIMS bertentangan dengan
1 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the
Uruguay Round (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 1995), hlm. 138.
Referensi utama untuk masalah ini lihat: Terence P. Stewart, (ed.), The
GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), vol. II:
Commentary (The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993), hlm. 1997 - 2240; Paul Bryan
Christy III, 'Negotiating Investment in the GATT: A Call for
Functionalism,' 12 Mich. J. Int'l.L 743 - 798 (1991).
2 Penggunaan organisasi (ekonomi) internasional merupakan kebijakan
ekonomi Amerika Serikat. (Lihat: T. L. Brewer and S. Young, The
Multilateral Investment System and Multinational Enterprises (Oxford:
Oxford U.P., 1998), hlm. 122). Laporan ekonomi presiden AS tahun 1998
menyatakan: 'The primary thrust of the U.S. trade policy is to use
multilateral discussions and fora such as GATT and the Organization for
Economic and Development to promote free, rules-based trade.' (W.A.
2
berbagai aturan atau pasal GATT.3 Sedangkan negara sedang
berkembang pada umumnya berpendapat, upaya-upaya penanaman modal
(investment measures atau TRIMs) bukan atau tidak dibuat untuk
merintangi perdagangan. Upaya penanaman modal ini semata-mata
ditujukan untuk memenuhi tujuan pembangunan negara (sedang
berkembang), termasuk untuk tujuan industrialisasi dan
pembangunan.4
Ada juga pandangan yang menyatakan bahwa cukup banyak
pemerintah di dunia yang telah menerapkan upaya penanaman modal
ini.5 Pandangan ini menyatakan, dalam merundingkan aturan-aturan
mengenai TRIMs, maka kajian terhadap pasal-pasal GATT perlu
dilakukan untuk memberi perlindungan yang cukup terhadap hak-hak
dari para peserta perundingan.6
Pandangan lain yang juga berbeda adalah mengenai tujuan dari
perundingan di bidang ini. Sedangkan sarjana baru lainnya
Fennel and J. W. Tyler, Trade and International Investment from the GATT
to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (1995), hlm. 2036).
3 Upaya-upaya yang terkait dengan penanaman modal yang sering dibahas
adalah: local content, yaitu manakala investor disyaratkan untuk membeli
bahan-bahan setempat untuk maksud-maksud produksi; export performance,
yaitu manakala investor disyaratkan untuk mengekspor produknya dalam
suatu jumlah tertentu; product mandating, yaitu manakala terdapat suatu
kewajiban bagi investor untuk mengekspor kepada suatu negara tertentu
atau wilayah tertentu; trade balancing, yaitu manakala investor
disyaratkan untuk menggunakan keuntungannya untuk membayar produk atau
bahan impor; domestic sales, yaitu manakala investor disyaratkan untuk
memberikan produknya kepada pasar dalam negeri; dan exchange
restrictions, yaitu mankala akses investor terhdap mata uang asing atau
kemampuannya untuk mengimpor dibatasi. (GATT, GATT Activities 1990, hlm.
46).
4 GATT, GATT Activities 1987, hlm. 43; GATT, GATT Activities 1989, hlm.
66.
5 GATT, GATT Activities 1987, hlm. 43; lihat juga: Robert H. Edwards Jr.,
and Simon N. Lester, 'Towards a More Comprehensive World Trade
Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures,' 33 Stan.
J. Int'l.L 145 (1997).
3
berkeinginan untuk membuat aturan-aturan yang baru dan lebih luas
mengenai TRIMs. Sebaliknya, negara sedang berkembang menentang
upaya ini. Negara-negara ini berpendapat, negosiasi harus dibatasi
hanya untuk menguraikan aturan-aturan atau pasal-pasal GATT yang
ada yang mungkin dapat diterapkan terhadap TRIMs. Negara-negara
ini juga meminta agar negosiasi harus memberikan kesempatan yang
lebih luas dan kebebasan kepada negara sedang berkembang untuk
mempertimbangkan tujuan pembangunannya.7
Sejak semula negara maju semangat untuk membahas masalah
TRIMs dalam kerangka aturan GATT. Tetapi semangat ini kurang
mendapat dukungan GATT. Mandat Putaran uruguay sebagaimana termuat
dalam the Punta Del Este Declaration (Deklarasi Punta Del Este)
tidaklah seluas yang negara maju harapkan.
Terdapat tiga alasan mengapa Deklarasi Punta Del Este memuat
mandat yang tidak terlalu ambisius. Pertama, di antara negara maju
sendiri masih terdapat tujuan yang berbeda mengenai hasil
negosiasi yang akan dikeluarkan. Beberapa negara maju yang
dipimpin oleh Amerika Serikat berupaya agar tujuan dari
perundingan akan menghasilkan suatu aturan yang luas muatannya.
Menurut negara ini, keluaran perjanjian harus mencakup aturan yang
memuat insentif dan pengawasan terhadap penanaman modal asing.
Sedangkan negara lainnya ternyata hanya menghendaki agar aturan di
6 GATT, GATT Activities 1987, hlm. 43.
7 Paul Bryan Christy III, supra, note 1, hlm. 783; Terence P. Stewart
(ed.), supra, note 1, hlm. 2073; Sidney Golt, The GATT Negotiations
1986-1990: Origin, Issues and Prospects (London: British-North American
Institute, 1990), hlm. 43.
4
bidang TRIMs hanya akan mengatur pengawasan upaya-upaya penanaman
modal yang terkait dengan perdagangan.8
Kedua, isu atau agenda perundingan lainya di dalam GATT
ternyata juga menarik perhatian sebagian besar para perunding,
khususnya perundingan mengenai GATS dan TRIPS.
Ketiga, negara sedang berkembang pada umumnya dengan keras
menentang adanya setiap upaya pembahasan agenda mengenai TRIMs.9
The Punta del Este Declaration mengenai penanaman modal
menyatakan sebagai berikut:10
“Following an examination of the operation of GATT articles
related to the trade restrictive and distorting effects of
investment measures, negotiations should elaborate, as
appropriate, further provisions that may be necessary to
avoid such adverse effects on trade.”
Deklarasi di atas mengungkapkan bahwa negosiasi mengenai
agenda penanaman modal memuat hal-hal berikut:
(1) Negosiasi dibatasi hanya kepada upaya-upaya penanaman modal
yang mempengaruhi perdagangan (TRIMs).
(2) Deklarasi mengakui pasal-pasal GATT dapat diterapkan terhadap
TRIMs.
(3) Perundingan diperlukan guna membentuk pengaturan di masa depan
yang mengatur TRIMs guna mencegah dampak yang merugikan
terhadap perdagangan.11
8 John Croome, supra, note 1, hlm. 138.
9 Stephen J. Canner, 'Trade and International Investment: from GATT to
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,' dalam: Joseph F. Dennin,
(ed)., Law and Practice of the World Trade Organization (New York:
Oceana Publ., 1995), hlm. 3.
10 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Uruguay Round: Papers on
Selected Issues (UNCTAD/ITP/10), 1989, Annex I, hlm. 376.
5
Pada awal perundingan, ternyata perhatian lebih banyak
difokuskan terhadap upaya pemahaman yang lebih baik mengenai
pengeritan TRIMs itu sendiri. Selain itu, para perunding juga
berupaya merumuskan pasal-pasal GATT yang dapat diterakan terhadap
upaya-upaya penanaman modal yang dapat mempengaruhi perdagangan
internasional.12
Perundingan sejak awal berjalan lambat. Hal ini memang dapat
dipahami mengingat pada waktu itu belum pernah ada pembahasan
mengenai hal ini. TRIMs seolah-olah lahir begitu saja tanpa
didahului oleh adanya studi atau kajian yang mendalam yang
dilakukan atau disponsori oleh GATT. Dalam perundingan pun negaranegara
peserta ternyata juga membahas dampak-dampak perdagangan
terhadap TRIMs. Selain itu, mereka mengkaitkannya dengan akibat
atau dampak perdagangan mereka dikaitkan dengan pasal-pasal
GATT.13
Selama proses perundingan, pandangan bahwa TRIMs tidak
diciptakan untuk mengganggu perdagangan masih mendominasi
perundingan. Para perunding percaya, TRIMs dibuat sebagai suatu
kebijakan yang sah guna memenuhi pembangunan suatu negara seperti
industrialisasi atau pembangunan.
11 Lihat Maskus and Eby, 'Developing New Rules and Disciplines on Trade-
Related Investment Measures,' dalam: Robert M. Stern (ed.), Multilateral
Trading System (Ann Arbor: the University of Michigan Press, 1993), note
109, hlm. 458. Mandat yang singkat untuk negosiasi TRIMs ini kelak
melahirkan beberapa penafsiran dan keterlambatan prosedural di dalam
negosiasi. (Lihat: John Croome, supra, note 1, hlm. 1).
12 GATT Focus 52 (1987/88) 5; GATT Focus 54 (1988) 6; GATT Focus 58
(1988) 7.
13 GATT Focus 56 (1988) 5; GATT, GATT Activities 1987, hlm. 42.
6
Negara-negara sedang berkembang mendukung pandangan ini
bahwa negosiasi harus berfokus pada perumusan masalah secara kasus
per kasus. Para peserta perundingan juga telah sepakat bahwa
negosiasi hanya akan membahas dampak yang merugikan dari upayaupaya
(kebijakan) penanaman modal dari suatu negara.14
Suatu komisi khusus yang dibentuk untuk mengkaji masalah
penanaman modal ini bertemu di Montreal pada bulan Desember 1988.
Pertemuan ini telah berhasil merumuskan tujuan dari perundingan
TRIMs, yakni sebagai berikut:
(a) Mengidentifikasi lebih lanjut dampak-dampak dari perdagangan
yang restriktif dan mengganggu upaya-upaya penanaman modal
yang dapat tercakup dalam pasal-pasal GATT;
(b) Mengidentifikasi dampak dari perdagangan yang bersifat
restriktif dan dampak merugikan dari upaya-upaya penanaman
modal yang baik tercakup dalam aturan-aturan GATT namun
relevan dengan mandat sebagaimana tercantum dalam the Punta
del Este Ministerial Declaration.
(c) Mengkaji kemungkinan pemberlakuan aspek-aspek pembangunan
dalam aturan-aturan penanaman modal (TRIMs Agreement);
(d) Upaya-upaya untuk mencegah adanya dampak perdagangan yang
merugikan termasuk, apabila memungkinkan, dirumuskannya
aturan-aturan baru apabila pasal-pasal GATT tidak dapat
14 GATT, GATT Activities 1987, hlm. 42. GATT, GATT Activities 1989, hlm.
66.
7
mengatur upaya-upaya penanaman modal yang terkait dengan
perdagangan.15
(e) Masalah-masalah lainnya seperti bentuk-bentuk penanaman modal
dan implementasinya.
Dari uraian di atas dan dari tujuan dari negosiasi mengenai
TRIMs, tampak bahwa sebenarnya negara-negara para peserta
perundingan tidak memiliki satu kesepahaman pengertian mengenai
apa yang dimaksud dengan TRIMs. Mereka ternyata masih dalam tahap
mengidentifikasi bentuk atau upaya-upaya apa yang dimaksud dengan
TRIMs yang memiliki dampak merugikan terhadap perdagangan
internasional, hubungan TRIMs dengan pasal-pasal GATT, serta
dampak dari upaya-upaya penanaman modal terhadap pembangunan.16
Pada tahun 1988, beberapa negara anggota GATT mengemukakan
proposalnya. Amerika Serikat, misalnya saja, mengusulkan agar
beberapa prinsip aturan GATT, seperti misalnya prinsip nondiskriminasi,
prinsip transparasi dan penyelesaian sengketa dapat
diterapkan terhadap TRIMs. Amerika Serikat mengusulkan perlunya
tambahan aturan-aturan GATT supaya upaya-upaya penanaman modal
TRIMs yang dapat merugikan perdagangan dapat dicegah.17
Negara sedang berkembang menentang usulan di atas. Mereka
berpendapat bahwa negosiasi harus dibatasi hanya kepada TRIMs.
Negara ini juga dengan tepat menyatakan bahwa aturan mengenai
15 GATT Focus 61 (1989) hlm. 8-9; GATT, GATT Activities 1989, hlm. 67;
UNCTAD, The Outcome of the Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment (New
York: UN, 1997), hlm. 138-139.
16 UNCTAD, supra, note 15, hlm. 139.
17 GATT, GATT Activities 1988, hlm. 52.
8
perlakuan yang lebih menguntungkan dan berbeda (bagi negara sedang
berkembang) perlu dicantumkan.18
Selama pembahasan di sepanjang tahun 1989, usulan-usulan
kembali diserahkan oleh berbagai negara peserta. Swiss dan Jepang
misalnya mengusulkan beberapa prinsip yang mempertimbangkan
dampak-dampak dari perdagangan yang restriktif terhadap upayaupaya
penanaman modal. Prinsip-prinsip ini adalah larangan upaya
perdagangan yang restriktif dan komitmen umum untuk menerapkan
semua upaya secara transparan dan non-diskriminatif.19
Amerika Serikat, didorong oleh kepentingan ekonomi dan
kebijakan pasar terbuka, mengemukakan kembali perlu dimasukkannya
perjanjian komprehensif mengenai penanaman modal dalam konteks
GATT.20 Amerika Serikat dalam hal ini mengusulkan suatu aturan
hukum baru yang akan mengatur TRIMs. Aturan tersebut mencakup
penghapusan atau pengurangan dampak dari perdagangan yang
merugikan.21
Amerika Serikat juga mengusulkan pembentukan suatu
Illustrative List dari TRIMs yang akan diuraikan baik pada kedua
kategori tersebut atau pada masing-masing kategori. Usulan penting
lainnya yang dikemukakan oleh Amerika Serikat kepada the
Negotiating Group adalah perlunya pengaturan mengenai
18 UNCTAD, supra, note 15, hlm. 141.
19 GATT Focus 64 (989) hlm. 3; GATT, GATT Activities 1989, hlm. 67;
Terence P. Stewart, (ed.), supra, note 1, hlm. 2093.
20 GATT Focus 64 (989) hlm. 3; Kebijakan Amerika Serikat untuk
merundingkan dengan rekan dagangnya didasarkan kepada UU Amerika Serikat
the U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act, Sect. 1101 (b) (11), 102
Stat. 1107. (Lihat lebih lanjut: William A. Fennel and Joseph W. Tyler,
supra, note 2, hlm. 2036).
9
transparansi, penegakan dan penyelesaian sengketa serta aturanaturan
transisi untuk memberlakukan perjanjian TRIMs.22
Dalam usulan awalnya, Amerika Serikat mengemukakan 3 (tiga)
bentuk kategori dan mengidentifikasi pasal serta prinsip-prinsip
GATT yang relevan dengan TRIMs, yakni:23
1). Upaya-upaya yang membatasi penjualan, pembelian dan penggunaan
(produk-produk) impor di dalam negara penerima (Pasal III, XI,
XIII, dan XV GATT);
2). Upaya-upaya yang membatasi kemampuan negara ketiga untuk
mengekspor (Pasal XI dan XIII GATT), dan
3). Upaya-upaya yang memaksa peningkatan ekspor dari negara tuan
rumah atau yang dapat mengganggu aliran perdagangan di pasar
dunia (Pasal XVI dan XVII).
Keseluruhannya jumlah usulan Amerika Serikat kepada the
Negotiating Group adalah 8 bentuk upaya yang tidak
diperkenankan.24 Amerika Serikat mengemukakan upaya-upaya ini
untuk dimasukkan ke dalam agenda perundingan GATT.
Kemudian Amerika Serikat mengemukakan usulan lainnya
mengenai sampai berapa jauh pasal-pasal GATT dapat diberlakukan
dan mengatur dampak-dampak yang timbul dari adanya TRIMs. Dalam
21 GATT Focus 64 (1989) hlm. 3.
22 GATT Focus 64 (1989) hlm. 3.
23 Stephen J. Canner, supra, note 9, hlm. 5.
24 Pesyaratan tersebut mencakup: (i) local content requirements; (ii)
export performance requirements; (iii) local manufacturing requirements;
(iv) trade balancing requirements; (v) production mandates; (vi) foreign
exchange restrictions; (vii) mandatory technology transfer; and (viii)
limits on equity participation and on remittances (lihat juga: Edward M.
Graham and Paul R. Krugman, 'Trade-Related Investment Measures,' dalam:
10
hal ini Amerika Serikat membuat tiga kategori berupa dampak-dampak
merugikan yang dapat timbul terhadap perdagangan:25
1) pengurangan impor (Pasal III dan XI GATT);
2) pengurangan atau peningkatan ekspor (Pasal I, VI dan XVI
GATT);
3) pengurangan ekspor (Pasal XI GATT tidak cukup untuk memberi
aturan atau landasan hukum).
Masyarakat Eropa (EC) dan negara-negara Skandinavia
beranggapan, perundingan (negosiasi) selayaknya tidak menyinggung
hal-hal yang mengganggu kebijakan penanaman modal nasional.
Negara-negara ini mengusulkan, setiap aturan baru harus berasaskan
pada aturan-aturan dan prinsip-prinsip GATT.26
Usulan yang dikemukakan oleh Komisi EC (The European
Commission) sangat lebih selektif dan berkaitan dengan upaya-upaya
TRIMs yang secara tegas atau diam-diam mengganggu perdagangan dan
aturan-aturan GATT. EC memisahkan masalah penanaman modal langsung
(foreign direct investment) dan masalah mengenai upaya-upaya
penanaman modal yang terkait dengan perdagangan. EC juga menentang
dimasukkannya 'the right of establishment' dan 'alih kekayaan
('transfer of resources') di dalam perundingan.
Di samping itu, EC juga berpendapat bahwa pemisahan tersebut
harus ditarik di antara upaya-upaya penanaman modal yang
Jeffrey J. Schott (ed.), Completing the Uruguay Round (Washington:
Institute for International Economics, 1990), hlm. 152.
25 Stephen J. Canner, supra, note 9, hlm. 5.
26 GATT, GATT Activities 1989, hlm. 67; Lihat juga: UNCTAD, The Outcome
of the Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment, Chapter VI, supra, note 15,
hlm. 141.
11
berpengaruh terhadap perdagangan baik yang secara langsung maupuan
tidak langsung. Dampak perdagangan langsung, menurut EC,
disebabkan oleh TRIMs - berkaitan dengan persyaratan licensing
local equity dan persyaratan alih teknologi, persyaratan
remittances (pengiriman keuntungan ke negara asalnya) dan
pembatasan atau restriksi tukar menukar mata uang asing) dan
insentif-insentif penanaman modal.27 Sedangkan TRIMs yang
mempunyai dampak yang secara tidak langsung berdampak terhadap
perdagangan akan tunduk pada prosedur konsultasi dan penyelesaian
sengketa.28
EC mengemukakan 8 TRIMs yang memenuhi krtieria yang
ditujukan kepada ekspor dan impor dari suatu perusahaan yang dapat
mempengaruhi perdagangan. Persyaratan-persyaratan tersebut adalah:
persyaratan penggunaan produk lokal (local content), persyaratan
untuk membuat suatu produk tertentu (manufacturing), pelaksanaan
ekspor tertentu (export performance), kewajiban membuat produk
tertentu (product mandatory), persyaratan untuk menyimbangi neraca
perdagangan (trade balancing), pembatasan nilai tukar mata uang
(exchange restrictions), persyaratan penjualan di dalam negeri
(domestic sales), dan pembatasan pembuatan suatu barang mengenai
komponen dari suatu produk final (manufacturing limitations
concerning components of the final product).29
27 UNCTAD, supra, note 15, hlm. 140.
28 UNCTAD, supra, note 15, hlm. 140.
29 UNCTAD, supra, note 15, hlm. 140. ME juga percaya bahwa negosiasi
mengenai masalah pengecualian seperti halnya untuk negara sedang
berkembamg hanya akan relevan manakala TRIMs dan aturan-aturan GATT yang
relevan telah dapat diidentifikasi.
12
Negara sedang berkembang agak segan untuk menetapkan tujuan
perundingan di bidang TRIMs ini. Negara-negara ini berpendapat,
perundingan di bidang TRIMs seyogyanya memfokuskan kepada dampakdampak
dari TRIMs yang merugikan, bukan kepada upaya-upaya
penanaman modalnya.30
Usulan dari negara sedang berkembang tidak menekankan kepada
upaya-upaya penanaman modal atau membentuk suatu sistem baru dalam
GATT untuk mengatur upaya-upaya penanaman modal yang terkait
dengan perdagangan. Negara-negara ini yang dipelopori oleh India
dan Brazil berpendapat, tujuan dari negosiasi adalah
mengklarifikasi pasal-pasal GATT dan membuat aturan pasal baru
apabila memang diperlukan.31
Negara-negara berkembang juga menekankan perlunya perlakuan
yang berbeda dan lebih menguntungkan kepada mereka.32 India
berpendapat, dimensi atau unsur pembangunan jauh lebih bermanfaat
daripada membahas dampak-dampak terhadap perdagangan. Upaya-upaya
ini diperlukan oleh negara sedang berkembang untuk mengurangi
dampak dari praktek bisnis restriktif (restrictive business
practices) dari perusahaan-perusahaan multinasional.33
India juga mengusulkan kepada the Negotiating Group untuk
memfokuskan kepada upaya-upaya penanaman modal yang mempunyai
akibat terhadap perdagangan yang sifatnya langsung dan signifikan.
India berpendirian, larangan upaya-upaya penanaman modal tertentu
30 Stephen J. Canner, supra, note 9, hlm. 4.
31 UNCTAD, supra, note 15, hlm. 141.
32 UNCTAD, supra, note 15, hlm. 141.
33 GATT Focus 66 (1989) hlm. 6; GATT, GATT Activities 1989, hlm. 67.
13
adalah sesuatu hal yang baru dalam GATT. India berpendapat, upayaupaya
penanaman modal yang memiliki pengaruh terhadap perdagangan
adalah:
a. persyaratan ekspor (export performance requirements),
b. penggunaan bahan lokal (local content requirement) dan
persyaratan manufaktur (manufacturing requirements) dan
c. persyaratan neraca perdagangan (trade balancing requirements),
dan lain-lain.34
Negara sedang berkembang juga berpendapat, aturan-aturan
penanaman modal internasional yang membatasi atau melarang
penggunaan TRIMs sebagaimana diusulkan oleh beberapa negara maju
merupakan pelanggaran terhadap kedaulatan negaranya. Hal ini
menurut India akan melahirkan kolonialisme baru oleh perusahaan
multinasional.
Selain itu beberapa negara sedang berkembang juga
berpendapat bahwa posisi beberapa negara maju tidak
mempertimbangkan faktor pembangunan di dalam membahas TRIMs.35
Negara sedang berkembang berpendapat bahwa negosiasi TRIMS tidak
boleh terlepas dari aturan-aturan atau pasal-pasal GATT.
Negara-negara berkembang juga berpendapat bahwa suatu
perjanjian multilateral mengenai TRIMS membatasi hak-hak
34 GATT Focus 66 (1989) hlm. 5,6.
35 GATT Focus 64 (1989) hlm. 3.
14
prerogatif pemerintah dari suatu negara untuk mengatur dan
menetapkan kebijakan perdagangannya.36
Selama perundingan di tahun 1990, the Negotiating Group
melanjutkan kajiannya mengenai aspek pembangunan dari TRIMS dan
hubungannya dengan pasal-pasal GATT. Dalam hal ini, beberapa
negara sedang berkembang (seperti Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia,
Cuba, India, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Mesir, Peru, Tanzania,
Zimbabwe) mengajukan suatu rancangan deklarasi. Deklarasi
menekankan perlunya the Negotiating Group untuk membahas dampakdampak
dari upaya penanaman modal terhadap perdagangan (bukan
kepada upaya-upaya penanaman modalnya), aspek pembangunan dari
upaya penanaman modal, dan hubungannya dengan pasal-pasal GATT
yang mempunyai dampak terhadap perdagangan.
Negara-negara berkembang juga menekankan perlunya pengakuan
bahwa upaya-upaya penanaman modal adalah instrumen hukum yang sah.
Upaya ini digunakan oleh para negara untuk memajukan tujuan-tujuan
pembangunan.37 Rancangan deklarasi tersebut, antara lain
menyatakan bahwa hasil dari perundingan harus mendorong aliran
penanaman modal melintasi batas-batas negara, khususnya dengan
maksud untuk membantu aspirasi atau keinginan pembangunan dari
negara-negara sedang berkembang.38
36 William A. Fennell and Joseph W. Tyler, supra, note 2, hlm. 2003.
Lihat juga Maskus and Eby, supra, note 11, hlm. 452. Selama negosiasi,
Singapura, yang mendukung posisi negara sedang berkembang, berpendapat
bahwa TRIMs tidak boleh dipandang sebagai hal yang membatasi atau
melanggar perdagangan manakala tidak ada kerugian terhadap pihak lainnya
ditemukan. (GATT Focus 64 (1989), hlm. 3).
37 GATT Focus 73 (1990), hlm. 10.
38 GATT, GATT Activities 1990, hlm. 47.
15
Negara-negara maju menanggapi pendapat atau seruan negara
berkembang di atas dengan positif. Namun mereka kemudian
menyatakan bahwa perlu dibuat aturan-aturan lebih lanjut guna
menghindari adanya dampak-dampak yang merugikan terhadap
perdagangan.39
The Negotiating Group tidak mampu menjembatani silang
pendapat ini. Hal-hal yang masih belum dapat dipecahkan adalah:
a) ruang lingkup TRIMs;
b) apakah beberapa TRIMs tertentu harus dilarang di dalam aturan
baru; dan
c) apakah suatu perjanjian mengenai TRIMs harus pula mengatur di
dalamnya ketentuan mengenai praktek bisnis restriktif dari
perusahaan swasta (restrictive business practices of private
enterprises).40
Usulan negara-negara sedang berkembang di atas pada pokoknya
menggambarkan pendekatan methodological untuk menentukan ada
tidaknya dampak merugikan dari TRIMs. TRIMs yang dimaksud adalah:
(1) Tidak ada prasangka bahwa upaya-upaya penanaman modal
merupakan resktriksi perdagangan atau menghalangi perdagangan.
(2) Apabila atas dasar kasus per kasus beberapa upaya penanaman
modal ternyata mempunyai dampak merugikan terhadap
perdagangan, dalam hal ini harus dapat dibuktikan bahwa
terdapat kaitan erat antara upaya penanman modal dengan akibat
merugikan terhadap perdagangan.
39 GATT, GATT Activities 1990, hlm. 47.
40 GATT, GATT Activities 1990, hlm. 47.
16
(3) Apabila terdapat kaitan tersebut, maka sifat dari dampak
terhadap kepentingan dari pihak yang berpengaruh harus dapat
dinilai.
(4) Harus dapat ditemukan cara-cara untuk menangani dampak-dampak
dari perdagangan (selain daripada upaya-upaya penanaman
modalnya).41
Selama perundingan di tahun 1991, ketua kelompok perunding
mengadakan serangkaian konsultasi. Konsultasi-konsultasi ini
berhasil merumuskan suatu teks perjanjian TRIMs (yang kelak akan
berperan penting dan menjadi sumbangan kepada Direktur Jenderal
Arthur Dunkel dalam merumuskan rancangan akhir perjanjian TRIMs.42
Rancangan perjanjian menetapkan bahwa beberapa upaya
penanaman modal tertentu dapat merintangi atau mengganggu
perdagangan. Draft perjanjian juga menyatakan, negara anggota
tidak boleh menerapkan TRIMs yang tidak sesuai dengan GATT. Untuk
41 Lihat: UNCTAD, supra, note 16, hlm. 141; Stephen J. Canner, supra,
note 9, hlm.7. Pada awal tahun 1990, Amerika Serikat sebenarnya telah
pula menyerahkan rancangan perjanjian TRIMs. Rancangan perjanjian
tersebut memuat larangan mengenai upaya penanaman modal yang merintangi
perdagangan dan memuat komitmen umum yang berlaku atas dasar nondiskriminasi
(Pasal 1 and 2). Draft perjanjian memuat pula jangka waktu
transisi untuk negara sedang berkembang untuk menghapus TRIMs yang
dilarang (Pasal 3), persyaratan transparansi (Pasal 4) dan pembentukan
Dewan Tetap TRIMs atau Standing TRIMs Committee (Pasal 5). Draft
Perjanjian memuat pula ketentuan mengenai pemberlakuan pasal-pasal GATT
mengenai penyelesaian sengketa (Pasal 6), dan perlunya untuk meninjau
aturan-aturan perjanjian TRIMs secara tetap atau periodik (Pasal 7)
(Lihat: Terence P. Stewart, (ed.), supra, note 1, hlm. 2108-9). Namun
sayangnya beberapa delegasi tidak memberi lampu hijau terhadap usulan
rancangan perjanjian ini. Mereka menganggap usulan rancangan perjanjian
tersebut sifatnya terburu-buru. Mereka menyatakan bahwa prinsip-prinsip
atau konsep dasar mengenai TRIMs harus terlebih dahulu disepakati. Di
samping itu, usulan Amerika Serikat untuk melarang beberapa bentuk dari
TRIMs telah dipandang tidak dapat diterima. Bahkan beberapa negara
anggota beranggapan bahwa usulan tersebut tidak mencantumkan ketentuan
mengenai pertimbangan atau aspek pembangunan (GATT Focus 69 (1990), hlm.
4).
17
menetapkan upaya-upaya penanaman modal apa saja yang tidak sesuai
dengan TRIMS, Perjanjian TRIMs melampirkan suatu Daftar Ilustrasi
(Illustrative List).43
Rancangan perjanjian juga mensyaratkan pemberitahuan
mengikat (memaksa) dari semua upaya yang tidak sesuai dengan TRIMs
dan penghapusannya dalam jangka waktu 2 tahun untuk negara maju
dan 7 tahun untuk negara sedang berkembang. Rancangan perjanjian
juga memuat aturan pembentukan suatu Komisi TRIMs (Committee on
TRIMs) yang tugasnya, antara lain, memonitor pelaksanaan
perjanjian TRIMs.44
Perbedaan pandangan antara negara maju dan negara sedang
berkembang selama perundingan sulit dipertemukan. Hal ini antara
lain karena para pihak masih menganggap masalah ini masih baru.
Perundingan-perundingan sebelumnya dan pengaturan yang ada pada
umumnya menyangkut masalah perlindungan investasi, prinsip ganti
rugi yang timbul dari nasionalisasi dan ekspropriasi perusahaan
asing.
Sedangkan masalah atau agenda yang dirundingkan sekarang ini
masih merupakan isu baru dan sangat 'sensitif' terutama bagi
negara sedang berkembang. Hal ini juga karena masalah penanaman
modal terkait dengan aspek kedaulatan negara-negara ini untuk
mengatur dan mengontrol masuknya penanaman modal. Di samping itu,
untuk negara sedang berkembang pada umumnya, masalah yang dibahas
42 GATT, GATT Activities 1991, hlm. 31.
43 GATT, GATT Activities 1991, hlm. 31.
44 GATT, GATT Activities 1991, hlm. 31-32.
18
sekarang ini sangat berpengaruh terhadap tujuan pembangunan
ekonomi mereka.45
Selain itu, Deklarasi Punta del Este yang menjadi dasar bagi
negosiasi mengenakan tugas yang terbatas bagi negara anggota GATT
untuk menegosiasikan masalah ini. Beberapa pengarang berpendapat,
negosiasi di bidang TRIMs tidaklah mudah karena tidak ada insentif
yang diberikan kepada para pihak untuk dapat mencapai kesepakatan
di bidang ini.46
Meskipun terdapat pandangan yang berbeda antara negara maju
dan sedang berkembang, terdapat sedikitnya padangan yang sama.
Kedua kelompok negara sepakat bahwa terdapat dua bentuk TRIMs,
yaitu persyaratan kandungan lokal (local content requirement) dan
persyaratan pelaksanan (performance requirement),47 yang
45 Cf., Amerika Serikat khawatir mengenai masalah kedaulatan ini
khususnya ketika Kongres Amerika Serikat hendak memutuskan untuk
meratifikasi Piagam ITO. Ketika Kongres pada tahun 1994 membahas
kemungkinan meratifikasi Perjanjian WTO, isu atau masalah kedaulatan
terangkat kembali ke permukaan dan pembahasan mengenai isu kedaulatan
ini, oleh Professor John Jackson disebut sebagai 'the Great 1994
Sovereignty Debate.' (See: John H. Jackson, 'The Great 1994 Sovereignty
Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round
Results,' 36 Colum. J. Transn'l L. 157- 188 (1997).
46 Lihat: Steven Wong and J. Brady Lum, 'TRIMs at the Elevenths Hour:
Prospects and Possibilities for Multilateral Solutions,' dalam: N.
Sopiee and J. B. Lum, (eds.), Towards the Closing of the Uruguay Round
and Beyond, (Malaysia: the Institute of Strategic and International
Studies, 1990), hlm. 53.
47 Sebagaimana dinyatakan di atas, persyaratan kandungan lokal (local
content requirements) mensyaratkan bahwa suatu produk tertentu harus
menggunakan material atau komponen yang berasal dari dalam negeri
(domestic market). Persyaratan ekspor (Export performance requirements)
mensyaratkan bahwa beberapa jumlah tertentu dari suatu produk harus
dijual ke luar negeri (diekspor). (John Croome, supra, note 1, hlm.
139).
19
mempengaruhi perdagangan dan kedua bentuk TRIMs ini layak untuk
dibahas lebih lanjut ('legitimate subjects for discussion').48
Mengingat terdapat perbedaan kepentingan yang tajam antara
negara maju dan negara sedang berkembang serta tugas dari
perundingan ini yang cukup sulit, hasil dari perundingan Uruguay,
sebagaimana tercantum dalam perjanjian TRIMs (the TRIMs
Agreement), masih jauh dari komprehensif.
48 John Croome, supra, note 1, hlm. 139.
1
BAB IV
PERJANJIAN WTO MENGENAI TRIMS
Perundingan mengenai TRIMs, sebagaimana digambarkan di atas,
tidak berjalan mulus. Kepentingan dan perhatian dari para
perunding (negosiator) pada saat berakhirnya perundingan sangat
sedikit. Namun demikian, inisiatif Direktur Jenderal GATT, Arthur
Dunkel sangat berarti. Beliau membuat rancangan perjanjian yang
merupakan hasil dari perundingan mengenai TRIMs. Perjanjian TRIMs
('Perjanjian') pada prinsipnya tidak lain adalah hasil-hasil
kompromistis antara negara maju dan negara sedang berkembang.1
Teks perjanjian TRIMs memuat upaya-upaya penanaman modal
yang dilarang, jangka waktu transisi untuk negara-negara anggota
untuk menghapus praktek-praktek yang dilarang.2 Perjanjian
tersebut juga mengakomodasi kepentingan negara sedang berkembang.
Perjanjian membolehkan negara berkembang untuk tidak menerapkan
ketentuan-ketentuan Perjanjian untuk sementara waktu. Perjanjian
juga memuat suatu ketentuan untuk meninjau kembali muatan
Perjanjian TRIMs.3
Ketentuan mengenai TRIMs sebagaimana termuat dalam Rancangan
Perjanjian kemudian berhasil disahkan menjadi Perjanjian TRIMs
1 Penting untuk dicatat di sini bahwa Rancangan Arthur Dunkel bukanlah
suatu hasil dari suatu perundingan selama 6 tahun mengenai Perjanjian
TRIMs. Rancangan Arthur Dunkel tidak lain adalah ketentuan yang berupaya
mengakomodasi atau berupa kompromi yang diciptakan oleh Arthur Dunkel
(Terence P. Stewart (ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History
(1986-1992), Vol. II: Commentary (The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993), hlm.
2127).
2 Terence P. Stewart, supra, note 1, hlm. 2127.
3 Thomas L. Brewer and Stephen Young, The Multilateral Investment System
and Multinational Enterprises, (Oxford: Oxford U.P.,1998), hlm. 124.
2
tanpa mengalami perubahan yang berarti. Patut diperhatikan pula
bahwa Amerika Serikat yang semula menentang keras dimasukkannya
ketentuan substantif TRIMs secara luas pada akhirnya mengakui
hasil-hasil perundingan mengenai TRIMs. Perubahan sikap ini antara
lain adalah karena perundingan Uruguay Round telah sepakat untuk
memasukkan agenda HaKI dan perdagangan di bidang jasa ke dalam
perundingan Uruguay.4
Perjanjian TRIMs seperti dikemuakkan di atas, tidaklah
komprehensif. Perjanjian ini termuat dalam Annex 1 dari Teks
Uruguay Round Agreement.5 Namun demikian perjanjian ini merupakan
perjanjian yang tersingkat dibandingkan dengan perjanjianperjanjian
lainnya. Perjanjian hanya memuat 9 (sembilan) pasal
ditambah daftar ilustrasi TRIMs.
4 Low and Subramanian, 'TRIMs in the Uruguay Round: An Unfinished
Business', dalam: Robert M. Stern (ed)., Multilateral Trading System,
(Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan U.P., 1993), hlm. 416. Sylvia Ostry juga
menyatakan bahwa di samping sedikitnya perhatian Amerika Serikat pada
masalah ini, negara-negara anggota ME lainnya juga tidak begitu semangat
untuk membatasi penggunaan persyaratan penananam modal (investment
performance requirements) (khususnya dalam upaya mereka untuk
meningkatkan kompetisi industri mereka). (Sylvia Ostry, A New Regime for
Foreign Direct Investment (Washington DC: Group of Thirty, 1997), hlm.
6-7).
5 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiation, Marrakesh, 15 April 1994. Perlu diingat bahwa
ketentuan-ketentuan mengenai penanaman modal tidaklah tercakup dalam
Perjanjian TRIMs, tetapi juga dalam Perjanjian WTO lainnya. Ketentuan
mengenai penanaman modal terdapat pula dalam Perjanjian Perdagangan yang
terkait dengan Jasa (GATS), Perjanjian mengenai Hak Atas Kekayaan
Intelektual (TRIPs Agreement), dan bahkan dalam aturan mengenai
Penyelesaian Sengketa Dagang (the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes). Namun demikian, perjanjianperjanjian
lainnya ini tidak secara langsung mengatur penanaman modal.
Analisis lebih lanjut mengenai hal ini, lihat, misalnya, Sir Leon
Brittan, 'Building on the Singapore Ministerial: Trade, Investment and
Competition,' dalam: J. Bhagwati and M. Hirsch, (eds.), The Uruguay
Round and Beyond (Verlag: Springer, 1998), hlm. 275; Thomas L. Brewer
and Stephen Young, The Multilateral Investment System and Multinational
Enterprises (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1998), hlm. 126-130; WTO, Trade and
3
Preambul Perjanjian TRIMs memuat dan menegaskan putusan
mandat Deklarasi Punta Del Este bahwa beberapa upaya penanaman
modal tertentu "can cause trade-restrictive and distorting
effects" (' dapat menyebabkan rintangan terhadap perdagangan dan
berakibat yang merugikan').
Pasal 1 Perjanjian menyatakan bahwa perjanjian hanya terkait
dengan perdagangan di bidang barang (yang terkait dengan penanaman
modal). Pasal ini dengan jelas menyatakan keinginan negara sedang
berkembang yang menginginkan agar pengaturan di bidang penanaman
ini tidak memuat aturan baru atau tambahan.6
Pada pokoknya hasil dari perjanjian TRIMS ini merupakan
penegasan kembali prinsip-prinsip pokok, yaitu the National
Treatment (Pasal III) (National Treatment on Internal Taxation and
Regulation) dan larangan penggunaan restriksi kuantitatif (kuota)
Pasal XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions)
Pasal 3 menyatakan bahwa semua pengecualian yang termuat
dalam GATT (GATT 1994) akan tetap berlaku terhadap ketentuan
pasal-pasal Perjanjian TRIMs, seperti misalnya moral masyarakat,
perlindungan lingkungan, keamanan nasional, dll.
Pasal 4 secara khusus untuk negara sedang berkembang. Pasal
ini membolehkan negara-negara ini untuk menyimpangi untuk
Foreign Direct Investment, New Report by the WTO (PRESS 55/57, 9 October
1996), hlm. 46-51.
6 UNCTAD, The Outcome of the Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment (New
York: UN, 1997), hlm. 142 (menyatakan bahwa negara sedang berkembang
telah berhasil di dalam mencegah perluasan kewajiban perdagangan ke
dalam bidang penanaman modal. Negara-negara ini telah juga berhasil
dalam mencegah dimasukkannya prinsip-prinsip seperti 'right of
4
sementara waktu ketentuan pasal 2, sepanjang dan sesuai dengan
ketentuan pasal III dan XI GATT dapat disimpangi sesuai dengan
Pasal XVIII GATT 1994, the Understanding on the Balance-of-
Payments of GATT 1994 dan Deklarasi mengenai Upaya-upaya
Perdagangan yang diambil guna tujuan penyeimbangan neraca
perdagangan (Declaration on Trade Measures taken for Balance-of-
Payment Purposes of 28 November 1979).
Pasal 5 mensyaratkan negara anggota untuk menotifikasi
kepada Dewan Perdagangan Barang (the Trade in Goods Council) dalam
jangka waktu 90 hari setelah berlakunya Perjanjian WTO semua TRIMs
yang tidak sesuai yang negara-negara anggota terapkan (ayat 1).7
Pasal 5 ayat 2 juga mensyaratkan negara-negara anggotanya
untuk menghapuskan semua TRIMs dalam jangka waktu 2 (dua) tahun
untuk negara maju, 5 (lima) tahun untuk negara sedang berkembang
dan 7 (tujuh) tahun untuk negara miskin (least developed
countries).
Negara sedang berkembang dapat pula memohon perpanjangan
waktu transisi apabila mereka menghadapi masalah dalam
establishment' atau 'national treatment' terhadap investor ke dalam
Perjanjian TRIMs).
7 Hingga 30 Juni 1999, dua puluh enam negara telah menotifikasi the Trade
in Goods Council mengenai upaya-upaya yang tidak sesuai dengan TRIMs
yang dipraktekkannya. Negara-negara ini adalah: Argentina, Barbados,
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, India, Mexico, Malaysia, Mesir, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Peru, Philippines, Polandia, Romania, Thailand, Uganda, Uruguay,
Venezuela and South Africa (WTO, Annual Report 1999 [Geneva: WTO, 1999],
hlm. 66).
5
mengimplementasikan perjanjian TRIMs (ayat 3).8 Pasal 5 ayat 4
menyatakan bahwa:
“a Member shall not modify the terms of any TRIMs which it
notified under paragraph 1 from those prevailing at the date
of entry into force of the WTO Agreement so as to increase
the degree of inconsistency with the provisions of Article
2.”
Pasal ini memuat pula suatu ketentuan khusus yang
membolehkan penerapan TRIMs terhadap perusahaan-perusahaan (baru)
selama jangka waktu transisi apabila hal ini dipandang perlu agar
tidak merugikan perusahaan yang telah ada yang tunduk kepada
ketentuan Perjanjian TRIMs (Ayat 5).9
Pasal 6 memuat kewajiban transparansi di dalam menerapan
perjanjian TRIMs. Pasal ini mensyaraktan kewajiban notifikasi
kepada Sekretariat WTO mengenai publikasi adanya TRIMs, termasuk
TRIMs yang diterapkan oleh pemerintah daerah dan atau pejabatpejabat
yang memiliki kewengan di bidang kebijakan penanaman modal
di dalam wilayah kekuasaannya.10
Pasal 7 memuat pembentukan badan baru, yaitu the Committee
on Trade-Related Investment Measures (the "Committee") (Ayat 1).
8 Belum ada negara yang memanfaatkan pasal ini (WTO, Annual Report 1999
(Geneva: WTO, 1999), hlm. 66.
9 Low and Subramanian, supra, note 4, hlm. 416.
10 Untuk melaksanakan ketentuan ini, pada bulan September 1996, the
Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures mengesahkan suatu
prosedur notifikasi TRIMs dalam ruang lingkup pasal 6. Hingga tanggal 30
Juni 1999, berikut adalah negara-negara yang telah menyerahkan informasi
mengenai prosedur notifikasi TRIMs: Argentina, Australia, Brunei
Darussalam, Bulgaria, Chad, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, the European
Community, Fiji, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica,
Japan, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia,
Uganda, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. (WTO, Annual
Report 1999 (Geneva: WTO, 1999), hlm. 66.
6
The Committee bertugas memonitor pelaksanaan komitmen-komitmen
negara anggota berdasarkan Perjanjian TRIMs ini dan melaporkannya
setiap tahun kepada the Council for Trade in Goods (Ayat 3).
Pasal 8 terkait dengan penyelesaian sengketa TRIMs. Pasal
ini memberlakukan pasal XXII-XXIII GATT 1994. Ketentuan
penyelesaian sengketa ini kemudian mengacu pula kepada Annex 2
mengenai the Dispute Settlement Understanding.11
Pasal 9 menyatakan bahwa the Council for Trade in Goods akan
meninjau Perjanjian TRIMs dalam jangka waktu 5 tahun sejak
berlakunya Perjanjian. Tujuan dari tinjauan ini adalah untuk
mengusulkan amandemen terhadap muatan atau isi daftar ilustrasi
dan mempertimbangkan ketentuan mengenai kebijakan investasi (the
scope of complimentary provisions on investment policy) dan
kebijakan persaingan (competition policy).12
Lampiran Perjanjian memuat daftar ilustasi TRIMs yang tidak
sesuai dengan Pasal III (4) dan Pasal XI (1) GATT 1994. Lampiran
ini sifatnya memaksa dan mengikat baik berdasarkan hukum
(substantif GATT) atau aturan-aturan administratif.
Berikut adalah daftar ilustrasi yang dilarang berdasarkan
Perjanjian TRIMs:13
11 Ketentuan pasal ini mensyaratkan Perjanjian TRIMs untuk tunduk pada
prosedur Penyelesaian Sengketa WTO. Hal ini juga menunjukkan pentingnya
WTO sebagai forum penyelesaian sengketa dagang di antara negara
anggotanya.
12 P. Sauvé, 'A First Look at Investment in the Final Act of the Uruguay
Round,' 29 J.W.T. 5 (1995), hlm. 8.
13 Upaya-upaya di atas, khususnya local content requirement dan trade
balancing requirement merupakan upaya-upaya yang umum diterapkan
khususnya di negara sedang berkembang dan praktek negara menunjukkan
bahwa upaya-upaya ini telah menjadi sumber sengketa di antara negara.
7
(i) berdasarkan perlakuan nasional yang dikeluarkan untuk
memperoleh suatu keuntungan dalam hal penerapan:
(a) persyaratan untuk membeli atau kewajiban untuk
menggunakan produk-produk lokal oleh perusahaan (local
content requirement); atau
(b) pembelian atau penggunaan suatu produk impor yang
dikaitkan dengan jumlah atau nilai dari produk lokal yang
diekspor (trade balancing requirement);
(ii) TRIMs yang tidak sesuai dengan kewajiban Pasal XI ayat 1,
yakni:
(a) import produk hingga jumlah tertentu yang dikaitkan
dengan jumlah atau nilai produk yang diekspor (trade
balancing);
(b) impor produk dengan membatasi akses perusahaan kepada
nilai mata uang asing hingga sejumlah masuknya jumlah
mata uang ke perusahaan tersebut (foreign exchange
restrictions); atau
(c) ekspor suatu produk yang dikaitkan dengan nilai produk
lokal (domestic sales requirement).
Dari daftar tersebut di atas, tampak bahwa TRIMs lainnya
tidak masuk dalam daftar.14 Hal ini berarti bahwa upaya-upaya
(John H,. Jackson, The World Trading System (Cambridge: the MIT Press,
2nd ed., 1997), hlm.317.
14 Upaya penanaman modal tidak tercakup oleh Perjanjian TRIMs, termasuk
persyaratan mengenai kepemilikan saham, alih teknologi dan lisensi,
persyaratan produksi untuk kebutuhan lokal, dan persyaratan ekspor,
pembatasan tenaga kerja dan pembatasan pemulangan keuntungan ke negara
atau perusahaan asal (induk) (local equity, technology transfer and
licensing, local manufacturing, local employment, and export performance
requirements, personnel entry restrictions, remittance restrictions).
8
lainnya masih dimungkinkan berdasarkan Perjanjian TRIMs.15
Ketentuan ini tampaknya berupaya mengakomodasi kepentingan negara
sedang berkembang yang acapkali masih menerapkan atau membebankan
persyaratan ini terhadap investor asing. Di samping itu, ketentuan
ini di banyak negara berkembang biasanya bersifat mengikat.16
Dalam laporannya tahun 1988, Kelompok Kerja WTO mengenai
Hubungan Perdagangan dan Penanaman Modal (the WTO Working Group on
the Relationship Between Trade and Investment) menyatakan bahwa
beberapa bentuk dari persyaratan pelaksanaan (performance
requirements), seperti halnya persyaratan alih teknologi dan
promosi untuk penelitian dan pembangunan telah terbukti sebagai
suatu cara penting untuk memenuhi tujuan pembangunan.17
Namun ada beberapa pembatasan dari Perjanjian TRIMs ini.
Pertama, perjanjian tidak memberi batasan atau test objectif guna
mengidentifikasi suatu upaya yang tergolong ke dalam TRIMs. Karena
itu untuk negara (anggota) penotifikasi sajalah yang akan
menentukan sendiri bentuk-bentuk upaya TRIMs mana sajakah yang ia
anggap tidak sah berdasarkan Perjanjian TRIMs.18
Kedua, Perjanjian TRIMs dapat dianggap sebagai suatu
kemunduran di dalam hal penegakan hukum. Menurut Low dan
Subramanian, dengan memberikan jangka waktu transisi kepada negara
anggota untuk menghilangkan TRIMs, Perjanjian TRIMs telah seolah-
15 UNCTAD, supra, note 6, hlm. 143.
16 UNCTAD, supra, note 6, hlm. 143.
17 WTO, Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Relationship between
Trade and Investment to the General Council, WT/WGTI/2. 8 December 1998,
paragraph 68. (Selanjutnya disebut sebagai Report [1998]).
18 UNCTAD, supra, note 6, hlm. 143.
9
olah mengabaikan fakta bahwa, sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam
Sengketa the FIRA, suatu TRIMs yang mengganggu perdagangan telah
dinyatakan atau telah ditentukan sebelumnya.19
Ketiga, kekurangan lainnya dari hasil Putaran Uruguay
mengenai TRIMs ini adalah bahwa Perjanjian ini telah gagal untuk
memasukkan ketentuan-ketentuan penting mengenai praktek bisnis
yang restriktif. Ketentuan-ketentuan ini cukup penting untuk
negara sedang berkembang manakala mereka berhubungan dengan
investor asing yang memiliki posisi dominan dan daya saing yang
kuat.20
Keempat, meskipun Perjanjian TRIMs mengakomodasi kepentingan
negara sedang berkembang, namun perjanjian ini telah gagal untuk
memberikan perlakuan khusus dan non-resiprositas untuk negara
berkembang. Pasal yang secara khusus diberikan untuk negara
berkembang adalah Pasal 4 (yang menyatakan bahwa negara berkembang
bebas untuk menyimpangi prinsip national treatment dan restriksi
kuantitatif untuk sementara waktu).
Di samping itu, pasal 5 ayat 2 membolehkan negara sedang
berkembang untuk memperpanjang jangka waktu transisi untuk
melaksankaan Perjanjian. Namun demikian, untuk dapat memperoleh
19 Low and Subramanian, supra, note 4, hlm. 418. Dari hasil
keseluruhannya, Perjanjian TRIMs, sebagaimana dinyatakan oleh Brewer and
Young, 'is something perceived to be tangible evidence of the failure of
the Uruguay Round to make significant progress on FDI manufacturing,
since its core provisions were already embodied in the previous GATT
agreements concerning trade in goods.' (Brewer and Young, supra, note 3,
hlm. 124).
20 Untuk analisis lebih lanjut mengenai hal ini, lihat: Report (1998),
supra, note 17, paragraph 28, hlm. 101-119 (menyatakan bahwa kehadiran
suatu kebijakan persaingan yang efektif merupakan suatu persyaratan yang
10
perpanjangan waktu transisi ini tidaklah mudah. Pasal 5 ayat 2
menentukan 2 persyaratan:
(1) Perjanjian mensyaratkan negara sedang berkembang bersangkutan
untuk menunjukkan bahwa negara tersebut menghadapi kesulitan
di dalam melaksanakan Perjanjian TRIMs.
(2) Permohonan perpanjangan waktu transisi tersebut tidak
diberikan secara otomatis. Permohonan tersebut tunduk pada
persetujuan dari the Council for Trade in Goods setelah badan
ini mempertimbangkan kebutuhan-kebutuhan tertentu dari negara
yang bersangkutan.21
perlu untuk memberi keuntungan dari adanya liberalisasi penanaman modal
asing langsung).
21 Report (1998), supra, note 17, juga menyatakan bahwa Perjanjian TRIMs
tidak mengatur ketentuan mengenai Perlindungan Penanaman Modal
(paragraph 125).
11
ADDENDUM
AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED
INVESTMENT MEASURES
Members,
Considering that ministers in the Punta del Este Declaration that "Following
an examination of the operation of GATT Articles related to the trade restrictive
and distorting effects of investment measures, negotiations should elaborate, as
appropriate, further provisions that may be necessary to avoid such adverse
effects on trade";
Desiring to promote the expansion and progressive liberalisation of world
trade and to facilitate investment across international frontiers so as to increase
the economic growth of all trading partners, particularly developing country
Members, while ensuring free competition;
Taking into account the particular trade, development and financial needs
of developing country Members, particular these of least developed country
Members;
Recognizing that certain investment measures can cause trade restrictive
and distorting effects;
Hereby agree as follow:
Article 1
Coverage
This Agreement applies to investment measures related to trade in goods
only (referred to in Agreement as "TRIMS").
Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no
Members shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III
or Article XI of GATT 1994.
2. An illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national
treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 and the
12
obligation of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in
paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this
Agreement.
Article 3
Exceptions
All exceptions under GATT 1994 shall apply, as appropriate, to the
provisions of this Agreement.
Article 4
Developing Country Members
A developing country members shall be free to deviate temporarily from the
provisions of Article 2 to the extent and in such a manner as Article XVIII of GATT
1994, the Understanding on the Balance of Payments Provisions of GATT 1994,
and the Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance of Payments
Purposes adopted on 28 November 1979 (BISD 26S/205-209) permit the Member
to deviate from the provisions of Articles III and XI of GATT 1994.
Article 5
Notification and Transitional Arrangements
1. Members, within 90 days of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement,
shall notify the Council for Trade in Goods of all TRIMS they are applying that are
not in conformity within the provisions of this Agreement. Such TRIMS of general
or specific application shall be notified, along with their principal features.
2. Each Member shall eliminate all TRIMS which are notified under paragraph 1
within two years of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement in the case
of a developed country Member, within five years in the case of a developing
country Member, and within seven years in the case of a least developed country
Member.
3. On request, the Council for Trade in Goods may extend the transition period for
the elimination of TRIMS notified under paragraph 1 for a developing country
Member, including a least developed country Member, which demonstrates
particular difficulties in implementing the provisions of this Agreement. In
considering such a request, the Council for Trade in Goods shall take into account
the individual development, financial and trade needs of the Member in question.
13
4. During the transition period, a Member shall not modify the terms of any TRIM
which it notifies under paragraph 1 from those prevailing at the date of entry into
force of the WTO Agreement so as to increase the degree of inconsistency with
the provisions of Article 2. TRIMS introduced less than 180 days before the date
of entry into force of the WTO Agreement shall not benefit from the transitional
arrangements provided in paragraph 2.
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2, a Member, in order not to
disadvantage established enterprise which are subject to a TRIM notified under
paragraph 1, may apply during the transition period the same TRIM to a new
investment (i) where the products of such investment are like products to those of
the established enterprises, and (ii) where necessary to avoid distorting the
conditions of competitions between the new investment and the established
enterprises. Any TRIM so applied to a new investment shall be notified to the
Council for Trade in Goods. The terms of such a TRIM shall be equivalent in their
competitive effect to those applicable to the established enterprises, and it shall
be terminated at the same time.
Article 6
Transparency
1. Members reaffirm, with respect to TRIMS, their commitment to obligation on
transparency and notification in Article X of GATT 1994, in the undertaking on
"Notification" contained in the Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation,
Dispute Settlement and Surveillance adopted on 28 November 1979 and in the
Ministerial Decision on Notification Procedures adopted on 15 April 1994.
2. Each Member shall notify the Secretariat of the publication in which TRIMS
may be found, including those applied by regional and local governments and
authorities within their territories.
3. Each Member shall accord sympathetic consideration to request for
information, and afford adequate opportunity for consultation, on any matter
arising from this Agreement raised by another Member. In conformity with Article
X of GATT 1994 no Member is required to disclose information the disclosure of
which would impede law enforcement or otherwise be country to the public
14
interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interest of particular
enterprises, public or private.
Article 7
Committee on Trade Related Investment Measures
1. A Committee on Trade Related Investment Measures (referred to in this
Agreement as the "Committee") is hereby established, and shall be open to all
Members. The Committee shall elect its own Chairman and Vice Chairman, and
shall meet not less than once a year and otherwise at the request of any Member.
2. The Committee shall carry out responsibilities assigned to it by Council for
Trade in Goods and shall afford Members the opportunity to consult on any
matters relating to the operation and implementation of this Agreement.
3. The Committee shall monitor the operation and implementation of this
Agreement and shall report thereon annually to the Council for Trade in Goods.
Article 8
Consultation and Dispute Settlement
The provisions of Articles XXII and XXVIII of GATT 1994, as elaborated
and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding, shall apply to consultations
and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement.
Article 9
Review by the Council for Trade in Goods
Not later than five years after the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement, the Council for Trade in Goods shall review the operation of this
Agreement and, as appropriate, propose to the Ministerial Conference
amendments to its text. In the course of this review, the Council for Trade in
Goods shall consider whether the Agreement should be complemented with
provisions on investment policy and competition policy.
ANNEX
ILLUSTRATIVE LIST
15
1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided
for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory
or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance
with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from
any domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products. in terms of
volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its
local production ; or
(b) that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be limited to an
amount related to the volume or value of local products that it exports.
2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of general elimination of
quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994
include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under
administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an
advantage, and which restrict :
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local
production, generally or to an amount related to the volume or value of local
production that it exports;
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local
production by restricting its access to foreign exchange to an amount related to
the foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise; or
(c) the exportation or sale for export by an enterprise of products, whether
specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products,
or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production.
1
BAB V
ARTI PENTING PERJANJIAN TRIMs
A. Arti Penting
Hasil dari negosiasi Putaran (Perundingan) Uruguay, memiliki
arti yang cukup penting. Alasannya:
(1) Dimasukkannya penanaman modal dalam Perjanjian WTO merupakan
hasil yang mendasar. Belum pernah ada aturan atau perjanjian
yang sebelumnya memuat penanaman modal dikaitkan dengan
perdagangan.1 Perjanjian Penanaman Modal (TRIMs) juga suatu
aturan baru yang mengikat mayoritas negara di dunia.
Berlakunya perjanjian ini untuk pertama kalinya memperkuat
asumsi dan kenyataan bahwa terdapat hubungan yang erat antara
perdagangan dan penanaman modal.2
(2) Berhasilnya perundingan mengenai penanaman modal dalam Putaran
Uruguay ini telah menciptakan suatu lembaga baru, yaitu WTO
dengan badan khususnya 'Committee on TRIMs'. Badan khusus ini
bertugas mengawasi dan menjamin liberalisasi penanaman modal
asing secara langsung (foreign direct investment atau FDI).
Hal ini merupakan sumbangan penting bagi perkembangan hukum
internasional di bidang penanaman modal. Seperti diketahui,
1 Sir Leon Brittan, 'Building on the Singapore Ministerial: Trade,
Investment and Competition,' dalam: J. Bhagwati and M. Hirsch, (eds.),
The Uruguay Round and Beyond (Verlag: Springer, 1998), hlm. 275
(menyatakan bahwa Perjanjian TRIMs 'incorporates specific investment
disciplines in the multilateral system for the first time').
2 Hal penting yang perlu diperhatikan adalah bahwa ketentuan WTO yang
memiliki dampak tidak langsung pada penanaman modal dapat tidak tak
terbatas. Menurut Piere Sauvè, semua bidang kebijakan perdagangan dapat
saja terkait dengan penanaman modal dari perusahaan multinasional
2
sebelum tahun 1995, belum ada lembaga internasional yang
menangani secara khusus masalah TRIMs. Selain itu pula, peran
WTO mengenai masalah ini memiliki prosedur penyelesaian
sengketanya yang akan menangani sengketa-sengketa di antara
negara anggota apabila salah satu anggotanya melanggar
Perjanjian TRIMs atau komitmen di bidang penanaman modalnya.
Sebelumnya, terdapat beberapa argumen mengenai tidak adanya
lembaga internasional yang menangani masalah FDI. Ada yang
berpendapat, WTO bukanlah lembaga yang tepat menangani
masalah penanaman modal multilateral. Alasannya adalah karena
terdapatnya pandangan yang berbeda mengenai muatan standarstandar
substantif yang akan diatur dalam Perjanjian TRIMs.3
Argumentasi tersebut ada benarnya, tetapi argumennya lemah.
Seperti telah sejarah tunjukkan, eksistensi lembaga atau
forum akan sangat berperan dalam menangani masalah-masalah
perbedaan pendapat dan aturan standar substantif di antara
negara anggotanya.4 Karena itu, pembentukan dan keberadaan WTO
tidak saja akan menangani masalah aturan penanaman modal
(Lihat: Piere Sauvè, 'A First Look at Investment in the Final Act of the
Uruguay Round,' 29 J.W.T. 6 (1995).
3 Misalnya saja, Edward M. Graham and Paul R. Krugman, 'Trade-Related
Investment Measures,' dalam: Jeffrey J. Schott (ed.), Completing the
Uruguay Round (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1990),
hlm. 150..
4 Misalnya, selama negosiasi sempat muncul masalah mengenai sampai berapa
jauh ketentuan khusus untuk negara sedang berkembang harus juga
diterapkan terhadap TRIMs; masalah dumping; GATS dan TRIPs, hanyalah
beberapa contoh saja. Dalam bidang hukum internasional lainnya,
misalnya, perdebatan mengenai Bab XI dari Konvensi Hukum Laut, atau
masalah perbedaan pandangan antara negara maju dan negara sedang
berkembang mengenai kekuatan mengikat prinsip-prinsip hukum
internasional yang termuat dalam Piagam PBB mengenai Hak Dan Kewajiban
Negara tahun 1974.
3
tetapi juga dalam jangka panjang akan memastikan bahwa
kesepakatan-kesepakatan yang telah disepakati akan dihormati
dan ditegakkan.
(3) Perjanjian TRIMs memberikan sumbangan penting terhadap
pembangunan hukum internasional di masa depan di bidang
penanaman modal. Karena itu Perjanjian TRIMs, meskipun
aturannya singkat dan sederhana, namun perjanjian tersebut
sebenarnya membuka jalan lebih lanjut untuk pembahasan aturan
substantif yang lebih komprehensif di masa depan.5
(4) Perjanjian TRIMs membantu negara anggotanya untuk lebih
transparansi dalam kebijakan hukum penanaman modalnya. Hal
ini akan membentuk suatu kondisi yang lebih terbuka dan dapat
diduga serta kepastian hukum bagi investor asing untuk
melakukan usahanya di negara anggota WTO lainnya.
(5) Perjanjian TRIMs memberi ketentuan yang berimbang di antara
kepentingan negara maju dan sedang berkembang (dalam hal
kebijakan penanaman modalnya). Perjanjian ini, dipandang dari
sudut kepentingan negara sedang berkembang, memberi
keleluasaan kepada negara sedang berkembang untuk
melaksanakan Perjanjian. Perjanjian mensyaratkan 5 (lima)
tahun dan 7 (tujuh) tahun bagi negara sedang berkembang dan
negara miskin untuk dapat melaksanakan perjanjian secara
5 Lihat Pasal 9 Perjanjian TRIMs; Cf., DeAnne Julius dalam salah satu
tulisannya menyatakan bahwa 'creation of the WTO encompassing the GATT
as well as the new agreements provides a strong skeleton on which to
build sectoral codes that expand from and integrate new areas of traderelated
investment.' (DeAnne Julius, 'International Direct Investment:
Strengthening the Policy Regime,' dalam: Peter B. Kennen, (ed.),
4
penuh. Perjanjian yang memberikan jangka waktu transisi ini
menunjukkan bahwa WTO mempertimbangkan kedudukan negara
berkembang dan miskin di dalam pelaksanaan Perjanjian TRIMs.
(6) Dimasukkanya prosedur penyelesaian sengketa dalam perjanjian
TRIMs merupakan suatu perkembangan baru di dalam hukum
perdagangan internasional. Hal ini merupakan perkembangan
penting, karena sepanjang menyangkut penanaman modal,
masyarakat internasional selama ini menggunakan cara
penyelesaian sengketa secara tradisional, antara lain,
arbitrase nasional dan internasional (misalnya arbitrase
berdasarkan Konvensi ICSID).
B. Implikasi Perjanjian TRIMs pada Negara Sedang Berkembang.
Karena hasil dari negosiasi Putaran Uruguay mengenai
penanaman modal relatif singkat, namun implikasi dari perjanjian
ini pun tampaknya kecil dan tidak terlalu membebani negara-negara
anggotanya secara signifikan.6 Selain itu, perjanjian tidak secara
signifikan menghambat kemampuan negara anggota khususnya negara
berkembang untuk mengatur penanaman modal asing di dalam
wilayahnya.7
Managing The World Economy: Fifty Years after the Bretton Woods
(Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economic, 1994), hlm. 284.
6 UNCTAD, The Outcome of the Uruguay Round: An Initial Assessment (New
York: UN, 1997), hlm. 144.
7 Penting pula untuk dinyatakan di sini, sebagaimana dinyatakan oleh
Kirmani bahwa praktek menunjukkan bahwa penerapan TRIMs oleh negaranegara
pada umumnya sifatnya tidak memaksa tetapi suatu keleluasaan dari
negara masing-masing (discretionary). (Naheed Kirmani, et.al.,
International Trade Policies: The Uruguay Round and Beyond, vol. II:
Background Papers (Washington: IMF, 1994), hlm. 13.
5
Namun demikian, larangan persyaratan kandungan lokal (local
content requirement) dan persyaratan neraca perdagangan (trade
balancing requirement) telah memaksa negara sedang berkembang
untuk secara bertahap memberhentikan pencantuman persyaratan
terhadap penanaman modal asing untuk menggunakan kandungan atau
komponen lokal. Hal ini merupakan implikasi negatif karena negaranegara
ini acapkali menerapkan persyaratan-persyaratan ini untuk
memajukan industri dalam negeri dan pembangunan ekonominya.8
Implikasi lainnya dari Perjanjian TRIMs adalah bahwa
perjanjian tersebut membatasi kewenangan atau kontrol negara tuan
rumah terhadap penanaman modal secara langsung.9 Hal ini
sebenarnya merupakan tantangan cukup besar terhadap kebijakan
penanaman modal dari negara sedang berkembang. Negara berkembang
pada umumnya memang kerapkali berupaya mengontrol penanaman modal
asing.
Di samping itu, kewajiban notifikasi dan transparansi untuk
negara sedang berkembang sehubungan dengan TRIMs tidaklah mudah
bagi negara-negara ini. Suatu studi baru-baru ini menunjukkan
bahwa banyak kesulitan dalam menaati kewajiban notifikasi dari
8 Lihat: John H. Jackson, The World Trading System (Cambridge: the MIT
Press, 2nd ed., 1997), hlm.317; Trade Policy Review Mechanism GATT pada
tahun 1991-1994 menunjukkan bahwa beberapa negara sedang berkembang
ternyata menerapkan persyaratan kandungan lokal (local content
requirements), khususnya di dalam sektor otomotif. Negara-negara ini
adalah Bangladesh, Chile, Ghana, Indonesia, Mesir, Mexico, Nigeria,
Peru, Philippina, Senegal, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay). (Naheed
Kirmani, et.al., supra, note 7, hlm. 13.
9 Eric M. Burt, 'Developing Countries and the Framework for Negotiations
on Foreign Direct Investment in the World Trade Organization,' 12:6 Am.
U.J.Int'l.L & Pol'y 1027 (1997).
6
upaya-upaya yang tidak sesuai dengan TRIMs kepada Sekretariat
WTO.10
Untuk mencegah atau meminimalisasi implikasi negatif untuk
perundingan di masa depan di bidang penanaman modal bagi negara
sedang berkembang, Mashayekhi dan Gibbs mengemukakan pendapatnya
sebagai berikut:
'If developing countries are to maintain influence over the
future international trade agenda in the area of investment,
consistent with their growing importance as import markets,
they will have to exert considerable efforts to prepare
technically sound initiatives reflecting the realities of
globalization and liberalization for action in their favour,
i.e. 'positive agenda', and to form solid alliances and to
counter proposals emanating from developed country ...' 11
Pendapat dua sarjana tesebut di atas secara singkat
merekomendasikan negara sedang berkembang untuk:
(1) berupaya lebih keras untuk memasukkan atau memberi pengaruh
dan inisiatif secara teknis tentang keinginan dan usulan
negara-negara sedang berkemang ke dalam agenda-agenda
perundingan mengenai TRIMs;
(2) negara-negara sedang berkembang untuk semakin giat membentuk
blok-blok atau aliansi di antara mereka; dan
10 Thomas L. Brewer and Stephen Young, The Multilateral Investment System
and Multinational Enterprises, (Oxford: Oxford U.P.,1998), hlm. 143.
11 Mina Mashayekhi and Murray Gibbs, 'Lessons from the Uruguay Round
Negotiations on Investment,' 33:6 J.W.T. 12 (1999). Pendekatan aliansi
negara-negara sedang berkembang ini oleh beberapa sarjana dipandang
sebagai dapat dipraktekkan hanya terhadap negara-negara yang memiliki
kesadaran lebih baik mengenai aturan-aturan dan masalah-masalah yang
sedang dinegosiasikan. Di samping itu, forum di mana sesuatu masalah
dibicarakan juga mempunyai saham yang cukup besar. Masalah yang sangat
penting untuk segera dibahas adalah bahwa semua negara, khususnya negara
maju, perlu menyadari dan mempertimbangkan isu tujuan pembangunan
(development objectives) dan kondisi-kondisi khusus negara sedang
berkembang.
7
(3) mendesak negara berkembang untuk lebih proaktif dalam hal
memberi proposal atau usulan tandingan terhadap proposal atau
usulan negara maju.
Pendapat Mashayekhi dan Gibbs tersebut patut disambut
positif. Pendapat tersebut juga penting mengingat dilihat dari
kenyataannya dewasa ini, posisi negara sedang berkembang memang
sangat lemah.
1
BAB VI
PERKEMBANGAN PERJANJIAN TRIMs DALAM KONPERENSI TINGKAT TINGGI WTO
Sejak Putaran Uruguay, WTO telah melangsungkan serangkaian
pertemuan tingkat tinggi para anggota WTO (WTO Ministerial
Conference). Pertemuan tersebut adalah:
1. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi Singapura (Singapore Ministerial
Conference) 9 – 13 Desember 1996
2. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi Jenewa (Geneva Ministerial
Conference) 18 and 20 Mei 1998; dan
3. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi Seattle (Seattle Ministerial
Conference), 30 November – 3 Desember 1999;
4. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi Doha (Doha Ministerial Conference) 10
– 14 November 2001
5. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi Cancún (Cancún Ministerial
Conference) 10 - 14 September 2003.
1. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi Singapura, 1996
Pertemuan Ministerial Conference WTO pertama
diselenggarakan di Singapura dari tanggal 9 hingga 13 Desember
1996. Sebanyak 120 negara anggota WTO menghadiri Pertemuan
Tingkat Tinggi WTO pertama ini. Pertemuan ini mencakup pula
berbagai pertemuan bisnis multilateral dan plurilateral serta
bilateral. Berbagai pertemuan ini membahas masalah-masalah yang
terkait dengan pekerjaan WTO sejak dua tahun pertama berdirinya
badan ini. Masalah lainnya adalah berbagai masalah implementasi
dari berbagai perjanjian di bawah kerangka Perjanjian WTO.
a. Ministerial Declarations
Pertemuan Singapura melahirkan dua keputusan (Deklarasi)
sebagai berikut:
1. Ministerial Declaration; dan
2. Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology
Products.
Pertemuan Singapura membahas pula masalah penanaman modal
di dalamnya. Hasil pembahasan isu atau agenda penanaman modal
2
termuat dalam Ministerial Declaration yang disahkan pada tanggal
13 Desember 1996. Adapun keputusan menyangkut penanaman modal,
dalam teks bahasa Inggrisnya, menyatakan sebagai berikut:
Investment and Competition
20. Having regard to the existing WTO provisions on matters
related to investment and competition policy and the built-in
agenda in these areas, including under the TRIMs Agreement, and
on the understanding that the work undertaken shall not prejudge
whether negotiations will be initiated in the future, we also
agree to:
· establish a working group to examine the relationship
between trade and investment; and
· establish a working group to study issues raised by Members
relating to the interaction between trade and competition
policy, including anti-competitive practices, in order to
identify any areas that may merit further consideration in
the WTO framework.
These groups shall draw upon each other's work if necessary and
also draw upon and be without prejudice to the work in UNCTAD and
other appropriate intergovernmental fora. As regards UNCTAD, we
welcome the work under way as provided for in the Midrand
Declaration and the contribution it can make to the understanding
of issues. In the conduct of the work of the working groups, we
encourage cooperation with the above organizations to make the
best use of available resources and to ensure that the
development dimension is taken fully into account. The General
Council will keep the work of each body under review, and will
determine after two years how the work of each body should
proceed. It is clearly understood that future negotiations, if
any, regarding multilateral disciplines in these areas, will take
place only after an explicit consensus decision is taken among
WTO Members regarding such negotiations.
Dari teks tersebut, tersimpul 5 keputusan sebagai berikut:
(1) Negara peserta untuk pertama kalinya sepakat dan mengakui
keterkaitan erat antara penanaman modal dan kebijakan
kompetisi (persaingan), dua bidang yang disepakati sebagai
agenda yang menyatu untuk bahan pembahasan di masa depan.
Hubungan kedua bidang ini, penanaman modal dan persaingan,
dipandang sebagai 'The Singapore Issue'.
(2) Negara peserta sepakat untuk membentuk dua kelompok kerja,
yaitu satu kelompok kerja guna mengkaji hubungan antara
perdagangan dan penanaman modal. Kelompok kerja kedua mengkaji
masalah-masalah yang diangkat oleh negara-negara anggota
3
mengenai interaksi antara perdagangan dan kebijakan kompetisi,
termasuk praktek-praktek anti-kompetisi guna mengidentifikasi
hal-hal yang akan dibahas di mada depan;
(3) Negara anggota menyadari dan menganggap penting upaya-upaya
lembaga-lembaga internasional seperti misalnya UNCTAD, yang
juga berupaya merumuskan aturan-aturan di bidang penanaman
modal. Untuk itu, negara anggota sepakat bahwa WTO perlu
bekerja sama erat dengan lembaga-lembaga tersebut dalam
berupaya mencari rumusan yang tepat untuk mengatur perdagangan
dan penanaman modal;
(4) Negara-negara anggota sepakat pula bahwa di dalam pembahasan
substansi aturan-aturan penanaman modal, pertimbangan faktor
pembangunan dari negara sedang berkembang perlu mendapat
perhatian;
(5) Negara-negara anggota sepakat bahwa hasil kerja dari (dua)
kelompok kerja tersebut di atas diberi waktu 2 tahun yang
hasilnya akan ditinjau ulang untuk menentukan tindak lanjut
dari hasil kerja kedua kelompok kerja tersebut.
2. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi Jenewa 1998
Pertemuan Ministerial Conference WTO Kedua diselenggarakan
di Jenewa dari tanggal 18 hingga 20 Mei 1998. Dibandingkan dengan
Pertemuan Singapura, pertemuan kedua ini tidak secara khusus
membahas isu penanaman modal. Konperensi memuat beberapa butir
kesimpulan berupa komitmen negara anggota WTO beserta beberapa
rekomendasi.
Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi kedua ini sebenarnya tidak
menghasilkan hal-hal baru dan konkrit atau praktis seperti halnya
Pertemuan Singapura 1996. Hasil pertemuan kali ini sebagian besar
hanya memuat komitmen-komitmen negara anggota mengenai pentingnya
dan perlunya sistem perdagangan multilateral yang terbuka.
Hasil pertemuan yang dihiasi oleh berbagai komitmen ini
tampaknya banyak dipengaruhi oleh keadaan perdagangan dunia yang
diterpa krisis moneter yang melanda banyak negara pada tahun
4
1997. Seperti kita maklumi, krisis di Asia menimpa Korea Selatan,
kemudian menyebar cepat ke negara-negara lain di Asia Tenggara,
terutama memukul telak Indonesia.
Di samping krisis moneter, masalah perdagangan dan ekonomi
yang melilit negara sedang berkembang dan miskin WTO terutama
masalah beban utang luar negeri juga berpengaruh terhadap hasil
pertemuan Jenewa. Hasil pertemuan secara khusus menegaskan
komitmen negara-negara anggota untuk menangani masalah
marginalisasi negara miskin karena lilitan utang.
Khusus untuk penanaman modal, pertemuan Jenewa tidak secara
khusus menyinggungnya. Hasil pertemuan hanya menegaskan kembali
komitmen negara-negara anggota untuk melaksanakan hal-hal yang
telah disepakati atau dihasilkan dalam pertemuan Singapura 1996.
Hasil Jenewa 2001 menegaskan pula bahwa hasil-hasil pertemuan
Singapura akan dibahas lebih lanjut dalam Pertemuan Tingkat
Tinggi ke-3.
Adapun pernyataan dan rekomendasi dari pertemuan kedua ini
menyatakan sebagai berikut:
1. This Second Session of the Ministerial Conference of the WTO
is taking place at a particularly significant time for the
multilateral trading system, when the fiftieth anniversary of
its establishment is being commemorated. On this occasion we
pay tribute to the system's important contribution over the
past half-century to growth, employment and stability by
promoting the liberalization and expansion of trade and
providing a framework for the conduct of international trade
relations, in accordance with the objectives embodied in the
Preambles to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and
the World Trade Organization Agreement.
2. We underline the crucial importance of the multilateral rulebased
trading system. We reaffirm the commitments and
assessments we made at Singapore, and we note that the work
under existing agreements and decisions has resulted in
significant new steps forward since we last met. In
particular, we welcome the successful conclusion of the
negotiations on basic telecommunications and financial
services and we take note of the implementation of the
Information Technology Agreement. We renew our commitment to
achieve progressive liberalization of trade in goods and
services.
3. The fiftieth anniversary comes at a time when the economies of
a number of WTO Members are experiencing difficulties as a
result of disturbances in financial markets. We take this
5
opportunity to underline that keeping all markets open must be
a key element in a durable solution to these difficulties.
With this in mind, we reject the use of any protectionist
measures and agree to work together in the WTO as in the IMF
and the World Bank to improve the coherence of international
economic policy-making with a view to maximizing the
contribution that an open, rule-based trading system can make
to fostering stable growth for economies at all levels of
development.
4. We recognize the importance of enhancing public understanding
of the benefits of the multilateral trading system in order to
build support for it and agree to work towards this end. In
this context we will consider how to improve the transparency
of WTO operations. We shall also continue to improve our
efforts towards the objectives of sustained economic growth
and sustainable development.
5. We renew our commitment to ensuring that the benefits of the
multilateral trading system are extended as widely as
possible. We recognize the need for the system to make its own
contribution in response to the particular trade interests and
development needs of developing-country Members. We welcome
the work already underway in the Committee on Trade and
Development for reviewing the application of special
provisions in the Multilateral Trade Agreements and related
Ministerial Decisions in favour of developing country Members,
and in particular the least-developed among them. We agree on
the need for effective implementation of these special
provisions.
6. We remain deeply concerned over the marginalization of leastdeveloped
countries and certain small economies, and recognize
the urgent need to address this issue which has been
compounded by the chronic foreign debt problem facing many of
them. In this context we welcome the initiatives taken by the
WTO in cooperation with other agencies to implement in an
integrated manner the Plan of Action for the least-developed
countries which we agreed at Singapore, especially through the
High-Level Meeting on Least-Developed Countries held in Geneva
in October 1997. We also welcome the report of the Director-
General on the follow-up of this initiative, to which we
attach great importance. We commit ourselves to continue to
improve market access conditions for products exported by the
least-developed countries on as broad and liberal a basis as
possible. We urge Members to implement the market-access
commitments that they have undertaken at the High-Level
Meeting.
7. We welcome the WTO Members who have joined since we met in
Singapore: Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mongolia,
Niger and Panama. We welcome the progress made with 31
applicants currently negotiating their accession and renew our
resolution to ensure that the accession processes proceed as
rapidly as possible. We recall that accession to the WTO
6
requires full respect of WTO rules and disciplines as well as
meaningful market access commitments on the part of acceding
candidates.
8. Full and faithful implementation of the WTO Agreement and
Ministerial Decisions is imperative for the credibility of the
multilateral trading system and indispensable for maintaining
the momentum for expanding global trade, fostering job
creation and raising standards of living in all parts of the
world. When we meet at the Third Session we shall further
pursue our evaluation of the implementation of individual
agreements and the realization of their objectives. Such
evaluation would cover, inter alia, the problems encountered
in implementation and the consequent impact on the trade and
development prospects of Members. We reaffirm our commitment
to respect the existing schedules for reviews, negotiations
and other work to which we have already agreed.
9. We recall that the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization states that the WTO shall provide the forum
for negotiations among its Members concerning their
multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the
agreements in the Annexes to the Agreement, and that it may
also provide a forum for further negotiations among its
Members concerning their multilateral trade relations, and a
framework for the implementation of the results of such
negotiations, as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference.
In the light of paragraphs 1-8 above, we decide that a process
will be established under the direction of the General Council
to ensure full and faithful implementation of existing
agreements, and to prepare for the Third Session of the
Ministerial Conference. This process shall enable the General
Council to submit recommendations regarding the WTO's work
programme, including further liberalization sufficiently
broad-based to respond to the range of interests and concerns
of all Members, within the WTO framework, that will enable us
to take decisions at the Third Session of the Ministerial
Conference. In this regard, the General Council will meet in
special session in September 1998 and periodically thereafter
to ensure full and timely completion of its work, fully
respecting the principle of decision-making by consensus. The
General Council's work programme shall encompass the
following:
(a) recommendations concerning:
(i) the issues, including those brought forward by Members,
relating to implementation of existing agreements and
decisions;
(ii) the negotiations already mandated at Marrakesh, to ensure
that such negotiations begin on schedule;
(iii) future work already provided for under other existing
agreements and decisions taken at Marrakesh;
(b) recommendations concerning other possible future work on
the basis of the work programme initiated at Singapore;
7
(c) recommendations on the follow-up to the High-Level Meeting
on Least-Developed Countries;
(d) recommendations arising from consideration of other matters
proposed and agreed to by Members concerning their
multilateral trade relatons.
10. The General Council will also submit to the Third Session of
the Ministerial Conference, on the basis of consensus,
recommendations for decision concerning the further
organization and management of the work programme arising from
the above, including the scope, structure and time-frames,
that will ensure that the work programme is begun and
concluded expeditiously.
11. The above work programme shall be aimed at achieving overall
balance of interests of all Members.
8
3. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi Seattle 1999
Pertemuan tingkat tinggi WTO atau the Third WTO Ministerial
Conference diselenggarakan di kota Seattle, Washington State,
Amerika Serikat, 30 November dan 3 Desember 1999. Dalam pertemuan
ketiga ini para peserta tidak menghasilkan keputusan apa pun,
termasuk di bidang penanaman modal. Pertemuan ini gagal.
Penolakan yang keras dari para aktivis khususnya LSM-LSM
internasional menyebabkan pertemuan WTO kali ini gagal
berlangsung sesuai dengan jadwal.
Umumnya LSM menggugat keberadaan WTO. Mereka mengkritik WTO
sebagai badan negara maju. Keberadaan WTO tidak membantu sama
sekali kedudukan negara sedang berkembang dan miskin. WTO
dituding sebagai badan perdagangan dunia yang tidak demokratis,
merugikan petani, merusak lingkungan, tidak pro-pekerja, dll.
9
4. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi Doha, 2001
Pertemuan tingkat tinggi (Ministerial Conference WTO)
keempat ini berhasil menghasilkan beberapa keputusan (berupa
deklarasi). Keseluruhan keputusan disahkan pada tanggal 14
November 2001. Salah satu hasil penting di bidang penanaman modal
adalah diakuinya kembali hubungan erat antara perdagangan dan
penanaman modal. Deklarasi mengenai hubungan kedua bidang ini,
dalam teks bahasa Inggris, menyatakan sebagai berikut:
a. Hubungan antara Perdagangan dan Penanaman Modal
20. Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to secure
transparent, stable and predictable conditions for long-term
cross-border investment, particularly foreign direct investment,
that will contribute to the expansion of trade, and the need for
enhanced technical assistance and capacity-building in this area
as referred to in paragraph 21, we agree that negotiations will
take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference
on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at
that session on modalities of negotiations.
21. We recognize the needs of developing and least-developed
countries for enhanced support for technical assistance and
capacity building in this area, including policy analysis and
development so that they may better evaluate the implications of
closer multilateral cooperation for their development policies
and objectives, and human and institutional development. To this
end, we shall work in cooperation with other relevant
intergovernmental organisations, including UNCTAD, and through
appropriate regional and bilateral channels, to provide
strengthened and adequately resourced assistance to respond to
these needs.
22. In the period until the Fifth Session, further work in the
Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment
will focus on the clarification of: scope and definition;
transparency; non-discrimination; modalities for preestablishment
commitments based on a GATS-type, positive list
approach; development provisions; exceptions and balance-ofpayments
safeguards; consultation and the settlement of disputes
between members. Any framework should reflect in a balanced
manner the interests of home and host countries, and take due
account of the development policies and objectives of host
governments as well as their right to regulate in the public
interest. The special development, trade and financial needs of
developing and least-developed countries should be taken into
account as an integral part of any framework, which should enable
members to undertake obligations and commitments commensurate
with their individual needs and circumstances. Due regard should
be paid to other relevant WTO provisions. Account should be
10
taken, as appropriate, of existing bilateral and regional
arrangements on investment.
b. Penjelasan Deklarasi Doha
Paragrap 20 hingga 22 di atas memuat ketentuan pokok
mengenai komitmen negara anggota WTO terhadap Perjanjian TRIMs.
Ketiga paragrap tersebut mendapat penjelasan tidak resmi sebagai
berikut:
"The November 2001 declaration of the Fourth Ministerial
Conference in Doha, Qatar, provides the mandate for negotiations
on a range of subjects, and other work including issues
concerning the implementation of the present agreements.
The negotiations take place in the Trade Negotiations Committee
and Its Subsidiaries. Other work under the work programme takes
place in other WTO councils and committees.
This is an unofficial explanation of what the declaration
mandates.
c. Hubungan antara Perdagangan dan Penanaman Modal (Paragrap 20 -
22)
Di samping penjelasan terhadap paragrap 20 hingga 22, hasil
dari kesepakatan Doha memuat penjelasan (dan penegasan) mengenai
keterkaitan erat antara perdagangan dan penanaman modal.
Deklarasi menyatakan bahwa masalah hubungan kedua bidang ini
sejak awal dipandang sebagai 'Singapore Issue'. Seperti telah
dinyatakan di atas, untuk mengkaji masalah 'Singapore Issue' ini
suatu 'working group' telah dibentuk berdasarkan Hasil Singapore
Ministerial Conference tahun 1996.
Dalam pertemuan tahun 2001 ini, deklarasi yang
dikeluarkannya tidak menyatakan bahwa negosiasi di bidang ini
akan segera dilaksanakan. Deklarasi 2001 ini menyatakan:
“negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the
Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by
explicit consensus, at that session on modalities of negotiations
[i.e. how the negotiations are to be conducted].”
Dalam jangka waktu hingga diselenggarakannya Ministerial
Conference tahun 2003,, Deklarasi kali ini memerintahkan the
working group untuk memfokuskan dirinya guna mengklarifikasi
ruang lingkup dan definisi mengenai pokok bahasan (TRIMs),
11
prinsip transparansi, prinsip non-diskriminasi, cara-cara untuk
mempersiapkan komitmen-komitmen dari hasil negosiasi, ketentuan
mengenai pembangunan, pengecualian dan tindakan penyelamat neraca
pembayaran, konsultasi dan penyelesaian sengketa.
Komitmen hasil negosiasi (the negotiated commitments)
disepakati akan mengikuti model yang digunakan dalam perjanjian
GATS. Dalam perjanjian GATS, komitmen negara-negara ditetapkan
dengan berdasarkan pada — “positive lists” — , tidak menerapkan
pemberian komitmen yang luas dan memuat daftar-daftar
pengecualian.
Deklarasi menyatakan pula beberapa prinsip seperti prinsip
kebutuhan untuk menyeimbangkan kepentingan negara-negara (negara
investor dan negara penerima modal asing), hak negara untuk
mengatur penanaman modal, prinsip pembangunan, kepentingan umum
dan keadaan-keadaan khusus dari negara tertentu.
Hasil-hasil pertemuan tingkat tinggi ini secara eksplisit
menekankan isu pembangunan dalam keputusannya. Itulah sebabnya
pertemuan ini disebut juga sebagai 'Agenda Pembangunan Doha'
('The Doha Development Agenda').
Deklarasi juga menekankan perlunya dukungan dan kerja sama
internasional untuk negara sedang berkembang atau negara kurang
mampu, dan pentingnya koordinasi dengan organisasi internasional
lainnya seperti misalnya the UN Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD).
Hasil keputusan pertemuan ini menetapkan dilanjutkannya
pekerjaan Working Group hingga diselenggarakannya Ministerial
Conference WTO tahun 2003 di Mexico. Sedangkan negosiasi setelah
tanggal tersebut Working Group akan melangsungkan pekerjaannya
“on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus,
at that session on modalities of negotiations”. Untuk hal ini,
tanggal akhir dari pekerjaan oleh Working Group ditetapkan
tanggal 1 Januari 2004, sebagai bagian dari satu pekerjaan
keseluruhan bidang-bidang Perjanjian WTO lainnya.
12
5. Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi Cancún, 2003
Pertemuan Tingkat Tinggi WTO kelima (the Fifth WTO
Ministerial Conference) diselenggarakan di kota Cancún, Mexico
dari tanggal 10 hinggga 14 September 2003. Tujuan utama dari
pertemuan tingkat tinggi ini adalah untuk melihat sampai berapa
jauh kemajuan yang telah dicapai dalam perundingan dan pekerjaan
berdasarkan Agenda Pembangunan Doha (the Doha Development
Agenda).
Pada akhir pertemuan tingkat tinggi ini, konperensi
berakhir tanpa adanya konsensus. Ketika menutup pertemuan ini,
ketua pertemuan Mr. Luis Ernesto Derbez menyatakan bahwa
pertemuan masih belum ada kesepakatan mengenai isu-isu Singapura
(“Singapore” issues), termasuk di dalamnya isu hubungan antara
perdagangan dan penanaman modal.
1
BAB VII
SENGKETA PENANAMAN MODAL DI WTO: SENGKETA MOBIL NASIONAL RI
A. Pengantar
Sejak Perjanjian TRIMs disahkan hingga tulisan ini disusun,
Badan Penyelesaian Sengketa (Dispute Settlement Body atau DSB) WTO
telah menangani 4 (empat) sengketa, yakni: (1) ME (EC), Jepang, AS
lawan Indonesia dalam 'Indonesian Autos' (DS54, DS55, DS64 dan
DS59); (2) ME dan AS lawan India, dalam India, Automobiles (DS146,
DS175); (3) ME dan Jepang lawan Kanada dalam The US-Canada Auto
Pact, Duty Free Requirements (DS142, DS 139); AS lawan Philippina
dalam 'Automobiles' (DS 195).
Persamaan dari keempat sengketa di atas adalah bahwa semua
sengketa terkait dengan kebijakan otomotif. Dari keempat sengketa
tersebut, sengketa yang paling ternama dan terkenal adalah
sengketa the Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry (Indonesian Autos atau Sengketa Mobil Nasional/Mobnas).1
Sengketa ini cukup banyak menjadi acuan dalam berbagai literatur
yang menyangkut TRIMs. Sengketa ini pun sekaligus merupakan
sengketa pertama yang secara langsung terkait dengan TRIMs.2
B. Sengketa Mobnas RI
Sengketa ini menyangkut program mobil nasional (Mobnas) RI.
Program diluncurkan pada tahun 1993 ketika pemerintah mengeluarkan
rencana mobnasnya. Berdasarkan program ini, pemerintah memberikan
keuntungan (perlakuan khusus) dalam bentuk tarif dan pajak kepada
produsen mobil Indonesia. Keuntungan ini diberikan kepada produsen
yang bersedia menggunakan kandungan dalam negeri untuk mobnas (the
local content of the finished vehicles).
Kebijakan ini dikembangkan pada tahun 1996 ketika pemerintah
secara resmi meluncurkan 'Program Mobil Nasional'. Program ini
diberikan kepada perusahaan pionir, yaitu perusahaan Indonesia
1 Indonesia-Autos, Report of the Panel, 2 July 1998.
2 Lihat: Thomas L. Brewer and Stephen Young, 'WTO Dispute and Developing
Countries,' 33:5 JWT 177 (1999).
2
bernama PT Timor. PT Timor juga diberi hak untuk mengimpor 45,000
mobil jadi dari perusahaan Korea, the Korean Motor Corporation.
Perusahaan atau produsen mobil asing yang berada di
Indonesia, yaitu perusahaan dari Jepang, Masyarakat Eropa (ME) dan
Amerika Serikat (AS) protes. Mereka mengklaim program Mobnas ini
diskriminatif dan melanggar aturan perdagangan internasional
berdasarkan GATT. Jepang, ME dan AS melancarkan klaim secara
terpisah mengenai program Mobnas Indonesia ini. Mereka mengklaim,
upaya atau kebijakan pemerintah RI tersebut melanggar kewajiban
Indonesia berdasarkan, antara lain, Pasal I dan III, Pasal 2
Perjanjian TRIMs, Pasal 3, 6 dan 28 Perjanjian SCM (Subsidi dan
Bea Masuk Imbalan), dan Pasal 3, 203 dan 65 TRIPS.4
Mereka memohon konsultasi terpisah dengan pemerintah RI pada
bulan Oktober 1996. Setelah konsultasi gagal, mereka mengajukan
pembentukan panel. Tiga Panel terbentuk pada bulan Juni dan Juli
1997 untuk mengadili tuntutan 3 negara tersebut. Tetapi kemudian
DSB memutuskan bahwa panel cukup satu saja untuk mengadili
sengketa ini berhubung kasus, tuduhan dan tergugatnya sama.5
Dalam putusannya, Panel menyimpulkan bahwa persyaratan
kandungan lokal (the local content requirements) yang termuat
dalam program Mobnas tahun 1993 dan 1996 melanggar Pasal 2
Perjanjian TRIMS.6 Panel juga setuju dengan ME bahwa program
Mobnas telah merugikan ME sehubungan dengan pengertian Pasal 5 (c)
Perjanjian SCM.7 Namun Panel menolak bahwa RI telah melanggar
Pasal 28 para. 2 Perjanjian SCM dan Pasal 65 ayat 5 Perjanjian
TRIPs yang digugat Amerika Serikat.8
Menghadapi putusan panel, RI ternyata tidak mengajukan
banding. Tidak ada penjelasan resmi dari pemerintah mengapa RI
3 Para. 1.4, the Indonesia-Autos (Panel Report). (Lihat addendum Bab ini
mengenai ringkasan putusan (Report) Panel.
4 Para. 1.11, the Indonesia-Autos (Panel Report).
5 Para. 1.13, the Indonesia-Autos (Panel Report).
6 Para. 15.1, the Indonesia-Autos (Panel Report).
7 Para. 15.1, (d), the Indonesia-Autos (Panel Report).
8 Para. 15.1 (g), the Indonesia-Autos (Panel Report).
3
tidak mengajukan upaya ini. Dalam persidangan, Korea Selatan dan
India berpihak dan membela Indonesia. Tetapi pembelaan dua negara
ini tidak meyakinkan panel.
Alasan yang hingga kini diterima, pada waktu Panel WTO
menyidangkan dan memutus sengketa tersebut, ekonomi dan moneter RI
dalam keadaan yang sulit. Ketika Panel mengeluarkan putusannya
apda tanggal 2 Juli 1998, RI masih menderita krisis moneter dan
sangat membutuhkan bantuan dana dari donor-donor internasional,
khususnya IMF. Terungkap bahwa sebagai bagian dari skema bantuan
dana IMF, Indonesia diharuskan untuk mengakhiri program Mobnasnya.
Hal ini secara otomatis memupus upaya banding atas putusan Panel.9
Lembaga South Centre menyatakan sebagai berikut:
'The broader significance of this case is illustrated by the
major campaign mounted by the countries of the North against
this "national car project" and the fact that its
abandonment was one of the conditionalities of the IMF
rescue package for Indonesia which de facto precluded
Indonesia from challenging the panel ruling in WTO.'10
C. Penutup
Sengketa di atas menunjukkan bahwa Panel DSB WTO, negara
penuntut tidak ragu lagi melihat Perjanjian TRIMs sebagai
perjanjian yang efektif. Hal ini tampaknya penting bagi eksistensi
Perjanjian TRIMs. Telah dikemukakan di muka, Perjanjian TRIMs
adalah perjanjian yang 'gagal' dibanding perjanjian lain,
khususnya perjanjian TRIPS atau GATS. Selain itu, kekosongan
pemahaman tentang TRIMs itu sendiri tidak begitu dipersoalkan
dalam persidangan. Hal ini semua memberi dukungan positif terhadap
Perjanjian TRIMs.
9 Lihat: South Centre, Issues Regarding the Review of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Mechanism, T.R.A.D.E. Working Paper, (South Centre, 2000),
hlm. 34.
10 Ibid.
4
Addendum:11
WTO, INDONESIA - CERTAIN MEASURES AFFECTING THE AUTOMOBILE
INDUSTRY
REPORT OF THE PANEL (WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R,WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, 2
July 1998
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
1. Complaint of Japan
1.1 On 4 October 1996, Japan requested consultations with Indonesia pursuant to Article 4 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"), Article XXII:1 of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994") and Article 8 of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (the "TRIMs Agreement") regarding certain measures affecting the
automotive industry of Indonesia (WT/DS55/1).
1.3 On 5 November and 3 December 1996, Japan and Indonesia held the consultations requested on 4
October 1996. On 3 December 1996, also in Geneva, Japan and Indonesia held the consultations requested
on 29 November 1996. No mutually satisfactory solution was reached.
2. Complaint of the European Communities
1.5 On 3 October 1996, the European Communities requested consultations with Indonesia pursuant to
Article 4 of the DSU, Article XXII of GATT 1994, Article 8 of the TRIMs Agreement and Articles 7 and 30
of the SCM Agreement, with respect to certain measures affecting the automobile industry (WT/DS54/1).
1.6 The European Communities and Indonesia held consultations on 6 November 1996 and on
5 December 1996. No mutually satisfactory solution was reached.
3. Complaint of the United States
1.9 On 8 October 1996, the United States requested consultations with Indonesia pursuant to Articles 1
and 4 of the DSU, Article XXII:1 of GATT 1994, Article 8 of the TRIMs Agreement (to the extent it
incorporates by reference Article XXII of the GATT 1994), Articles 7 and 30 of the SCM Agreement (to the
extent Article 30 incorporates by reference Article XXII of the GATT 1994), and Article 64 of the TRIPS
Agreement (to the extent it incorporates by reference Article XXII of the GATT 1994) regarding certain
measures affecting trade and investment in the motor vehicle sector (WT/DS59/1).
1.10 The United States and Indonesia held consultations on 4 November 1996 and 4 December 1996,
but failed to reach a mutually satisfactory solution.
11 Footnote dalam ringkasan putusan (Report) sengketa Mobnas ini tidak
dicantumkam.
5
B. Establishment and Composition of the Panel
1.13 At its meeting on 12 June 1997, the DSB established a panel pursuant to requests by Japan and the
European Communities (WT/DS55/6-WT/DS64/4, and WT/DS54/6, respectively). At its meeting of
30 July 1997, the DSB agreed to the United States' request for establishment of a panel (WT/DS59/6), and also
agreed, as provided for in Article 9 of the DSU in respect of multiple complainants, that the Panel established
on 12 June 1997 to examine the complaints by Japan and the European Communities would also examine the
United States' complaint.
1.14 The terms of reference of the Panel are the following:
"To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by Japan
in document WT/DS55/6-WT/DS64/4, by the European Communities in document
WT/DS54/6, and by the United States in document WT/DS59/6, the matter referred to the
DSB by Japan, the European Communities and the United States in those documents and to
make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the
rulings provided for in those agreements".
1.15 Pursuant to a joint request by Japan and the European Communities, and as provided for in paragraph
7 of Article 8 of the DSU, on 29 July 1997 the Director-General composed the Panel as follows:
Chairman: Mr. Mohamed Maamoun Abdel Fattah
Members: Mr. Ole Lundby
Mr. David John Walker
1.16 India and Korea reserved their rights as third parties to the dispute.
II. FACTUAL ASPECTS
2.1 This dispute concerns a series of measures maintained by Indonesia with respect to motor vehicles
and parts and components thereof.
A. Tax and Tariff Treatment in Indonesia of Imported Completely Built-Up Motor Vehicles
2.2 Completely Built-Up motor vehicles ("CBUs") imported into Indonesia are subject to luxury tax as
set forth in Table 10 below, as well as to import duties. B. Measures at Issue
2.3 The measures at issue are the measures comprising: (1) "the 1993 Incentive System", which was
amended in 1995 and 1996 (referred to herein as the "1993 programme"), (2) "the National Car
Programme", which encompasses the so-called "February 1996 programme" and "the June 1996
programme", and (3) a $US690 million loan to PT Timor Putra Nasional ("PT TPN" or "TPN"). All
complainants raise claims with respect to the National Car Programme, and the European Communities and
the United States also raise claims with respect to the 1993 programme. In addition, the United States raises
claims with respect to the $US690 million loan. These measures can be summarized as follows:
1. "1993 Programme"
2.4 In 1993, Indonesia adopted the so-called 1993 Incentive System. The 1993 Incentive System
consists of:
(a) import duty relief (reductions or exemptions) on imports of automotive parts and
accessories based on (1) the per cent of local content of the finished motor vehicle in
which the parts are used, and (2) the type of vehicle in which the parts are used.
6
(b) import duty relief on imports of “subparts” used to make automotive parts and
accessories based on (1) the per cent of local content of the completed part or accessory,
and (2) the type of motor vehicle in which the part or accessory is used.
(c) exemption from or reduction of luxury sales tax on goods for certain categories of
motor vehicles.
(a) Decree No. 114/1993
2.5 The first decree in the 1993 programme was Minister of Industry Decree No. 114/M/SK/6/1993
(June 9, 1993) (“The Determination of Local Content Levels of Domestically Made Motor Vehicles or
Components”). Decree No. 114/1993 defines "local components" or "local sub components" as "parts or sub
parts of Motor Vehicles which are domestically made and have Local Contents at a level of more than
40 per cent for [light commercial vehicles and passenger cars] ... ". The decree sets forth import duties
dependent on specified local content rates for passenger cars, commercial vehicles, and automotive parts and
components.
(b) Decree No. 645/1993
2.9 The purpose of the second decree forming part of the 1993 Programme, Minister of Finance Decree
No. 645/KMK.01/1993 (June 10, 1993) (“The Relief of Import Duty on the Import of Certain Parts and
Accessories of Motor Vehicles for the Purpose of Automotive Assembling and/or Manufacture”), is to
authorize the incentives identified above under Decree No. 114/1993.
(c) Decree No. 647/1993
2.10 A third decree forming part of the 1993 Programme, Minister of Finance Decree No.
647/KMK.04/1993 (June 10, 1993) (“The Kinds and Types of Motor Vehicles Subject to Sales Tax on
Luxury Goods”) provides reduced Indonesian sales tax on luxury goods for motor vehicles with specified
local content rates. Specifically, passenger cars with cylinder capacities of 1600cc or less and jeeps are
subject to a luxury tax of 20 per cent provided that their local content exceeds 60 per cent. (An exception is
made for motor vehicles used for public purposes, such as police vans, ambulances, fire-engines, etc.). If
the local content is not in excess of 60 per cent, the applicable luxury tax rate is 35 per cent.
(d) Decree No. 223/1995
2.12 In 1995, through Minister of Finance Decree No. 223/KMK.01/1995 (May 23, 1995) (“The
Improvement of Decree of the Minister of Finance Number 645/KMK.01/1993 on the Relief of Import Duty
on Parts and Accessories of Motor Vehicles for the Purpose of Automotive Assembly and/or Manufacture”),
Indonesia modified the schedule of import duty rates corresponding to specified local content rates.
(e) Decree No. 36/1997
2.14 Minister of Finance Decree No. 36/KMK.01/1997 (January 21, 1997) ("The Granting of Import Duty
Relief to Certain Parts and Accessories of Motor Vehicles for the Assembly and or Manufacturing of Motor
Vehicles”) reissues the schedule of import duty relief set forth in Decree No. 223/1995 in light of changes in
the underlying customs statutes.
2. "The National Car Programme"
7
2.15 Two sets of measures have been identified by all parties under the 1996 National Car programme:
2.16 The first set of measures - the February 1996 Programme - provides for the grant of “pioneer” or
National Car company status to Indonesian car companies that meet specified criteria as to ownership of
facilities, use of trademarks, and technology. Maintenance of pioneer status is dependent on the National Cars'
meeting increasing local content requirements over a three year period. The benefits provided are exemption
from luxury tax on sales of National Cars, and exemption from import duties on parts and components.
2.17 The second set of measures - the June 1996 Programme - provides that National Cars manufactured in
a foreign country by Indonesian nationals and which fulfil the local content requirements prescribed by the
Minister of Industry and Trade, shall be treated the same as National Cars manufactured in Indonesia, i.e.
exempt from import duties and luxury tax. In accordance with Decree 142/96, imported National Cars are
deemed to comply with the 20 per cent local content requirement for the end of the first production year if the
overseas producer manufacturing the National Cars “counter-purchases” Indonesian parts and components that
account for at least 25 per cent of the C&F value of the imported cars.
2.18 The United States alleges a third element of the National Car Programme - a series of loans, totalling
US$690 million with a maturity of 10 years, made on 11 August 1997, to TPN (the only pioneer company) for
TPN to carry out the national car project. The loans allegedly were made by a consortium of state-owned and
private banks at the direction of the Government of Indonesia, with the state-owned banks providing at least 50
per cent of the financing.
(a) "The February 1996 Programme"
2.19 The so-called February 1996 programme consists of a series of decrees and regulations published in
February and March 1996.
(1) Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996
2.20 Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 (“The Development of the National Automobile Industry”) was
issued on 19 February, 1996. The purpose of Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 is “to continue to strengthen
the self-reliance of the nation, particularly in providing means of land transportation in the form of the
production of a national car . . . ” Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 directs the Minister of Industry and
Trade, the Minister of Finance, and the State Minister for the Mobilization of Investment Fund/Chairman of
Capital Investment Coordinating Board to implement a series of “provisions.”
2.21 First, Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 directs these ministers collectively to implement “measures
in close coordination to realize as fast as possible the development of the national car industry, which meets the
following criteria: (a) the use of a brand name of its own; (b) domestically produced; (c) the use of
components which are domestically produced.”
2.22 Second, Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 directs the Minister of Industry and Trade “to foster,
guide and grant facilities, in accordance with the use of provisions of laws in effect such that the national car
industry: (a) uses a brand name of its own; (b) uses components produced domestically as much as possible;
(c) is able to export its products.”
2.23 Third, Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 directs the Minister of Finance to “grant the following
facilities in the field of taxation in accordance with regulations in force: (a) import duty exemption for
importation of components produced domestically as much as possible which still need to be imported; (b) the
assessment of the Value Added Tax at the rate of 10 per cent upon the delivery of the produced automobiles;
(c) payment of the Sales Tax on Luxury Goods which is owed upon the delivery of the produced automobiles
will be borne by the Government.”
8
(2) Decree No. 31/1996
2.24 Also on 19 February 1996, Indonesia issued Minister of Industry and Trade Decree No.
31/MPP/SK/2/1996 (“The National Motor Vehicle”). Decree No. 31/1996 identifies its purpose as “to
implemen[t] Presidential Instruction No.2 of 1996 on the Development of the National Car Industry ... in the
framework of promoting industry ... .”
2.25 Decree No. 31/1996 sets forth the requirements for designation as a “national motor vehicle”.
Specifically, national motor vehicles are those which:
(a) are made domestically at production facilities owned by national industrial
enterprises or Indonesian corporations, the shares of which are wholly owned by Indonesian
citizens;
(b) use "a brand name of its own which has never been registered by any other party in
Indonesia and which is owned by an Indonesian companies/citizen"; and
(c) are "developed with technology, construction, design and engineering based on
national capability applied by stages."
The Decree also provides that “the motor vehicle industrial enterprise which produces national motor vehicles
in accordance with the requirements set forth in Article 1 will be granted the status of ‘Pioneer enterprise'.”
2.26 Decree No. 31/1996 sets forth a schedule of local content rates to be achieved by a “national motor
vehicle industrial enterprise given 'Pioneer status'”:
(3) Decree No. 82/1996
2.27 The third measure issued on February 19, 1996, was Decree of the Minister of Finance No.
82/KMK.01/1996 (“The Improvement of the Decree of the Minister of Finance No. 645/KMK.01/1993 on the
Grant of Import Duty Relief to Certain Parts and Components of Motor Vehicles for the Assembly Purposes
and/or Manufacture of Motor Vehicles as Previously Improved by the Decree of the Minister of
No. 223/KMK.01/1995”). Decree No. 82/1996 establishes that parts and components imported by a
producer/assembler of National Cars, for assembly or manufacture of National Cars fulfilling the local content
rates identified above, are exempted from import duties.
(4) Government Regulation No. 20/1996
2.28 The final measure issued on February 19, 1996, was Government Regulation No. 20 (“The
Amendment of Government Regulation No. 50 of 1994 Regarding the Implementation of Law No. 8 of 1983
on Value Added Tax on Goods and Services and Sales Tax on Luxury Goods as Amended by Law No. 11 of
1994”). By this regulation, National Cars fulfilling the specified requirements, including local content rates,
were exempted from luxury tax.
(5) Decree of the State Minister for Mobilization of Investment Funds/Chairman of the
Investment Coordinating Board No. 01/SK/1996
2.30 On 27 February 1996, Indonesia issued Decree of the State Minister for Mobilization of Investment
Funds/Chairman of the Investment Coordinating Board No. 01/SK/1996 ("Investment Regulations Within the
Framework of the Realization of the Establishment of the National Automobile Industry"). The decree
provided that "to realise the establishment of [a] national car industry, the investment approval will be issued to
the automobile industry sector with tax facilities in accordance with legal provisions enacted specifically for
that purpose."
9
(6) Ministry of Industry and Trade Decree No. 002/SK/DJ-ILMK/II/1996
2.31 On 27 February 1996, Decree No. 002/SK/DJ-ILMK/II/1996 of the Ministry of Industry and Trade
was issued. This Decree designated PT Timor Putra Nasional (“TPN”) as "a pioneer national motor vehicle
enterprise." On 5 March 1996, Decision No. 02/SK/1996 of the State Minister for the Mobilization of
Investment Funds/Chairman of the Capital Investment Co-ordinating Board was issued. This decision
designated TPN "to establish and produce a National Car."
2.32 The National Car, the "Timor", was to be based on the design and other technology of the Kia Sephia,
model produced by Kia Motors of Korea. The Timor was to be produced initially in knock-down form in
Korea by Kia Motors, for export to Indonesia, where it was to be assembled at TPN's facility at Karawang,
Indonesia. (At the time that the February 1996 programme was announced, construction of this facility had not
yet begun.) TPN was to gradually increase the level of local content of the Timor.
(b) "The June 1996 Programme"
2.33 The so-called June 1996 programme comprises a series of decrees issued in June 1996.
(1) Presidential Decree No. 42/1996
2.34 On 4 June 1996, Presidential Decree No. 42/1996 (“The Production of National Cars”) was issued.
This Decree No. 42/1996 stated that:
National cars which are made overseas by Indonesia workers and fulfil the local content
stipulated by the Minister of Industry and Trade will be treated equally to those made in
Indonesia.
In other words, National Cars in fully built-up form could be imported free of duty and luxury tax, if they were
made by Indonesian personnel and fulfilled the local content requirements for the National Car.
2.35 This Decree also provided that this tax and duty exemption would be granted only once for a
maximum period of one year, and would involve a total number of vehicles to be stipulated by the Minister of
Industry and Trade. In Minister of Industry and Trade Decree No. 1410/MPP/6/1996 (30 June 1996), TPN was
authorized to import 45,000 Timors pursuant to Decree No. 42/1996.
(2) Regulation No. 36/1996
2.36 Also on 4 June 1996, Indonesia issued Government Regulation No. 36/1996 (“The Amendment of
Government Regulation No. 50 of 1994 on the Implementation of Law No. 8 of 1983 on Value Added Tax on
Goods and Services and Sales Tax on Luxury Goods as Amended by Law No. 11 of 1994, as Lastly Amended
by Government Regulation No. 20/1996”). Regulation No. 36/1996 made further revisions to the luxury tax on
motor vehicles, which, as discussed, had been most recently revised on 19 February 1996, in Regulation No.
20/1996.
(3) Decree No. 142/1996
2.38 As indicated, Presidential Decree No. 42/1996 permitted the “national motor vehicle” to be produced
abroad for a period of one year and still receive the duty and tax benefits of the National Motor Vehicle
programme, if the local content requirements for the National Car (20 per cent local content for the first year)
were met and the car was produced by Indonesian personnel.
2.39 The Decree of the Minister of Industry and Trade No. 142/MPP/Kep/6/1996, issued 5 June 1996
(“The Production of the National Cars”) established guidelines for meeting the local content requirement
referred to in Decree 42/1996. Decree No. 142/1996 provides that “the production of national cars can be
10
carried out overseas ... on the condition that Indonesian parts and components are used”, and then states further
that “[t]he procurement of Indonesian-made parts and components shall be performed through the system of
counter purchase of parts and components of motor vehicles by the overseas company carrying out the
production and reexporting of national cars to Indonesia.” In addition, the decree states that “[t]he value of the
counter purchase ... shall be fixed at the minimum of 25% (twenty-five per cent) of the import value of the
national cars assembled abroad (C&F value).”
2.40 In other words, counter purchases by the overseas producer of the National Car of Indonesian motor
vehicle parts and components worth at least 25 per cent of the C&F import value of the imported National Cars
would satisfy the local content requirements for the National Car.
(4) Audit of TPN's performance under Decree 142/1996
2.41 Indonesia has submitted a letter to the Panel dated January 1998, containing the results of an audit of
TPN's compliance with the counterpurchase requirement of Decree No. 142/1996. The letter indicates that
TPN was found in the audit not to have met the counterpurchase requirement.
3. The US$690 million loan to TPN
2.42 The United States' claims include one additional measure, which it characterizes as a further
component of the National Car Programme: a loan provided on 11 August 1997. According to the United
States, at the direction of the Indonesian Government a consortium of four government-owned banks and
twelve private banks decided to disburse US$650 million in ten-year loans to TPN to carry out the national car
project. The United States also asserts that one of the Government-owned banks involved previously had
disbursed a US$40 million bridging loan to TPN, bringing the total loan amount to US$690 million.
According to the United States, the loans reportedly will carry an annual interest rate of 3 per cent over the 3-6
month deposit rate, a maturity of 10 years, and a grace period of 3 years, and the four government-owned banks
will provide one-half of the $650 million loan.
2.43 On 25 February 1998, Indonesia notified the Subsidies Committee that, as of 21 January 1998, it had
terminated all subsidies previously granted under the National Car programme. On 2 March 1998, Indonesia
notified the Panel and requested the Panel to terminate the dispute settlement proceeding, at least as it relates to
the 1996 National Car programme measures.
C. Notifications by Indonesia to WTO Committees
2.44 On 23 May 1995, Indonesia made a notification with respect to the 1993 Incentive System to the
TRIMs Committee under Article 5.1 of the TRIMs Agreement (G/TRIMS/N/1/IDN/1). On 28 October 1996,
Indonesia notified the TRIMs Committee that it was “withdrawing” its notification related to automobiles
because it considered that its programme was not a TRIM (G/TRIMS/N/1/IDN/1/Add.1); on the same day
Indonesia made a notification with respect to its 1993 Incentive System and its 1996 National Car programme
to the SCM Committee (G/SCM/N/16/IDN).
III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REQUESTED BY THE PARTIES
A. Japan
3.1 Japan requests the Panel to find that:
(a) the luxury sales tax exemption with regard to domestically produced National Cars
pertaining to the February 1996 National Car Programme measures identified is inconsistent
with Article III:2 of GATT 1994, since imported automobiles are subject to luxury sales tax
in excess of that applied to the like domestic products (i.e. National Cars);
11
(b) the local content requirements with regard to domestically produced National Cars
pertaining to the February 1996 National Car Programme measures identified are
inconsistent with Article III:4 of GATT 1994, since the requirements accord to products
imported from Japan treatment less favourable than that accorded to like domestic products;
(c) the local content requirements and the exemption from customs tariff and luxury
sales tax pertaining to the February 1996 National Car Programme measures identified are
trade related investment measures as stipulated in paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List
annexed to the TRIMs Agreement, and are therefore inconsistent with Article 2 of the
TRIMs Agreement;
(d) the customs tariff exemption with regard to the import of automotive parts and
components and the sales tax exemption pertaining to the February 1996 National Car
Programme measures identified are inconsistent with Article I:1 of GATT 1994, since the
exemptions are not accorded to the like products originating in all other members including
Japan;
(e) the exemption from customs tariff and sales tax granted under the extended
National Car Programme of June 1996 solely to the completed automobiles originating in the
Republic of Korea is inconsistent with Article I:1 of GATT 1994, since the exemption is not
accorded to the like products originating in other Members including Japan;
(f) the extended National Car Programme measures were not promptly published and
have not been administered in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner, thus being
inconsistent with Articles X:1 and X:3(a) of GATT 1994.
3.2 Japan requests that the Panel recommend that Indonesia bring its measures into conformity with its
obligations under GATT 1994 and the TRIMs Agreement.
B. European Communities
3.3 The European Communities requests the Panel to find that:
(a) Indonesia violates the provisions of Article III:2, first sentence, by exempting from
the luxury sales tax the sales of the following categories of motor vehicles:
(i) domestically manufactured motor cycles with engines of 250 cc or less;
(ii) combines, minibuses, vans and pick-ups using gasoline as fuel
which are manufactured domestically and have a local content of more than 60 per
cent;
(iii) combines, minibuses, vans and pick-ups using diesel oil as fuel
which are manufactured domestically and have a local content of more than 60 per
cent;
(iv) domestically manufactured buses;
(v) domestically manufactured sedans and stations wagons
of less than 1,600 cc with a local content of more than 60 per cent;
(vi) National Cars assembled in Indonesia by pioneer companies; and
(vii) imported National Cars.
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(b) the following measures favour the “use” by Indonesian car manufacturers of
domestic parts and components over “like” imported parts and components and are,
accordingly, inconsistent with Article III:4 of GATT:
(i) the exemption from the luxury sales tax of locally manufactured
combines, minibuses, vans and pick-ups with more than 60 per cent local content;
(ii) the exemption from the luxury sales tax of locally manufactured
sedans and stations wagons of less than 1,600 cc with more than 60 per cent local
content;
(iii) the exemption from the luxury sales tax of National Cars
assembled in Indonesia by pioneer companies meeting certain local content
requirements;
(iv) the exemption from the luxury sales tax of National Cars
assembled in Korea by “overseas producers” meeting certain counter-purchasing
obligations;
(v) the grant of import duty relief to parts and components used in
the assembly of motor vehicles (or of other parts and components for the assembly
of motor vehicles) in Indonesia based on the finished vehicles (or the parts and
components) meeting certain local content requirements;
(vi) the exemption from import duties for parts and components used
for the assembly of National Cars in Indonesia by pioneer companies meeting
certain local content obligations.
(c) the following measures are inconsistent with Indonesia's obligations under Article
I:1 of GATT:
(i) the exemption from customs duties on imports of National Cars;
(ii) the exemption from the sales tax on luxury goods for imported
National Cars;
(iii) the exemption from the sales tax on luxury goods for National
Cars assembled in Indonesia; and
(iv) the exemption from customs duties on imports of parts and
components for the assembly of National Cars in Indonesia.
(d) the measures listed in paragraph b. above are also TRIMs inconsistent with
Article III of GATT and, accordingly, that by applying those measures Indonesia is in
violation of its obligations under Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement.
(e) the following incentives granted to PT TPN under the National Car Programme
constitute "specific subsidies" within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement
and cause "serious prejudice" to the interests of the Community in the sense of Article 5(c)
of that Agreement:
(i) customs duty relief for parts and components intended for
assembly into National Cars;
(ii) exemption from the luxury sales tax for National Cars;
13
(iii) customs duty relief for National Cars imported from Korea.
C. United States
3.4 The United States requests the Panel to find that:
(a) Indonesia’s system of tariff and tax incentives under the 1993 Incentive System and
National Car programmes and the government-directed $690 million loan to TPN are
inconsistent with Article III:4 of GATT 1994 and are not covered by Article III:8 of GATT
1994;
(b) Indonesia’s discriminatory application of the luxury sales tax is inconsistent with
Article III:2, first sentence, of GATT 1994;
(c) alternatively, Indonesia's discriminatory application of the luxury sales tax is
inconsistent with Article III:2, second sentence;
(d) Indonesia's exemption of CBU Kia Sephia sedans imported from Korea from import
duties and the luxury sales tax violates Article I:1 of GATT 1994.
(e) Indonesia’s system of tariff and tax incentives under the 1993 Incentive System and
National Car programmes and the government-directed $690 million loan to TPN are
inconsistent with Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement;
(f) Indonesia’s grant of “national motor vehicle” benefits only to motor vehicles
bearing a unique Indonesian trademark owned by Indonesian nationals discriminates against
foreign-owned trademarks and their owners and is inconsistent with Articles 3, 20 and 65 of
the TRIPS Agreement;
(g) Indonesia has extended the scope of its tariff and tax subsidies in a manner
inconsistent with Article 28.2 of the SCM Agreement.
(h) Indonesia's subsidies under the National Motor Vehicle Programme have caused
serious prejudice to the interests of the United States within the meaning of Articles 6 and 27
of the SCM Agreement;
(i) Indonesia's subsidies under the National Motor Vehicle Programme have caused a
threat of serious prejudice to the interests of the United States within the meaning of
Articles 6 and 27 of the SCM Agreement.
3.5 The United States requests that the Panel recommend that Indonesia bring its measures into
conformity with its obligations under GATT 1994, the TRIMs Agreement, the TRIPS Agreement, and the
SCM Agreement.
3.6 The United States also requests that the Panel recommend, pursuant to Article 7.8 of the SCM
Agreement, that Indonesia take appropriate steps to remove the serious prejudice and the threat of serious
prejudice or withdraw its subsidies.
D. Indonesia
3.7 Indonesia requests the Panel to reject the complainants' assertions and find that the 1993 incentive
programme and the 1996 National Car programme are allowable subsidies under the Subsidies Agreement and
do not violate any provisions of GATT 1994, the TRIMs Agreement, or the TRIPs Agreement.
VI. CLAIMS UNDER THE TRIMS AGREEMENT
14
A. Claims Raised by Japan
6.1 Japan argues that the National Car Programme (see Section III.A) violates Article 2 of the TRIMs
Agreement. The following are Japan's arguments in support of this claim:
6.2 Article 2:1 of the TRIMs Agreement provides that "no Member shall apply any TRIM that is
inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994." The issues before this panel,
therefore, are twofold: (i) whether or not the National Car Programme is a "TRIM", and (ii) whether or not it
violates either of the relevant GATT articles. As we have demonstrated, the exemption from the luxury tax and
the import duty on the basis of local content is in violation of Article III:4. Consequently, the second of the
above has been met, and the focus of the analysis here is on the first of the two issues.
1. Indonesia's Programmes are "TRIMs" as defined in the TRIMs Agreement
6.3 There is no doubt that Indonesia's programmes constitute "investment measures related to trade".
First, in the context of GATT/WTO, a "measure" is interpreted broadly. For example, in the case of GATS, it
is expressly stated that "'measure' means any measure by a Member, whether in the form of law, regulation,
rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form". In light of the usage of the term within the
context of the TRIMs Agreement, the notion of a "measure" should be interpreted similarly. Government
regulations requiring certain local content to obtain an exemption from a luxury tax or specifying levels of
import duty thus constitute "measures" within the meaning of the TRIMs Agreement.
6.4 Second, Indonesia's programmes are all "trade-related investment measures". The National Car
Programme has been established specifically "with a view to supporting the development of the automotive
industry." The central aspect of the National Car Programme is to develop the domestic manufacturing
capability of automobiles and automotive parts and components. The fact that the Programme includes
"investment measures" is also obvious from the fact that one of its implementing regulations is entitled
"Investment Provisions for Realization of the National Automobile Industry." The Programme indeed impacts
on the automobile industry in Indonesia where foreign-owned manufacturers are actively participating.
Furthermore, these are all "trade-related" since the Programme is conditioned on local contents requirements
and thus naturally affects trade.
6.5 Indonesia has essentially confirmed this point in prior meetings of the WTO Committee on
Trade-Related Investment Measures. In the Minutes of the Meeting Held on 30 September and 1 November
1996, the representative of Indonesia stated:
[T]he National Car Programme was intended to bring about major structural changes in the
Indonesian automotive sector so that it could develop into a world standard industry ... .
These policies were expected to encourage car companies to increase their local content,
resulting in a rapid growth of investments in the automotive component industry. (Emphasis
added)
6.6 In addition, the Illustrative List in the Annex to the TRIMs Agreement, paragraph 1, specifically
includes local content requirements as TRIMs that are inconsistent with Article III:4:
TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in
[Article III:4] include those ...compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage,
and which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin ...
specified in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production ....
Indonesia's measures, which are contingent on compliance with local content requirements, thus clearly
constitute prohibited TRIMs as set forth in the Illustrative List.
15
6.7 Furthermore, Japan considers that any TRIMs which violate GATT Article III, including both
Article III:2 and Article III:4, are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. Japan believes that
the February 1996 Programme violates GATT Article III, is a "trade-related investment measure", and thus
violates TRIMs Article 2.1.
2. Even if Indonesia's measures were deemed to constitute a subsidy, it is nonetheless also a TRIM
6.8 Indonesia claims that the measure is a "subsidy" rather than a "TRIM". However, the concepts of a
TRIM and subsidy are not mutually exclusive. Nothing in the text, objective or purpose of the TRIMs
Agreement would support the contention that a TRIM is no longer a TRIM simply because the local
administering authority prefers to call it a subsidy rather than a TRIM.
3. Indonesia cannot enjoy the benefit of the transitional period
6.9 Nor can Indonesia enjoy the benefit of the five-year transitional period for developing countries
stipulated in TRIMs Agreement, Article 5.2, in light of Indonesia's failure to comply with its notification and
standstill obligations. The TRIMs Agreement, Article 5.2 requires notification for Members to benefit from the
transitional period, and Article 5.4 imposes a standstill obligation during the period. Indonesia has complied
with neither provision. First, there is no notification. Indonesia submitted a notification on 23 May 1995,
which specifies certain automotive related measures, but the notification was withdrawn in October 1996.
Second, even if the notification had not been withdrawn, its content is irrelevant to the National Car
Programme. While the measures appeared in the notification may be tangentially related to the National Car
Programme, the Programme itself was not specified in the notification. Moreover, the National Car
Programme, which was introduced in 1996, could have never been notified in the notification, which was due
within 90 days after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement (i.e., 1 January 1995) and was actually
made by Indonesia in May 1995. Therefore, Indonesia cannot enjoy the benefit of the transitional period
under Article 5.2. of the TRIMs Agreement.
B. Claims Raised by the European Communities
6.10 The European Communities claims that Indonesia has violated its obligations under Article 2.1 of
the TRIMs Agreement, as the following measures (See Section III.B) are TRIMs inconsistent with Article III
of GATT 1994:
(1) the exemption from the Sales Tax on Luxury Goods of locally manufactured
combines, minibuses, vans and pick-ups with more than 60 per cent local content;
(2) the exemption from the Sales Tax on Luxury Goods of locally manufactured
sedans and stations wagons of less than 1,600 cc with more than 60 per cent local content;
(3) the exemption from the Sales Tax on Luxury Goods of National Cars assembled in
Indonesia by Pioneer Companies meeting certain local content requirements;
(4) the exemption from the Sales Tax on Luxury Goods of National Cars assembled in
Korea by “overseas producers” meeting certain counter-purchasing obligations;
(5) the grant of duty relief to parts and components used in the assembly of motor
vehicles (or of other parts and components for the assembly of motor vehicles) in Indonesia
based on the finished vehicles (or the parts and components) meeting certain local content
requirements; and
(6) the exemption of import duties for parts and components used for the assembly of
National Cars in Indonesia by Pioneer Companies meeting certain local content obligations.
6.11 The following are the European Communities' arguments in support of this claim:
16
6.12 Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement provides that:
Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall apply any
TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT.
6.13 The notion of TRIM (“Trade Related Investment Measure”) is not defined in the TRIMs Agreement.
Nevertheless, the Annex to the TRIMs Agreement contains what Article 2.2 of that Agreement describes as:
An Illustrative List of TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided
for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 and the obligation of general elimination of
quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI.
6.14 The above measures are “investment measures” because they are specifically designed to promote
investment into the automotive sector with the purpose of achieving “full manufacturing” of motor vehicles in
Indonesia. Further, the measures are “trade related” because they encourage the use of domestic parts and
components over imported ones. Finally, as demonstrated above, the measures are inconsistent with Article
III:4 and, in some cases, also with Article III:2, first sentence.
6.15 The above analysis is confirmed by the Illustrative List annexed to the TRIMs Agreement. Indeed,
the measures at issue fall squarely within the category defined in Item 1 (a) of the Illustrative List, which
reads as follows:
1. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for
in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those [....] compliance with which is
necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic
origin or from any domestic source [...] in terms of a proportion of volume or
value of its local production.
6.16 Article 5.2 of the TRIMs Agreement provides a temporary derogation from the obligation contained
in Article 2 in respect of TRIMs which were in force at least 180 days before the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement and which have been duly notified by the Member concerned within 90 days from the entry into
force of the WTO Agreement, as required by Article 5.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. In the case of developing
country Members, such as Indonesia, this temporary derogation has a duration of five years.
6.17 On 23 May 1995, Indonesia made a notification under Article 5.1 of the TRIMs Agreement. This
notification, however, does not entitle Indonesia to invoke the temporary arrangement provided in Article 5.2
with respect to the measures at issue.
6.18 In the first place, Indonesia’s notification was made more than 90 days after the entry into force of
the WTO Agreement. Accordingly, it does not constitute a valid notification under Article 5.1.
6.19 Moreover, Indonesia’s notification covered only the measures provided in Decree 645/93. The tax
benefits provided in Government Regulation 36/96 and the incentives granted under the National Car
Programme were introduced by Indonesia only after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. For that
reason, they were not, and could not have been, notified under Article 5.1.
6.20 On 28 October 1996 (i.e. immediately before the first round of consultations with the Community
took place) Indonesia withdrew formally its notification. Allegedly because, based on a further analysis of the
measures concerned, it had concluded that the measures were not TRIMs. In reality, however, the obvious
reason for withdrawing the notification was Indonesia’s belated realisation that the notification would not
only fail to provide the expected immunity for the notified measures, but, in addition, would represent an
open admission that both the notified measures and the non-notified ones are contrary to Articles III:4 of
GATT and 2 of the TRIMs Agreement.
17
C. Claims raised by the United States
6.21 The United States claims that Indonesia’s system of tariff and tax incentives and the governmentdirected
$690 million loan to TPN (See Section III.C) are inconsistent with Article 2 of the TRIMs
Agreement. The following are the United States' arguments in support of this claim:
6.22 Indonesia’s system of tariff and tax incentives and the government-directed $690 million loan to
TPN are based upon the achievement of designated local content targets and, as such, discriminate against
imported automotive parts (and subparts) in favour of their domestic counterparts. In addition to violating
Article III:4 of GATT 1994, these measures also violate Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement.
6.23 Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreements, in pertinent part, states the following:
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member
shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III … of GATT
1994.
2. An illustrative list of TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national
treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 … is contained in the
Annex to this Agreement.
6.24 Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List, in turn, provides as follows:
1. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for
in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or
enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is
necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from
any domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in
terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of
volume or value of its local production ... . (emphasis added).
6.25 The tariff and tax incentives provided by Indonesia fall squarely within the example of a TRIM in
paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List. The tax and tariff incentives under the 1993 Programme and the
National Car Programme require, within the meaning of Article 1(a) of the Illustrative List, "the purchase or
use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source ...". "Compliance" with these
requirements "is necessary to obtain an advantage" within the meaning of Article 1 of the Illustrative List. As
such, these incentives fall squarely within the Illustrative List. Under both the 1993 programme and the
National Motor Vehicle programme, in order to obtain the “advantage” of tariff or tax reductions or
exemptions, an “enterprise” must “comply” with the requirement to “use . . . products of domestic origin”.
Likewise, the provision of the government-directed $690 million loan to TPN was based on TPN’s status as a
participant in the production of a “national motor vehicle”, a status which, in turn, was based on compliance
with the requirement to satisfy the local content requirements for a “national motor vehicle”. Therefore, the
tariff and tax incentives and the provision of the government-directed $690 million loan constitute TRIMs that
are prohibited by Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement.
6.26 With respect to the 1993 programme, Indonesia, as a developing country, could have taken
advantage of the notification and transitional arrangements of Article 5 of the TRIMs Agreement. Paragraphs
1 and 2 of Article 5 provide, in pertinent part:
1. Members, within 90 days of the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement [i.e., by 31 March 1995], shall notify the Council for Trade in Goods of
all TRIMs they are applying that are not in conformity with the provisions of this
Agreement. Such TRIMs of general or specific application shall be notified, along
with their principal features.
18
2. Each Member shall eliminate all TRIMs which are notified under
paragraph 1 … within five years [of the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement] in the case of a developing country Member ... . (footnote omitted).
6.27 Indonesia did notify, pursuant to Article 5.1, that portion of the 1993 programme providing tariff
incentives. However, that notification was untimely, because it was made on 23 May 1995, well after the
deadline for notifying TRIMs under Article 5.1 had closed. Moreover, the notification did not cover that
portion of the 1993 programme providing tax incentives. Subsequently, Indonesia withdrew that portion of its
notification pertaining to the tariff incentives for motor vehicles. As a result, Indonesia has not notified any of
the TRIMs described above, and, thus, is ineligible to take advantage of the transitional arrangements in
Article 5.2.
D. Response by Indonesia to Claims under the TRIMs Agreement
6.28 Indonesia argues, in response to the claims under the TRIMs Agreement, that the TRIMs
Agreement interprets Article III of the GATT 1994, and adds no new obligations; thus it cannot alter the fact
that Article III is not applicable. The following are Indonesia's arguments in this regard.
1. Summary
6.29 At the start of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United States, the European Communities, Japan
and other developed countries had grand plans for an agreement that would broadly discipline investment
measures. Throughout the negotiations, however, the developed countries' efforts were countered by virtually
all developing countries. To avoid the absence of any agreement at all, the agreed-upon TRIMs text provides
that the type of local content measure found to be inconsistent with Article III of the General Agreement in
Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (7 February 1994), BISD 30S/140, (as well as
another type of measure previously found to be inconsistent with Article XI) should also be proscribed as a
TRIM. In other words, to be a TRIM, a measure must be inconsistent with GATT Articles III or XI.
6.30 Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement states:
Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member
shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or
Article XI of GATT 1994. (Emphasis added.)
The TRIMs Agreement does not add any new obligations; it merely interprets Article III. This was
recognized in the Report of the Panel on European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/USA (22 May 1997), which declares at paragraph 7.185:
In considering these arguments, we first examine the relationship of the TRIMs
Agreement to the provisions of GATT. We note that with the exception of its
transition provisions the TRIMs Agreement essentially interprets and clarifies the
provisions of Article III (and also Article XI) where trade-related investment
measures are concerned. Thus the TRIMs Agreement does not add to or subtract
from those GATT obligations, although it clarifies that Article III:4 may cover
investment-related matters. (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.)
6.31 As demonstrated (See Section V.D), Indonesia's luxury tax subsidy is not inconsistent with Article
III of the General Agreement. Therefore, the TRIMs Agreement is not germane to this dispute.
2. The TRIMs "Illustrative List" cannot alter the fact that Article III is inapplicable
6.32 Complainants seek to use the TRIMs Illustrative List as the tail to wag the Article III dog, claiming
that the Indonesian measures fall within the scope of paragraph 1(a) of the List and hence are TRIMs.
19
6.33 During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United States clearly indicated the subordinate nature
of the Illustrative List. The official minutes of the 10-11 July 1989 meeting of the TRIMs negotiating group
record the following exchange:
One participant asked for clarification on the nature of and the role that would be
assigned to "illustrative lists"; were they only concepts within the framework of the
negotiations, would they remain illustrative rather than definitive in any final
agreement and would they be open-ended so that they could be added to at a later
stage? ... The representative of the United States said that the lists should be purely
illustrative. Disciplines should be based on general criteria such as the inherently
trade distorting nature of TRIMs and illustrative lists could then be drawn up with
specific examples of TRIMs that were subject to specific disciplines. In that way
any new measure that was devised could still be caught by the discipline even if it
did not appear on an illustrative list.
6.34 The United States, the European Communities, Japan and other developed countries had extensive
negotiating goals for the TRIMs Agreement, but at the end of the negotiation the parties could not even agree
upon basic definitions such as "investment" measure and "trade-related." The only "general criteria" that
survived the negotiating process and was reflected in the final text of the TRIMs Agreement was that a TRIM
must be inconsistent with the obligations of either Article III or XI of the General Agreement. In sum,
because the luxury tax subsidy is not inconsistent with Article III, it cannot be proscribed by the TRIMs
Agreement.
3. Subsidies are governed by the subsidies agreement and are not within the scope of the TRIMs
Agreement
6.35 One of the many fundamental issues on which there were major differences of opinion among the
participants in the Uruguay Round TRIMs negotiating group was whether subsidies were governed solely by
the Subsidies Agreement or also could be considered to be an "incentive" or a "condition for receipt of an
advantage" and thus governed by the TRIMs Agreement. The United States and Japan argued that subsidies
could also be TRIMs. Argentina, Hungary, India, the Nordics, the Philippines (for ASEAN), Poland and
others disagreed. So did the European Communities, which included the following in its 13 November 1989
submission to the TRIMs negotiating group:
[G]overnment incentives, including subsidies, are being addressed in the
Negotiating Group on Subsidies; such incentives are therefore not the subject of the
current negotiations on TRIMs.
6.36 The disagreement remained throughout the life of the negotiating group. In the "Chairman's Report
on the Status of Work in the Negotiating Group" (MTN.GNG/NG12/W/27), the paragraph and accompanying
footnote asserting that subsidies could be TRIMs was in brackets, thereby signifying lack of agreement with
the proposition. In its 1997 Report to the WTO Council for Trade in Goods, the TRIMs Committee stated:
“[d]iffering views continue to be expressed on issues such as ... the relationship of the provisions of the
[TRIMs] Agreement to those of other WTO agreements, including the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures and the Agreement on Agriculture.” Even the United States has acknowledged that
"[o]ther issues that appear to require additional follow [sic] include: ... the relationship of the TRIMs
Agreement with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures."
6.37 The foregoing clarifies that no consensus exists that subsidy measures also are subject to the
disciplines (whatever they might be) of the TRIMs Agreement. The luxury tax reductions and exemption
under the 1993 Incentive Programme and the February 1996 national car programme are not TRIMs; they are
subsidies. They are governed by and subject to the disciplines of the Subsidies Agreement.
4. Customs import duty subsidies are not within the scope of the TRIMs Agreement
20
6.38 The TRIMs Agreement merely interprets Article III of the General Agreement. It does not add new
obligations. Therefore, where, as here, Article III is not applicable, the TRIMs Agreement is not applicable.
The “Illustrative List,” therefore, is irrelevant. Customs duty subsidies are governed by the Subsidies
Agreement and are not within the scope of the TRIMs Agreement.
5. Indonesia has not violated the TRIMs Agreement: The TRIMs Agreement does not apply - it adds
no new obligations, but merely puts a gloss on Article III of GATT 1994
(a) The TRIMs Agreement, unlike the SCM Agreement, is not lex specialis; it neither defines
“TRIM” nor sets forth special remedies
6.39 The TRIMs Agreement differs substantially from the SCM Agreement. Unlike the SCM
Agreement, which is lex specialis for this dispute, the TRIMs Agreement is not lex specialis for this or, for
that matter, any dispute. This is because the TRIMs Agreement:
- first, does not define “TRIM” (in fact, it does not contain even a limited definition of
“TRIM”); and
- second, does not set forth special remedies for measures found to be TRIMs (in fact, it sets
forth no remedies at all).
To Indonesia’s knowledge, these facts concerning the TRIMs Agreement are not in dispute.
(b) The TRIMs Agreement does not establish a “new balance of rights and obligations”; rather,
it merely elaborates on the FIRA Panel’s decision regarding the coverage of Article III of
GATT
6.40 The United States asserts that the TRIMs Agreement establishes a “new balance of rights and
obligations,” and that Indonesia ignores it (See Section VI.E.3). These allegations are unfounded. It should
go without saying that any contract, memorandum of understanding or trade agreement establishes a “balance
of rights and obligations”. The real question, however, is: what was agreed to? Indonesia has demonstrated
conclusively that the developing countries successfully countered the developed states’ drive to increase the
scope of what became the TRIMs Agreement.
6.41 As Indonesia has demonstrated, the TRIMs Agreement was conceived of and drafted in order to
further specify the application of Article III of the GATT to trade-related investment measures. No provision
of the TRIMs Agreement brings Indonesia’s subsidies within the scope of the Agreement.
6.42 In further specifying Article III, the TRIMs Agreement elaborates on the decision of the Panel in
Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) (7 February 1994), BISD 30S/140.
The United States, in discussing this fact, attempts to undercut Indonesia's argument by focusing on the word
“essentially” in the following passage from paragraph 7.185 of Bananas III:
the TRIMs Agreement essentially interprets and clarifies the provisions of
Article III (and also Article XI) where trade-related investment measures are
concerned.
The United States asserts that “essentially” indicates that the TRIMs Agreement must cover other items (See
Section VI.E.3). But the United States ignores, as it must, the very next sentence from the Panel report, which
clarifies that the Panel did not use “essentially” to indicate that the phrase following it is false or incomplete:
Thus the TRIMs Agreement does not add to or subtract from those GATT obligations, although it
clarifies that Article III:4 may cover investment-related measures.
This quotation pretty much sums it up. It is a precise statement of Indonesia’s position.
21
6.43 Thus, the United States, in its arguments, runs afoul of the very criticism it levies against Indonesia.
It is complainants, not Indonesia, that come before this Panel seeking to revisit and rewrite the TRIMs
Agreement by having the Panel adopt interpretations explicitly rejected during the negotiations.
6. Japan is in Error; the Government most certainly does not view the National Car Programme as an
investment programme
6.44 The two measures which make up the National Car Programme are subsidies. This has been the
consistent view of Indonesia since this dispute began. When the measures initially were introduced, the
Indonesian Government, on the basis of an incomplete and unsound analysis of the legal nature of the
subsidies under the WTO Agreements, notified them as TRIMs. Upon a more exacting legal analysis, the
Government realized its mistake, withdrew its TRIMs notification and notified the measures as subsidies.
6.45 From time to time, some Indonesian officials have referred to the measures as relating to industrial
development, trade, investment, etc. These references do not and cannot alter the nature of the measures. Nor
do the statements of various officials from competing bureaucracies change the Government’s position that
the measures are subsidies. As demonstrated, the measures are subsidies to a domestic industry to encourage
its development. Alternative descriptions or characterizations cannot alter this fact.
7. The underlying decree, rules and regulations, and Indonesia’s statements to the Committee on
TRIMs establish that the National Car Programme does not involve a TRIM
6.46 Japan claims that because one implementing decree contains the word “investment” in its title
(which, according to Japan, means that it addresses the measure as an investment measure), the subsidy must
be a TRIM. This is incorrect. Of the large number of regulations and decrees regarding the National Car
Programme, Japan selected a single regulation on the basis of its heading. Japan then arbitrarily affixed the
designation “key” to that single regulation and, finally, promoted it to the rank of evidence that the National
Car Programme is an “investment measure.”
6.47 The seminal regulation for the February 1996 measure is Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 of 19
February 1996. It simply instructs two Ministers, the Minister of Industry & Trade (MIT) and the Minister of
Finance (MOF), to perform detailed activities. It also charges the Minister for the Mobilization of Investment
Funds/Chairman of the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) with the very general task of “safeguarding”
the development of the national car industry.
6.48 On 19 February 1996, the same day that Presidential Instruction No. 2/1996 was issued, both MIT
and MOF issued their implementation decrees. MIT implemented the Presidential Instruction by issuing
Decree No. 31/MPP/SK/2/1996; MOF issued implementing Decree No. 82/KMK.01/1996.
6.49 The BKPM implementing regulation appeared eight days later, on 27 February 1996. BKPM had to
wait until further implementing regulations were issued by the two principal ministries before ascertaining
what secondary supporting regulation was appropriate for it to promulgate. The principal implementing
regulation (supplementing the two decrees cited above) was issued by MIT’s Director General for the Metal,
Machinery & Chemical Industries (Decree No. 002/SK/DJ-ILMK/II/1996), appointing a Pioneer Motor
Vehicle Industrial Enterprise. Only after the Director General issued this decree did BKPM issue the
Investment Provisions for the Realization of the National Automobile Industry. Even then, on closer scrutiny,
the “Investment Provisions” turn out to be merely a rehash of the earlier MIT Decree (No.
31/MPP/SK/2/1996).
6.50 Why did BKPM have to issue a regulation at all? It had to issue the regulation because TPN is a
Domestic Capital Investment Company (a PMDN), and all PMDN companies operate under the auspices of
BKPM. BKPM Decree No. 01/SK/1996 is not a “key implementing regulation.” It is merely an
administrative and procedural regulation that could not be issued prior to the MIT and MOF decrees.
Moreover, it simply repeats another Ministerial decree. Again, the February 1996 national car measure is a
subsidy and Complainants’ misrepresentations do not bring it under the TRIMs Agreement.
22
6.51 Japan similarly misuses Indonesia’s presentation at the 30 September 1996 meeting of the
Committee on TRIMs. At this meeting, Indonesia responded to questions posed by the delegation of Japan
and mentioned at least seven objectives of the National Car Programme:
- to improve the competitiveness of local companies and strengthen overall industrial
development;
- to promote the competitiveness of Indonesia’s automotive production;
- to develop the capacity of multiple-source auto parts and components;
- to encourage the development of the automotive industry and the automotive component
industry;
- to bring about major structural changes in the Indonesian automobile industry;
- to encourage the transfer of technology and contribute to large-scale job creation; and
- to encourage car companies to increase their local content, resulting in a rapid growth of
investment in the automobile component industry.
6.52 Like Japan’s selective use of Indonesia’s regulations to buttress its assertion that Indonesia’s national
car policy is an investment measure, Japan again has acted arbitrarily here. It has chosen one of the seven
objectives to carry its allegation that the February 1996 national car measure is a TRIM and, even then, its
conclusion does not reflect the facts.
6.53 The single sentence used by Japan as evidence that the national car measure is a TRIM is in item 4 of
page 2 of Indonesia’s response:
These policies are expected to encourage car companies to increase their local content,
resulting in a rapid growth of investments in the automotive component industry.
But Japan’s interpretation even of this one (of seven) goals is inaccurate. The expectation and, therefore, the
objective is directed toward car companies increasing their local content. The measure is a subsidy
conditioned upon the increasing use of local content. The “rapid growth of investments” is not an objective of
the national car measure; it is only a side product of such objective.
8. The measures are not investment measures but subsidies granted to an automaker to use domestic
parts and components
6.54 The Indonesian measures are not investment measures, but subsidies granted to an automaker to use
domestic parts and components, for the following reasons:
1. The subsidies are granted by the Minister of Finance.
2. The regulating authority over the automaker vests with the Minister of Industry and Trade.
3. The involvement of the Minister for the Mobilization of Investment Funds/Chairman of the
Capital Investment Coordinating Board is purely administrative and is required only
because the automaker happens to be a domestic capital investment company.
4. The considerable number of regulations providing and implementing the subsidy do not
once refer to "investments".
23
5. Although subsidies may at times indirectly affect investment decisions of the recipient of
the subsidy or other parties, these decisions are not the object, but rather the unintended
result, of the subsidy. Indeed, increased investment indirectly results from many subsidies.
6. Moreover, even if the TRIMs Agreement did apply, the subsidies are not inconsistent with
Article III of GATT 1994.
9. The measures are not TRIMs that violate Article III:2 of GATT 1994
6.55 The government measures are not TRIMs. Specific subsidies by definition discriminate between
products benefiting from the subsidies and those that do not. If GATT Article III:2 and Article III:4 were
applied every time a specific subsidy came up, virtually all actionable subsidies granted by developing
countries would be undone by GATT Articles III:2 and III:4 and the TRIMs Agreement. Article 32.1 of the
SCM Agreement unequivocally provides that GATT actions against subsidies are to be resolved under the
SCM Agreement. It is the SCM Agreement that deals with actionable subsidies under Art. 27.3, not the
GATT.
10. The TRIMs Agreement is not lex specialis to any dispute
6.56 Unlike the SCM Agreement, the TRIMs Agreement is not lex specialis to any dispute. By its very
terms it cannot be. For example, Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement states that the TRIMs Agreement
operates "[w]ithout prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994".
6.57 The Article continues, stating, "no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the
provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994". (This passage breathes new life into Article III of
GATT 1994 which, complainants assert, Indonesia's lex specialis and conflict arguments would render
moribund.) Thus the TRIMs Agreement itself states that it is naught but a general agreement that depends
upon the General Agreement to have any meaning whatsoever.
6.58 Given this, other Annex 1A and 1C Agreements can apply and, more importantly, in the case of
those agreements which are lex specialis, such as the SCM Agreement, control certain disputes, such as this
one, to the complete exclusion of the TRIMs Agreement.
E. Arguments made in rebuttal to Indonesia's responses to the claims under the TRIMs Agreement
1. Rebuttal arguments made by Japan
6.59 Japan makes the following arguments in rebuttal to Indonesia's responses to the claims under the
TRIMs Agreement:
(a) The February 1996 Programme violates TRIMs Article 2.1
6.60 As demonstrated (See Section VI.A), the February 1996 Programme violates GATT Article III, is a
"trade-related investment measure," and thus violates TRIMs Article 2.1.
6.61 Indonesia argues that the TRIMs Agreement only interprets GATT Article III and GATT Article III
is not applicable to the February 1996 Programme. As discussed (See Section VI.D), GATT Article III does
apply and the Programme is inconsistent with it.
6.62 Indonesia also attempts to evade its violation of the TRIMs Agreement by arguing that the
Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement is "purely illustrative" and that the List cannot alter the "fact" that
GATT Article III is inapplicable. Once again, however, the Government of Japan has amply demonstrated
that Article III does in fact apply. It appears, moreover, that Indonesia misunderstands Japan's argument. The
Government of Japan does not argue that the National Car Programme violates TRIMs Article 2 because it is
24
on the Illustrative List, but that it violates TRIMs Article 2 because it is a TRIM and it is inconsistent with
GATT Article III. Thus, Indonesia's argument about the nature of the List is irrelevant.
6.63 Therefore, the February 1996 Programme is inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement and the
Government of Indonesia's contrary argument lacks any merit.
(b) The SCM Agreement does not excuse indonesia's violations of the TRIMs Agreement
6.64 Indonesia seems to argue that there is a conflict between SCM Article 27.3 and TRIMs Article 2.1,
such that SCM Article 27.3 excuses the violations of TRIMs Article 2.1. However, that argument also lacks
any merit. These provisions do not conflict and Indonesia's assumption that the SCM Agreement would
prevail in a hypothetical conflict is unfounded.
6.65 As discussed (See Section V.E.1), the Bananas III Panel found that a conflict between two WTO
Agreements can only arise if the two establish "mutually exclusive" obligations or one "explicitly permits"
what another prohibits. As already shown with respect to GATT Article III, however, the SCM Agreement
neither creates obligations that are "mutually exclusive" with TRIMs Article 2.1 nor "explicitly permits"
violations of TRIMs Article 2.1.
6.66 Rather, the TRIMs and SCM Agreements create “different or complementary obligations.” The
TRIMs Agreement applies to TRIMs regardless of whether such TRIMs are also “subsidies” under the SCM
Agreement and the SCM Agreement applies to “subsidies” regardless of whether such “subsidies” are also
TRIMs. A WTO Member can, and therefore must, comply with the provisions of both Agreements with
respect to a measure that is both a “subsidy” under the SCM Agreement and a TRIM under the TRIMs
Agreement. Nothing in the text, context, object or purpose of the TRIMs Agreement supports the Indonesian
contention that a TRIM is no longer a TRIM simply because the administering authority prefers to call it
something else.
6.67 This conclusion is strengthened by a review of the TRIMs and SCM provisions that establish the
transition periods for developing country Members. SCM Article 27.3 allows developing countries a period
of time (five years for Indonesia) before they must comply with the prohibition on subsidies contingent on the
use of domestic over imported products. TRIMs Article 5.1 likewise also allows developing country
Members time before they must comply with the TRIMs Article 2 provisions on local content requirements
which are inconsistent with GATT Article III, provided that the measure existed when the WTO Agreements
entered into force (i.e., on 1 January 1995) and that the Member notified the measure within ninety days of
such entry into force (i.e., by 1 April 1995). For TRIMs that are also “subsidies” under the SCM Agreement,
it is clearly possible for developing country Members to receive the benefits of the transitional arrangements
under both Agreements by acting in accordance with the terms of each Agreement. Moreover, if such TRIMs
should be subject only to the SCM Agreement, it would render the specifically crafted notification
requirement under the TRIMs Agreement, for the substantial part of its coverage, meaningless.
6.68 Finally, if a conflict may some day arise between the TRIMs and SCM Agreements, there is no
reason to assume - as Indonesia apparently does - that the SCM Agreement would prevail in such a conflict.
Indonesia’s faulty assumption seems to result from its mistaken equating of the GATT and the TRIMs
Agreement, discussed above. The plain text of the General Interpretative Note refutes this assumption. That
Note expressly provides that Annex 1A Agreements - including both the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM
Agreement - prevail over the GATT to the extent of a conflict. The General Interpretative Note thus gives the
TRIMs and SCM Agreements alike a hierarchical status above the GATT in the event of a conflict, but it does
not establish any hierarchy between the two. Recent Appellate Body Reports also support the conclusion. For
example, in Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, a WTO panel firmly rejected an argument by
Canada that the scope of the GATS and the GATT were mutually exclusive, holding that:
The ordinary meaning of the texts of GATT 1994 and GATS as well as Article II:2 of the
WTO Agreement, taken together, indicates that obligations under GATT 1994 and GATS
can co-exist and that the one does not override the other. If the consequences suggested by
Canada were intended, there would have been provisions similar to Article XVI:3 of the
25
WTO Agreement or the General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A in order to establish
hierarchical order between GATT 1994 and GATS. The absence of such provisions between
the two instruments implies that GATT 1994 and GATS are standing on the same plain in
the WTO Agreement, without any hierarchical order between the two."
The WTO Appellate Body approved this aspect of the panel decision in the Periodicals case, quoting the
above reasoning by the panel and noting that: "The entry into force of the GATS ... does not diminish the
scope of application of GATT 1994". Since GATS is not covered by the General Interpretative Note (which
gives WTO agreements in Annex 1A other than GATT precedence over GATT in the event of a conflict),
GATS is on equal footing with GATT. In the same way, the TRIMs Agreement is on equal footing with the
SCM Agreement. Thus, the Panel should not, without any textual basis, elevate one Annex 1A Agreement
over the others.
(c) Incentive measures are covered by the TRIMs Agreement
6.69 The Government of Indonesia also contends that “no consensus exist[ed] that subsidy measures also
are subject to the disciplines of the TRIMs Agreement,” that its incentives to encourage purchases of domestic
goods over imports "are not TRIMs; they are subsidies", and thus “they are subject to the disciplines of the
Subsidies Agreement”. (See Section VI.D).
6.70 However, Indonesia's allegation contradicts the text of the TRIMs Agreement. The text of the
Agreement requires only two elements for a measure to constitute a violation of TRIMs Article 2.1: first, the
measure is an "investment measure related to trade in goods"; and second, the measure is "inconsistent with
the provisions of [GATT] Article III or Article XI". As described in paragraph 3.14 above, it has been firmly
established that GATT Article III:4 applies not only to mandatory measures but also to measures with which a
company may comply voluntarily to obtain a benefit. Therefore, it is clear that TRIMs Article 2.1 also applies
to such voluntary measures, or incentive measures, as long as they fall within the concept of "TRIMs".
6.71 The Illustrative List in the Annex of the TRIMs Agreement also demonstrates that the February 1996
Programme is a TRIM. That list explicitly provides that prohibited TRIMs include any local content
requirement "compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage".
6.72 Because the text of the TRIMs Agreement clearly and unambiguously establishes that it applies not
only to mandatory measures but also to measures "compliance with which is necessary to obtain an
advantage", there is no need to resort to the drafting history to understand this point. In fact, however, a
review of the preparatory work of the TRIMs Agreement confirms - unsurprisingly, in view of the plain text -
that the negotiators decided to include so-called "incentive measures" in the TRIMs Agreement.
6.73 Although the preparatory work shows active discussion about the definition of a "TRIM" throughout
the negotiations and a wide variety of views were expressed, at the final stage a consensus was created, as
discussed below.
6.74 Late in the TRIMs negotiations (i.e., October 1991 through 20 December 1991), the Chairman
distributed texts for the purpose of discussion. The key phrase concerning incentive measures (i.e., “TRIMs
.... compliance with which is necessary to obtain advantage”) was included in the Chairman's first draft,
removed in the revised text of 25 November 1991 at the behest of India and other developing countries, and
revived in the Chairman’s second draft after developed countries objected to the earlier deletion. Ultimately,
this phrase was finally adopted, with the developing countries accepting it in exchange for the developed
countries' acceptance of the five-year transition period. Indeed, the negotiating group rejected a proposal by
one Member that would have expressly limited TRIMs to mandatory measures.
6.75 It is also relevant to note that the final TRIMs Agreement did not incorporate a position advanced by
some developing countries that would have provided for only the disciplines of the SCM Agreement to apply,
when a "subsidy" (as defined in the SCM Agreement) was granted contingent on meeting certain
requirements, such as local content requirements. That position was rejected, because most Members
recognized that it would create too large a loophole in the TRIMs Agreement. This loophole was avoided by
26
leaving both the SCM Agreement and the TRIMs Agreement silent about their relationship, thereby ensuring
that the disciplines of both would apply to measures that were both TRIMs and "subsidies."
6.76 Thus, it is clear that the positions advanced in the quotations from the preparatory work cited in
Indonesia's First Submission were not adopted in the final text of the TRIMs Agreement. Of course, it is the
text of a treaty itself that governs and any views expressed during the negotiations that do not comport with
the text carry no weight.
6.77 Finally, subsequent practice under the WTO, which is relevant to its interpretation, confirms that
TRIMs that fall within the SCM definition of "subsidy" have nevertheless been understood to also be subject
to the TRIMs Agreement. This is demonstrated by the fact that even many developing country Members have
included such measures in their notifications to the TRIMs Committee under Article 5. In fact, the
Government of Indonesia itself notified the TRIMs Committee of the incentive measures in its 1993
automobile programmes, although it did so late and later withdrew the notification, apparently in connection
with these proceedings.
(d) Indonesia's arguments would render parts of the TRIMs Agreement virtually
meaningless
6.78 Finally, it should also be noted that Indonesia's argument that incentive measures should be governed
only by the SCM Agreement, not by the TRIMs Agreement, would render parts of the TRIMs Agreement
virtually meaningless.
6.79 As discussed (See Section VI.A), the text of the TRIMs Agreement clearly shows that an incentive
measure, or a measure "compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage", is within the coverage of
the Agreement. It appears that a TRIM that is an incentive measure would very often also be a "subsidy"
under the SCM Agreement. Therefore, if an interpretation were taken that a measure, which constitutes both
a "TRIM" under the TRIMs Agreement and a "subsidy" under the SCM Agreement, shall be governed only
by the SCM Agreement, that would negate a substantial part of the TRIMs Agreement coverage.
6.80 Accordingly, a "TRIM" under the TRIMs Agreement should not be excluded from the coverage of
the TRIMs Agreement, only because it constitutes a "subsidy" under the SCM Agreement.
2. Rebuttal arguments made by the European Communities
6.81 The following are the European Communities' rebuttal arguments to Indonesia's responses to the
claims under the TRIMs Agreement:
(a) The measures at issue infringe GATT Article III and are therefore contrary to
Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement
6.82 Indonesia argues that the measures at issue do not infringe Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement
because they are not within the scope of, and therefore cannot be “inconsistent” with, Article III. The
European Communities has shown (see Sections V.A.2 and V.C.2) that the measures at issue are inconsistent
with GATT Articles III:2 and/or III:4. Therefore, they are contrary also to Article 2.1 of the TRIMs
Agreement.
(b) Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement lays down a legally distinct obligation
6.83 Indonesia claims that the TRIMs Agreement “interprets GATT Article III and does not add new
obligations”. Indonesia relies for this proposition on the following passage of the Panel Reports on EC
regime concerning the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas :
with the exception of its transitional provisions, the TRIMs Agreement, essentially interprets
and clarifies the provisions of Article III (and also Article XI) were trade-related investment
27
measures concerned. Thus the TRIMs Agreement does not add to or subtract from those
GATT obligations, although it clarifies that Article III:4 may cover investment matters.
6.84 Properly interpreted, this passage means that, in substance, the TRIMs Agreement is limited to
restate and clarify the obligations laid down GATT Article III. Formally, however, Article 2.1 of the TRIMs
Agreement lays down an obligation which is distinct from the obligation contained in GATT III. This is
confirmed by the prior finding in the same Panel Report that the provisions of GATT and the TRIMs
Agreement were “equally applicable” to the European Communities’s import licensing procedures.
Furthermore, if Article 2.1 of the TRIMs did not provide for an additional and distinct obligation, it would
have been superfluous to stipulate in Article 3 of the TRIMs Agreement that all exceptions under GATT 1994
shall apply also to the provisions of the TRIMs Agreement. Likewise, it would have been unnecessary to sate
in Article 4 of the TRIMs Agreement that developing Members shall be free to deviate from Article 2 “to the
extent and in such manner” as Article XVIII of GATT and other related legal instruments permit those
Members to deviate from GATT Articles III and XI.
(c) Even if it was found that there is a “conflict” between GATT Article III and the
SCM Agreement, that conflict would not preclude a violation of Article 2 of the TRIMs
Agreement
6.85 The General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A only applies to conflicts between GATT and the other
Annex 1A Agreements. It does not apply to conflicts between the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM
Agreement. Accordingly, even if it was found by the Panel that there is a “conflict” between GATT Article
III and the SCM Agreement, such “conflict” would not preclude a violation of the legally distinct obligation
contained in Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement. In fact, the existence of a “conflict“ between the SCM
Agreement and GATT Article III would not make the measures concerned “consistent” with GATT Article
III but merely exclude the application of that provision. Quite to the contrary, the existence of a “conflict”
between the SCM Agreement and GATT Article III would presuppose necessarily that the measures are
“inconsistent” with the latter.
(d) The TRIMs Agreement may apply to subsidies
6.86 The TRIMs Agreement applies to any trade related investment measure which is inconsistent with
GATT Article III. Given that GATT Article III may apply to measures which are “subsidies” within the
meaning of the SCM Agreement, it follows that the TRIMs Agreement may also apply to “subsidies”. This is
confirmed by the Illustrative List. In accordance with its ordinary meaning, the term “advantage” used in the
Illustrative List may include also “subsidies” within the meaning of the SCM Agreement.
3. Rebuttal Arguments made by the United States
6.+87 Noting that it agrees with the points made by Japan and the EC at the second meeting of the Panel,
and, in particular, the arguments made by the European Communities (See Section VI.E.2(b)), the United
States makes the following arguments in rebuttal to Indonesia's responses to the claims under the TRIMs
Agreement:
(a) The tariff and tax incentives under the 1993 Programme and the National Car
Programme are inconsistent with Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement
6.88 With respect to Indonesia’s violations of Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, Indonesia argues that
the TRIMs Agreement imposes no new obligations, but is merely an interpretation of Article III of GATT
1994. Indonesia, of course, must advance this argument in light of its “conflict” argument (the flaws in which
we have addressed (See Section V.E.III)), because the General interpretative headnote to Annex 1A addresses
only alleged “conflicts” between the GATT 1994 and the provisions of another Annex 1A agreement, not
alleged “conflicts” between two or more Annex 1A agreements other than GATT 1994.
6.89 In advancing its argument, Indonesia relies on a statement made by the panel in the Bananas III case
at para. 7.185 of the report. Indonesia argues that the panel ruled that the TRIMs Agreement does not add any
28
new obligations. However, that is not what the Bananas III panel said. While the panel said that the TRIMs
Agreement “essentially” interprets Article III and Article XI of GATT 1994, the panel also noted that the
TRIMs Agreement clarified those obligations and granted transition provisions. Moreover, the panel’s
holding simply was that in the context of that particular case, the panel did not need to make a specific ruling
under the TRIMs Agreement, because it already had found the measures in question to be violative of Article
III:4. That limited holding is far different from holding that the TRIMs Agreement does not, in itself, impose
obligations.
6.90 Indeed, the Bananas III panel itself recognized that the TRIMs Agreement reflected a new balance of
rights and obligations; namely, a trade-off between the clarification of obligations and the grant of transition
periods. An additional trade-off that the panel did not mention was the addition of transparency requirements
in the form of the notification provisions in Article 5. For purposes of our Autos dispute, the most important
clarification was that “incentive-based” measures, such as Indonesia’s local content incentives, are covered.
6.91 As the Appellate Body stated in the Wool Shirts case, page 16, where an agreement reflects a
carefully drawn balance of rights and obligations of Members, “[t]hat balance must be respected”. Rather than
respecting the balance reflected in the TRIMs Agreement, Indonesia would have this Panel ignore it.
6.92 Indonesia’s other argument is that the drafting history of the TRIMs Agreement somehow
demonstrates that the TRIMs Agreement was not intended to impose a new balance of rights and obligations.
This argument, too, is easily disposed of.
6.93 Indonesia cites to a statement made by the United States during the TRIMs negotiations that
allegedly demonstrates the subordinate nature of the TRIMs Illustrative List. However, the statement in
question was made in the context of a United States proposal that was not adopted, and, thus, is of limited, if
any, relevance.
6.94 Second, Indonesia refers to the fact that an issue in the negotiations was whether subsidies could be
considered an “incentive” or a “condition for receipt of an advantage” and, thus, subject to the TRIMs
Agreement. As discussed previously in connection with Indonesia’s “conflicts” argument, the drafting history
of the TRIMs Agreement demonstrates: (1) that local content subsidies are covered by the TRIMs
Agreement; and (2) that Article 27.3 of the SCM Agreement was added at the last minute to ensure that
subsidies permitted by the transitional provisions of the TRIMs Agreement would not be precluded by the
SCM Agreement. Indeed, the very fact that Article 27.3 was added to the SCM Agreement demonstrates that
the drafters intended that local content subsidies would be covered by the TRIMs Agreement.
6.95 Third, Indonesia refers to a document, "US Paper on WTO Agenda", which states that "[o]ther issues
that appear to require additional follow [sic] include: ... the relationship of the TRIMs Agreement with the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures." The document was drafted for the so-called
"Invisibles Committee" (senior Capital-Based Officials), which functions as an ad hoc and unofficial steering
group of sorts. Other participants in the Committee had asked the United States to draft the paper as a means
of "kick-starting" a collective assessment of the Singapore Ministerial and the ensuing and continuing work
across the spectrum of WTO activities. Thus, the paper was a discussion paper, and was intended to provide a
representative mix of Members' actual or perceived thoughts about where the WTO has been and where it
ought to go. It definitely was not intended to convey US positions on particular issues.
6.96 With respect to the discussion of the TRIMs Agreement, the paper draws no conclusions about the
legal relationships between the agreements cited, nor does it even suggest that there are conflicts among them.
Instead, it merely expresses the commonsense and obvious point that in considering the future work of the
TRIMs Committee, it might be appropriate to look at how the three agreements relate to one another given
their obvious overlap. Given the views that Indonesia already had articulated in the TRIMs Committee and
the SCM Committee, it is hardly surprising that this issue would be identified as one for further discussion.
Also, by the time the paper was drafted, there already had been several "sleights of hand" by several Members
that were making multiple notifications under the TRIMs and SCM Agreements and then later "withdrawing"
some. Because a measure can be both a TRIM and a subsidy in substance, the italicized "Question for
Discussion" in the paper appropriately suggests that Members should take a look at all of the notification
29
provisions to see where gaps from one could fill in for another, or where improvements are needed in order to
monitor phase-out obligations across agreements.
6.97 Thus, even if this Panel should find incorrectly that Article III:4 of GATT 1994 does not apply to the
Indonesian tax and tariff incentives due to an alleged “conflict” with the SCM Agreement, those measures
nonetheless violate Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement.
(b) The Indonesian measures are "trade related investment measures"
6.98 Indonesia also argues that the measures in question do not violate Article 2.1 of the TRIMs
Agreement because they are not "investment" measures. In the view of the United States, if a measure
described in the Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement is being applied, nothing more need be shown to
establish an Article 2 violation. If any Member, in whatever context, requires the purchase by an enterprise of
a domestic product in order to obtain an advantage, that requirement by definition has investment
consequences for such an enterprise, putting the measure within the coverage of the TRIMs Agreement. The
United States is unaware of anything in the negotiating history of the TRIMs Agreement that would warrant a
different conclusion.
6.99. Moreover, even if the identification of a relationship to an investment were necessary to prove an
inconsistency with the TRIMs Agreement, the Indonesian measures in question fulfil such a condition,
because they necessitate an investment in Indonesia (either as a producer of motor vehicles or motor vehicle
parts) to qualify for the various tax and tariff incentives.
(c) The TRIMs Agreement imposed a new obligation on Indonesia
6.100 Indonesia's argument that because the TRIMs Agreement allegedly merely restates Article III, the
TRIMs Agreement does not give rise to a separate obligation, reflects a fundamental misperception of the
significance of the TRIMs Agreement. It is true that, to an extent, the TRIMs Agreement codifies the GATT
1947 panel jurisprudence concerning Article III:4 arising out of such cases as Italian Tractors, EC Parts and
Components, and FIRA. However, because panel decisions were not, and are still not, stare decisis, Indonesia
was not bound by this jurisprudence. Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, Report of the
Appellate Body adopted 1 November 1996, pages 14-16. By signing the WTO Agreement, Indonesia did
become bound by this jurisprudence, as codified in the TRIMs Agreement. Thus, the TRIMs Agreement
imposed a new obligation on Indonesia.
(d) The notion of lex specialis is irrelevant in this case with respect to the relationship
between Article III and the TRIMs Agreement
6.101 Insofar as the issues in this dispute are concerned, because Indonesia did not notify the measures in
question pursuant to Article 5.1 of the TRIMs Agreement, there are no conflicting obligations between Article
III and the TRIMs Agreement. Thus, the notion of lex specialis is irrelevant.
6.102 Having said that, however, the United States should note that in the Bananas III case, the Panel
found, at para. 7.158, that in the absence of a "conflict" between GATT 1994 and the TRIMs Agreement, both
agreements applied equally. This finding would not have been necessary if the Panel had considered that the
TRIMs Agreement was lex specialis in relationship to GATT 1994.
6.103. More generally, Article III:2, Article III:4, and the TRIMs Agreement each impose legally distinct
obligations on Members, and a single measure may be found to be inconsistent with all three.
30
XIV. FINDINGS
…………….
1. Claims of the complainants
14.10 The various Indonesian measures at issue in this dispute are described in paragraphs 2.3 to 2.43 of
the Descriptive Part of this report. For the purpose of these findings, we shall generally categorize and refer
to the measures as those adopted pursuant to the 1993 car programme, the February 1996 car programme
and the June 1996 car programme. When we refer to the “Indonesian car programmes”, especially in the
discussion on the general relationship between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and Article III of
GATT, we include all the measures adopted pursuant to all three car programmes. When we refer to the
National Car programme we refer to the measures adopted pursuant to the February and June 1996 car
programmes. Our use of these general references is not intended to preclude discussion of the WTO
compatibility of more specific aspects of the various car programmes. We note, however, that Japan
considers that most of Government Regulation No.20/1996 and Government Regulation No. 36/1996 are not
related to the National Car Programme. We also note that Government Regulation No. 36/1996 has affected
the level of benefits under the 1993 car programme.
14.11 We understand from the requests for establishment of the panel that the claims of the complainants
are as follows:
(i) Local-content requirements
14.12 The European Communities and the United States claim that the local content requirements of the
1993 car programme (to which are linked tax benefits for finished motor vehicles incorporating a certain
percentage value of domestic products and customs duty benefits for imported parts and components used in
motor vehicles incorporating a certain percentage value of domestic products) violate the provisions of
Article III:4 of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade of 1994 (hereafter, “GATT”) and Article 2 of the
Agreement on Trade-Related-Investment Measures (hereafter “TRIMs Agreement”).
14.13 Japan, the European Communities and the United States claim that the local content requirements
of the February 1996 car programme (to which are linked tax benefits for National Cars incorporating a
certain percentage value of domestic products and customs duty benefits for imported parts and components
used in National Cars) violate the provisions of Article III:4 of GATT and Article 2 of the TRIMs
Agreement.
2. Indonesia’s general defence
14.27 More specifically, we understand Indonesia’s argument to be two-fold. First, in support of its
defense that the only law applicable to this dispute is the SCM Agreement, Indonesia submits that: …
4. Since Article III is not applicable, the TRIMs Agreement is not applicable.
Second, we understand that Indonesia argues that should Article III and/or the TRIMs Agreement be
considered to apply to this dispute, there are specific conflicts between some of the provisions of the SCM
Agreement, on the one hand, and some provisions of Article III on which the complainants base their claims,
on the other hand. For Indonesia, any and all conflicts should be resolved in favour of the SCM Agreement
which, according to Indonesia, permits the car programmes under examination. We shall first address
Indonesia’s argument that the only law applicable to this dispute is the SCM Agreement.
5. Is the TRIMS Agreement applicable to this dispute?
14.47 Indonesia argues that the TRIMs Agreement is not applicable to this dispute. For Indonesia, since
Article III does not apply to the measures under examination, being in conflict with the SCM Agreement,
31
the TRIMs Agreement does not apply either. Indonesia also argues that its car programmes are subsidies
and therefore cannot be trade-related investment measures.
14.48 We note that we have found above that the provisions of Article III are generally relevant and
applicable to the present dispute. We therefore reject Indonesia's argument that the TRIMS Agreement is
not applicable to the measures under examination because Article III does not apply to those measures. We
must now proceed to examine whether the Indonesian car programmes under examination can be covered at
the same time by the provisions of the TRIMs Agreement and those of the SCM Agreement.
14.49 In considering this issue of whether a measure covered by the SCM Agreement can also be subject
to the obligations contained in the TRIMs Agreement, we need to examine whether there is a general
conflict between the SCM Agreement and the TRIMs Agreement. We note first that the interpretive note to
Annex IA of the WTO Agreement is not applicable to the relationship between the SCM Agreement and the
TRIMs Agreement. The issue of whether there might be a general conflict between the SCM Agreement
and the TRIMs Agreement would therefore need to be examined in the light of the general international law
presumption against conflicts and the fact that under public international law a conflict exists in the narrow
situation of mutually exclusive obligations for provisions that cover the same type of subject matter.
14.50 In this context the fact that the drafters included an express provision governing conflicts between
GATT and the other Annex 1A Agreements, but did not include any such provision regarding the
relationship between the other Annex 1A Agreements, at a minimum reinforces the presumption in public
international law against conflicts. With respect to the nature of obligations, we consider that, with regard to
local content requirements, the SCM Agreement and the TRIMs Agreement are concerned with different
types of obligations and cover different subject matters. In the case of the SCM Agreement, what is
prohibited is the grant of a subsidy contingent on use of domestic goods, not the requirement to use domestic
goods as such. In the case of the TRIMs Agreement, what is prohibited are TRIMs in the form of local
content requirements, not the grant of an advantage, such as a subsidy.
14.51 A finding of inconsistency with Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement can be remedied by removal of
the subsidy, even if the local content requirement remains applicable. By contrast, a finding of
inconsistency with the TRIMs Agreement can be remedied by a removal of the TRIM that is a local content
requirement even if the subsidy continues to be granted. Conversely, for instance, if a Member were to
apply a TRIM (in the form of local content requirement), as a condition for the receipt of a subsidy, the
measure would continue to be a violation of the TRIMs Agreement if the subsidy element were replaced
with some other form of incentive. By contrast, if the local content requirements were dropped, the subsidy
would continue to be subject to the SCM Agreement, although the nature of the relevant discipline under the
SCM Agreement might be affected. Clearly, the two agreements prohibit different measures. We note also
that under the TRIMs Agreement, the advantage made conditional on meeting a local content requirement
may include a wide variety of incentives and advantages, other than subsidies. There is no provision
contained in the SCM Agreement that obliges a Member to violate the TRIMs Agreement, or vice versa.
14.52 We consider that the SCM and TRIMs Agreements cannot be in conflict, as they cover different
subject matters and do not impose mutually exclusive obligations. The TRIMs Agreement and the SCM
Agreement may have overlapping coverage in that they may both apply to a single legislative act, but they
have different foci, and they impose different types of obligations.
14.53 In support of this finding, we agree with the principles developed in the Periodicals and
Bananas III cases concerning the relationship between two WTO agreements at the same level within the
structure of WTO agreements. It was made clear that, while the same measure could be scrutinized both
under GATT and under GATS, the specific aspects of that measure to be examined under each agreement
would be different. In the present case, there are in fact two different, albeit linked, aspects of the car
programmes for which the complainants have raised claims. Some claims relate to the existence of local
content requirements, alleged to be in violation of the TRIMs Agreement, and the other claims relate to the
existence of subsidies, alleged to cause serious prejudice within the meaning of the SCM Agreement.
32
14.54 To respond to an argument raised by Indonesia in the context of its discussion of the relationship
between Article III of GATT and the SCM Agreement, we do not consider that the application of the TRIMs
Agreement to this dispute would reduce the SCM Agreement, and Article 27.3 thereof, to “inutility”. On
the contrary, with Article 27.3 of the SCM Agreement, those subsidy measures of developing countries that
are contingent on compliance with TRIMs (in the form of local content requirement) and that are permitted
during the transition period provided under Article 5 of the TRIMs Agreement, are not prohibited by Article
3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, for the transition period specified in Article 27.3 of the SCM Agreement.
14.55 We find that there is no general conflict between the SCM Agreement and the TRIMs Agreement.
Therefore, to the extent that the Indonesian car programmes are TRIMs and subsidies, both the TRIMs
Agreement and the SCM Agreement are applicable to this dispute.
6. Conclusion
14.56 In view of the above findings, we reject Indonesia’s general defense that the only applicable law to
this dispute is the SCM Agreement. We consider rather that the obligations contained in the WTO
Agreement are generally cumulative, can be complied with simultaneously and that different aspects and
sometimes the same aspects of a legislative act can be subject to various provisions of the WTO Agreement.
14.57 We now turn to the claims of the complainants.
D. Claims of Local Content Requirements
14.58 The European Communities and the United States claim that the 1993 car programme, by providing
for local content requirements linked to tax benefits for finished cars incorporating a certain percentage
value of domestic products, and to customs duty benefits for imported parts and components used in cars
incorporating a certain percentage value of domestic products, violates the provisions of Article 2 of the
TRIMs Agreement, and Article III:4 of the GATT.
14.59 Japan, the European Communities and the United States also claim that the 1996 car programme,
by providing for local content requirements linked to tax benefits for National Cars (which by definition
incorporate a certain percentage value of domestic products), and to customs duty benefits for imported parts
and components used in National Cars, violates the provisions of Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement and
Article III:4 of the GATT.
1. The relationship between the TRIMS Agreement and Article III of GATT
14.60 Since the complainants have raised claims that the local content requirements of the car
programmes violate both the provisions of Article III:4 of GATT and Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, we
must consider which claims to examine first. For Indonesia, this issue does not arise because it argues that
the TRIMs Agreement does not add anything to Article III; it merely interprets Article III, elaborates the
principles developed in the FIRA panel report and applies them to trade-related investment measures. In
deciding which claims to examine first, we must, initially, address the relationship between Article III of
GATT and the TRIMs Agreement.
14.61 In this regard, we note first that on its face the TRIMs Agreement is a fully fledged agreement in
the WTO system. The TRIMs Agreement is not an “Understanding to GATT 1994”, unlike the six
Understandings which form part of the GATT 1994. The TRIMs Agreement and Article III:4 prohibit local
content requirements that are TRIMs and therefore can be said to cover the same subject matter. But when
the TRIMs Agreement refers to “the provisions of Article III”, it refers to the substantive aspects of
Article III; that is to say, conceptually, it is the ten paragraphs of Article III that are referred to in Article 2.1
of the TRIMs Agreement, and not the application of Article III in the WTO context as such. Thus if Article
III is not applicable for any reason not related to the disciplines of Article III itself, the provisions of Article
III remain applicable for the purpose of the TRIMs Agreement. This view is reinforced by the fact that
Article 3 of the TRIMs Agreement contains a distinct and explicit reference to the general exceptions to
33
GATT. If the purpose of the TRIMs Agreement were to refer to Article III as applied in the light of other
(non Article III) GATT rules, there would be no need to refer to such general exceptions.
14.62 Moreover, it has to be recognized that the TRIMs Agreement, in addition to interpreting and
clarifying the provisions of Article III where trade-related investment measures are concerned, has
introduced special transitional provisions including notification requirements. This reinforces the conclusion
that the TRIMs Agreement has an autonomous legal existence, independent from that of Article III.
Consequently, since the TRIMs Agreement and Article III remain two legally distinct and independent sets
of provisions of the WTO Agreement, we find that even if either of the two sets of provisions were not
applicable the other one would remain applicable. And to the extent that complainants have raised separate
and distinct claims under Article III:4 of GATT and the TRIMs Agreement, each claim must be addressed
separately.
14.63 As to which claims, those under Article III:4 of GATT or Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, to
examine first, we consider that we should first examine the claims under the TRIMs Agreement since the
TRIMs Agreement is more specific than Article III:4 as far as the claims under consideration are concerned.
A similar issue was presented in Bananas III, where the Appellate Body discussed the relationship between
Article X of GATT and Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement and concluded that the Licensing Agreement
being more specific it should have been applied first. This is also in line with the approach of the panel and
the Appellate Body in the Hormones dispute, where the measure at issue was examined first under the SPS
Agreement since the measure was alleged to be an SPS measure.
2. The application of the TRIMS Agreement
14.64 Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement provides that
“ ... no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III
or Article XI of GATT 1994.”
By its terms, Article 2.1 requires two elements to be shown to establish a violation thereof: first, the
existence of a TRIM; second, that TRIM is inconsistent with Article III or Article XI of GATT. No claims
have been raised with reference to a violation of Article XI of GATT.
14.65 Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement refers to Article III generally. It is our view that the
complainants have limited their TRIMs inconsistency claims to the aspects of the Indonesian car
programmes that would violate the provisions of the TRIMs Agreement which prohibit any advantage
conditional on meeting local content requirements. In other words, while the complainants have claimed
that some other aspects of the same car programmes also violate the provisions of Article III:2 of GATT,
they have not claimed that the tax discrimination aspects of the measures per se violate the TRIMs
Agreement. Therefore, we will examine under the TRIMs Agreement, only the consistency of the local
content requirements made effective through the custom duty and tax benefits of these car programmes.
Later, we shall examine the consistency of the tax discrimination aspects per se of these car programmes
with the provisions of Article III:2 of GATT.
14.66 We note also that Article 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement provides:
“2.2 An Illustrative List of TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligations of
national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 ... is contained
in the Annex to this Agreement.
14.67 The United States and the European Communities claim that any measure that falls within the
description of Item 1(a) of the Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement constitutes per se a TRIM
inconsistent with Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement. For the United States, if any Member, in whatever
context, requires the purchase by an enterprise of a domestic product in order to obtain an advantage, that
requirement by definition has investment consequences for such an enterprise, bringing the measure within
the coverage of the TRIMs Agreement and confirming its violation thereof. The United States adds that,
34
even if the identification of a relationship to investment were necessary to prove an inconsistency with the
TRIMs Agreement, the Indonesian measures under examination fulfil such a condition, because the
measures necessitate an investment in Indonesia (as a producer of motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts and
components) to qualify for the various tax and customs duty incentives.
14.68 Japan rather argues that two elements must be shown to establish a violation of Article 2 of the
TRIMs Agreement: first, there must be a TRIM; second, the measure in question must be inconsistent with
Article III of GATT (or with Article XI of GATT).
14.69 The European Communities and Japan submit as well that the central aspect of the various
measures included in the Indonesian car programmes is to develop domestic manufacturing capability of
automobiles and automotive parts and components, and that they thereby qualify as “investment” measures.
For these complainants, the Indonesian car programmes are “trade related” because they encourage the use
of domestic over imported parts and thereby affect trade.
14.70 Indonesia argues that, while its subsidies may at times indirectly affect investment decisions of the
recipient of the subsidy or other parties, these decisions are not the object, but rather the unintended result,
of the subsidy. Indonesia adds that many subsidies will result indirectly in increased investment. Indonesia
adds that these subsidies have not been adopted as investment regulations. Therefore, for Indonesia, the
measures under examination are not trade-related investment measures. Indonesia also supports the
argument put forward by India, a third party, that the TRIMs Agreement is basically designed to govern and
provide a level playing field for foreign investment, and that therefore measures relating to internal taxes or
subsidies cannot be construed to be trade-related investment measures.
14.71 We note that the arguments presented by the parties reflect different views on whether any
requirement by an enterprise to purchase or use a domestic product in order to obtain an advantage, by
definition falls within the Illustrative List or whether the TRIMs Agreement requires a separate analysis of
the nature of a measure as a trade-related investment measure before proceeding to an examination of
whether the measure is covered by the Illustrative List. However, if we were to consider that the measures
in dispute in this case are in any event trade-related investment measures, it would not be necessary to
decide this basic issue of interpretation. We note in this regard that the United States and the European
Communities have also argued in the alternative that, even if it is necessary to show a relationship of a
measure to investment, any such requirement would be satisfied in the case under consideration.
14.72 Therefore, we will first determine whether the Indonesian measures are TRIMs. To this end, we
address initially the issue of whether the measures at issue are “investment measures”. Next, we consider
whether they are “trade-related”. Finally, we shall examine whether any measure found to be a TRIM is
inconsistent with the provisions of Article III and thus violates the TRIMs Agreement.
(a) Are the Indonesian measures “investment measures”?
14.73 We note that the use of the broad term "investment measures" indicates that the TRIMs Agreement
is not limited to measures taken specifically in regard to foreign investment. Contrary to India’s argument,
we find that nothing in the TRIMs Agreement suggests that the nationality of the ownership of enterprises
subject to a particular measure is an element in deciding whether that measure is covered by the Agreement.
We therefore find without textual support in the TRIMs Agreement the argument that since the TRIMs
Agreement is basically designed to govern and provide a level playing field for foreign investment,
measures relating to internal taxes or subsides cannot be construed to be a trade-related investment measure.
We recall in this context that internal tax advantages or subsidies are only one of many types of advantages
which may be tied to a local content requirement which is a principal focus of the TRIMs Agreement. The
TRIMs Agreement is not concerned with subsidies and internal taxes as such but rather with local content
requirements, compliance with which may be encouraged through providing any type of advantage. Nor, in
any case, do we see why an internal measure would necessarily not govern the treatment of foreign
investment.
35
14.74 We next consider whether the Indonesian measures are investment measures. In this regard, we
consider the following extracts (emphases added) from the official Indonesian legislation relevant and
instructive.
14.75 With regard to the 1993 car programme, we note:
- The “considerations section” of the Decree of the Ministry of Industry
announcing the 1993 car programme states:
“a. that within the framework of supporting and promoting the
development of the automotive industry and/or the component industry
in the future, it is deemed necessary to regulate the local content levels
of domestically produced motor vehicles or components in connection
with the grant of incentives in the imposition of import duty rates;
b. that in order to further strengthen domestic industrial development by
taking into account the trend of technological advance and the increase
of the capability and mastering of industrial design and engineering, it
is necessary to improve the relevant existing regulations already laid
down;”
- The "considerations section" of the 1995 amendment to the 1993 car programme
states:
“That in the framework of further promoting of the development of the
motor vehicles industry and /or domestically produced components, it is
considered necessary to amend...”
14.76 With regard to the February 1996 car programme, we note the following:
- The title of the Presidential Instruction for the National Car programme (No.2) is
“The Development of the National Automobile Industry”.
- Paragraph a) of the “Considering” section of the Government Regulation No.20 states:
“that in the effort to promote the growth of the domestic automotive
industry, it is deemed necessary to enact regulations concerning the
Sales Tax on Luxury Goods upon the delivery of domestically produced
motor vehicles”.
- In addition, the State Minister for Mobilization of Investment Funds/Chairman of the
Investment Coordinating Board issued a decree entitled “Investment Regulations within the
Framework of the Realisation of the Establishment of the National Automobile Industry” which
emphasized that the new measures were intended to promote investment, stating in its fifth
considering:
“5. that it is therefore necessary to issue a decree for the regulation
of investment in the national automobile industry.”
- Article 2 of that same Investment Regulation by the Minister of State for
Mobilization of Investment Funds/Chairman of the Investment Coordinating Board
provides:
“In order to realise the development of the national automobile industry
as meant in Article 1:
36
1. ...
2. In the endeavour to realise the development of such national car
industry, the investment approval will be issued to the automobile
industry sector with tax facilities in accordance with legal provisions
enacted specifically for such purpose.”
- The Decision relating to the investment facilities regarding the Determination of PT.
Timor Putra National to Establish and Produce a National Car, entitled “Decision of the State
Minister for the Mobilization of Investment Funds/Chairman of the Capital Investment Coordinating
Board” states:
“1. That in implementing a national car industry it is deemed
necessary to determine investment approval for a car industry which will
build and produce a national car.
2. That in the framework of investment for the car industry,
PT.Timor Putra National has submitted an application and working
program to build a national car industry and has obtained domestic
investment approval (PMDN) NO.607/PMDN/1995, dated 9 November
1995”.
14.77 With regard to the June 1996 car programme, we note that the “Considering” section of the Decree
of the President of the Republic No. 4267 on the Extension (June) to the February 1996 car programme
provides:
“a. that the development of the national car is aimed at improving
the nation’s self-reliance ... and to achieve this solid preparations and
continuous support are necessary;
b. that the preparation for domestic production of national cars
require the availability of huge financing and therefore will be carried
out in stages;
c. that in connection with the preparations, it is considered
necessary to establish a policy on the implementation stage of the
production of national cars.”
- The “Considering” section of the Government Regulation No. 3667 states:
“That within the framework of promoting the development of the
automotive industry in the increased use of domestically produced
automotive components, it is deemed necessary to grant Sales Tax on
Luxury Goods facilities to the group of luxury goods upon delivery of
certain motor vehicles”
- The Elucidation to the Government Regulation No. 36 states:
“Within the framework of speeding up the realisation of production of
national motor vehicles using domestically made automotive
components, it is necessary to promote the domestic automotive industry
in order to further its growth particularly in the face of global
competition. One of the endeavours which can be exerted is the
provision of a tax incentive in the form of exemption from the
assessment of Sales Tax on Luxury Goods on the delivery of certain
motor vehicles which have achieved certain levels of local content.”
14.78 We note also that Indonesia indicates that the objectives of the National Car programme include the
following:
37
- To improve the competitiveness of local companies and strengthen overall industrial development;
- To develop the capacity of multiple-source auto parts and components;
- To encourage the development of the automotive industry and the automotive component industry;
- To bring about major structural changes in the Indonesian automobile industry;
- To encourage the transfer of technology and contribute to large-scale job creation;
- To encourage car companies to increase their local content, resulting in a rapid growth of
investment in the automobile industry.
14.79 Indonesia has also stated that PT TPN is a “domestic capital investment company”.
14.80 On the basis of our reading of these measures applied by Indonesia under the 1993 and the 1996 car
programmes, which have investment objectives and investment features and which refer to investment
programmes, we find that these measures are aimed at encouraging the development of a local
manufacturing capability for finished motor vehicles and parts and components in Indonesia. Inherent to
this objective is that these measures necessarily have a significant impact on investment in these sectors.
For this reason, we consider that these measures fall within any reasonable interpretation of the term
“investment measures”. We do not intend to provide an overall definition of what constitutes an investment
measure. We emphasize that our characterization of the measures as “investment measures” is based on an
examination of the manner in which the measures at issue in this case relate to investment. There may be
other measures which qualify as investment measures within the meaning of the TRIMs Agreement because
they relate to investment in a different manner.
14.81 With respect to the arguments of Indonesia that the measures at issue are not investment measures
because the Indonesian Government does not regard the programmes as investment programmes and
because the measures have not been adopted by the authorities responsible for investment policy, we believe
that there is nothing in the text of the TRIMs Agreement to suggest that a measure is not an investment
measure simply on the grounds that a Member does not characterize the measure as such, or on the grounds
that the measure is not explicitly adopted as an investment regulation. In any event, we note that some of
the regulations and decisions adopted pursuant to these car programmes were adopted by investment bodies.
(b) Are the Indonesian measures “trade-related”?
14.82 We now have to determine whether these investment measures are “trade-related”. We consider
that, if these measures are local content requirements, they would necessarily be “trade-related” because
such requirements, by definition, always favour the use of domestic products over imported products, and
therefore affect trade.
(c) Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement
14.83 An examination of whether these measures are covered by Item (1) of the Illustrative List of
TRIMs annexed to the TRIMs Agreement, which refers amongst other situations to measures with local
content requirements, will not only indicate whether they are trade-related but also whether they are
inconsistent with Article III:4 and thus in violation of Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement.
14.84 The Annex to the TRIMs Agreement reads as follows:
“ANNEX
ILLUSTRATIVE LIST
1. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for
in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or
enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which
is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any
domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of
38
volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its
local production;”
14.85 We note that all the various decrees and regulations implementing the Indonesian car programmes
operate in the same manner. They provide for tax advantages on finished motor vehicles using a certain
percentage value of local content and additional customs duty advantages on imports of parts and
components to be used in finished motor vehicles using a certain percentage value of local content. We also
note that under the June 1996 car programme, the local content envisaged in the February 1996 car
programme could be performed through an undertaking by the foreign producer of National Cars to counterpurchase
Indonesian parts and components.
14.86 For instance, the Decision to issue the Decree of the Minister of Industry Concerning The
Determination of Local Content Levels of Domestically Made Motor Vehicles or Components attached to
the Decree of the Ministry of Industry announcing the 1993 car programme states in its Article 2:
“(1) The Automotive Industry and/or the Components Industry may obtain certain
Incentives within the framework of importing needed Components, Sub-Components,
basic materials and semi-Finished Goods, originating in one source as well as various
sources (multi sourcing), if the production has reached/can achieve certain Local Content
levels. (...)
(3) The Local Content levels of domestically made Motor Vehicles and/or
Components which are eligible for Incentives including their Incentive rates shall be those
listed in Attachment I to this decree.” (emphasis added)
The Instruction of the President of the Republic of Indonesia No.2 of 1996 of the National Car programme
(dated 19 February 1998) states in its “INSTRUCT ... SECONDLY:
“WITHIN the framework of establishment of the National Car Industry:
1. The Minister of Industry and Trade will foster, guide and grant facilities in
accordance with provisions of laws in effect such that the national car industry:
a. uses a brand name of its own;
b. uses components produced domestically as much as
possible;
c. is able to export its products.” (emphasis added)
More specifically Regulation No. 20/1996 established the following sales tax structure where passenger cars
of more than 1600cc and jeeps with local content of less than 60% would pay 35% tax; passenger cars of
less than 1600cc, jeeps with local content of more than 60%, and light commercial vehicles (other than jeeps
using gas) would pay 20% tax; and National Cars would pay 0% tax. We recall that one of the requirements
for designation as a “National Car” is that the local content rate must be 20% at the end of the first year,
40% at the end of the second year and 60% at the end of the third year.
14.87 We also note with reference to the June 1996 car programme, that the Decree of the President of the
Republic of Indonesia Number 42 of 1996 on the production of National Cars provides in Article 1:
“National Cars which are made overseas by Indonesian workers and fulfil the local content
stipulated by the Minister of Industry and Trade will be treated equally to those made in
Indonesia.”
The Decree of the Minister of Industry and Trade adopted pursuant to this Presidential Decree 42 states in
Articles 1, 2 and 3:
“Article 1
39
Within the framework of preparations, the production of national cars can be carried out
overseas for a one-time maximum period of 1 (one) year on the condition that Indonesian
made parts and components are used.
Article 2
The procurement of Indonesian made parts and components shall be performed through a
system of counter purchase of parts and components of motor vehicles by the overseas
company carrying out the production and reexporting of national cars to Indonesia.
Article 3
The value of the Counter purchase referred to in Article 2 shall be fixed at the minimum of
25% (twenty-five percent) of the import value of the national cars assembled abroad (C&F
value)”.
14.88 We believe that under these measures compliance with the provisions for the purchase and use of
particular products of domestic origin is necessary to obtain the tax and customs duty benefits on these car
programmes, as referred to in Item 1(a) of the Illustrative List of TRIMs.
14.89 We need now to decide whether these tax and customs duty benefits are “advantages” in the
meaning of the chapeau of paragraph 1 of that Illustrative List. In the context of the claims under Article
III:4 of GATT, Indonesia has argued that the reduced customs duties are not internal regulations and as
such cannot be covered by the wording of Article III:4. We do not consider that the matter before us in
connection with Indonesia’s obligations under the TRIMs Agreement is the customs duty relief as such but
rather the internal regulations, i.e. the provisions on purchase and use of domestic products, compliance with
which is necessary to obtain an advantage, which advantage here is the customs duty relief. The lower duty
rates are clearly “advantages” in the meaning of the chapeau of the Illustrative List to the TRIMs Agreement
and as such, we find that the Indonesian measures fall within the scope of the Item 1 of the Illustrative List
of TRIMs.
14.90 Indonesia also argues that the local content requirements of its car programmes do not constitute
classic local content requirements within the meaning of the FIRA panel (which involved a binding contract
between the investor and the Government of Canada) because they leave companies free to decide from
which source to purchase parts and components. We note that the Indonesian producers or assemblers of
motor vehicles (or motor vehicle parts) must satisfy the local content targets of the relevant measures in
order to take advantage of the customs duty and tax benefits offered by the Government. The wording of the
Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement makes it clear that a simple advantage conditional on the use of
domestic goods is considered to be a violation of Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement even if the local content
requirement is not binding as such. We note in addition that this argument has also been rejected in the
Panel Report on Parts and Components.
14.91 We thus find that the tax and tariff benefits contingent on meeting local requirements under these
car programmes constitute “advantages”. Given this and our earlier analysis of whether these local content
requirements are TRIMs and covered by the Illustrative List annexed to the TRIMs Agreement, we further
find that they are in violation of Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement.
14.92 We note that a violation of Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement may be justified under Articles 3, 4
or 5 of the TRIMs Agreement. However, Indonesia has not invoked any of the general exceptions of GATT
as referred to in Article 3 of the TRIMs Agreement, nor the provisions available to developing countries
referred to in Article 4. In addition, Indonesia does not claim that the measures in dispute benefit from the
transitional period under Article 5 of the TRIMs Agreement.
…….
XV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
15.1 In the light of the findings above,
(a) We conclude that the local content requirements of the 1993 and of the 1996 February car
programmes to which are linked (i) sales tax benefits on finished motor vehicles incorporating a certain
40
percentage value of domestic products or on National Cars and (ii) customs duty benefits for imported parts
and components used in finished motor vehicles incorporating a certain percentage value of domestic
products or used in National Cars violate the provisions of Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement.
(b) We conclude that the sales tax discrimination aspects of the 1993 and the February and June 1996
car programmes in favour of domestic motor vehicles incorporating a certain percentage value of domestic
products and National Cars violate the provisions of Article III:2 of GATT.
(c) We conclude that the customs duty and sales tax benefits of the June 1996 car programme in favour
of imported National Cars and the customs duty benefits of the February 1996 car programme in favour of
imported parts and components to be used in National Cars assembled in Indonesia violate Article I of
GATT.
(d) We conclude that the European Communities have demonstrated by positive evidence that
Indonesia has caused, through the use of specific subsidies provided pursuant to the National Car
programme, serious prejudice to the interests of the European Communities within the meaning of Article
5(c) of the SCM Agreement.
(e) We conclude that the United States has not demonstrated by positive evidence that Indonesia has
caused, through the use of specific subsidies provided pursuant to the National Car programme, serious
prejudice to the interests of the United States within the meaning of Article 5(c) of the SCM Agreement.
(f) We conclude that Indonesia has not violated Article 28.2 of the SCM Agreement.
(g) We conclude that the United States has not demonstrated that Indonesia is in breach of its
obligations under Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement in respect of the acquisition of trademark rights or the
maintenance of trademark rights or in respect of the use of trademarks specifically addressed in Article 20 of
the TRIPS Agreement nor has it demonstrated that measures have been taken that reduce the degree of
consistency with the provisions of Article 20 and which would therefore be in violation of Indonesia's
obligations under Article 65.5 of the TRIPS Agreement.
15.2 Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is infringement of the obligations assumed
under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or
impairment of benefits under that agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that to the extent that Indonesia has
acted inconsistently with the provisions of covered agreements, as described in the preceding paragraph, it
has nullified or impaired the benefits accruing to the complainants under those agreements.
15.3 With respect to the conclusion of serious prejudice to the interests of the European
Communities, Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement provides that, “[w]here a panel report or an Appellate
Body report is adopted in which it is determined that any subsidy has resulted in adverse effects to the
interests of another Member within the meaning of Article 5, the Member granting or maintaining the
subsidy shall take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or shall withdraw the subsidy.”
15.4 The Panel recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request Indonesia to bring its
measures into conformity with its obligations under the WTO Agreement.
__________

   

   


   










   

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